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Preface 
 
 
It feels like an eternity ago (and truth to be told, it’s not much less) when a young, 
idealistic graduate chanced upon a vacancy for a junior researcher to support a 
project by the European Commission on future European climate policy in 
Amsterdam. What followed was a job interview with very friendly and inspiring 
future colleagues in beautiful Amsterdam spring weather, with the sunshine glittering 
over the canals, and a very intuitive, not entirely thought-through decision to ‘dig 
deeper’ in climate policy issues than I thought was possible in policy-making, my 
initial career choice, and to become a researcher instead.  
The consequence was a stint in the lowlands much longer than initially envisaged, 
with high points and low points, lots of things learned, but most of all, beautiful 
memories and important friendships which will hopefully last for a lifetime. The 
ADAM project, which initially kept me busy at IVM, proved to be a behemoth among 
the European research projects, and coordinating remotely across four countries on 
how to conduct a meta-analysis of European climate policy evaluations turned out 
more challenging than initially expected. Alongside I went on a quest for a PhD topic 
that lent itself to being completed next to working on different project deliverables. 
The idea to focus on games as a means to stimulate learning on climate policy 
immediately appealed to me, having had a passion for board games and for bringing 
different people together since childhood. The ADAM project and later on the REDD-
ALERT project, which focused on ways to reduce emissions from deforestation in the 
tropics, provided the setting for conducting the two policy exercises that are at the 
heart of this book. Designing and organizing them has been both exciting and nerve-
wrecking, and I learned a lot in the process. I also learned a lot about things that were 
more alien to my background, such as social science theory and methods. But 
perhaps the biggest learning experience was about me and myself.  I am not sure 
these were always things I wanted to know, and as they make risky material for 
anything published during my lifetime, I will stop navel-gazing right here and turn to 
those who escorted and supported me. 
Turning to the people who were part of this process, my promotors Frans Berkhout 
and Dave Huitema deserve a huge thank you. Dave was ‘in the trenches’ with me, 
acted as an intellectual sparring partner, – the reading clubs on various issues will 
remain a cherished memory! – encouraged me patiently, and cheered me on to make 
progress on the PhD rather than getting too distracted with other publications and 
project work. Dave, I know I strained your patience towards the end of this project, 
but I hope that, despite the Dutch notoriety for bluntness, you lack the audacity to 
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disagree with an authority such as Shakespeare: all’s well that ends well. Frans, with 
inimitable diplomatic skills and knack for a birds-eye perspective, was a perfect 
complement to Dave, encouraging me with constructive high-level feedback, and 
helping rebuild confidence when necessary. Thanks again to both of you. 
Several people generously provided support in the realm of gaming-simulation and 
without them my policy exercises would not have seen the light of day. Professor Igor 
Mayer kindly invited me to follow an inspiring course on game design at TU Delft, 
which provided much of the game design fundamentals required for this thesis. A 
research stay with Professor Ted Parson at the University of Michigan allowed me to 
gain important insights into policy exercises, as Ted generously shared his insights 
and experience with me. Conversations with Ferenc Toth further helped me to 
understand the ideas behind this method and served to better delineate my choice of 
topic. Particularly big credit is due to Ivo Wenzler, who took time out of his busy 
consultant life to help me develop the design for the first exercise and who then did 
an excellent job facilitating it.  
Developing a game rests as much on design skills as on an in-depth understanding of 
the policy area it seeks to simulate. For the exercise on burden-sharing in EU climate 
policy, sincere thanks go to the rest of the work package team on EU policy and 
governance in the ADAM project – Frans Berkhout, Dave Huitema, Harro van Asselt 
and Eric Massey from IVM, Andy Jordan and Tim Rayner from the University of East 
Anglia, Johannes Stripple and Roger Hildingsson from Lund, and Suvi Monni from JRC 
in Ispra. Together, we worked hard to unravel the key ‘attention points’ and 
‘dilemmas’ in European climate governance. Special thanks in this context to Andy 
Jordan, the indefatigable editor-in-chief of our opus magnum on the topic, whose 
skills in ‘cutting dead wood’ continue to amaze and inspire. Credit is also due to many 
interviewees who generously shared their expert insights and process knowledge into 
the issue of burden-sharing / effort-sharing, which helped inform the design of my 
policy exercise.  
The REDD-ALERT project subsequently allowed me to broaden my climate policy 
focus to tropical deforestation, an issue whose complexities extend far beyond the 
‘traditional’ realm of climate governance. Interesting field trips to Indonesia and Peru 
offered an initial first-hand glimpse into the realities of deforesting countries, and 
inspiring discussions with our project partners – amongst others Eric Lambin, Robin 
Matthews, Patrick Meyfroidt, Peter Minang, Meine van Noordwijk, and Lou Verchot – 
further helped me get a grasp of the multiple challenges involved in tackling 
deforestation. A research stay as a YSSP fellow at the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria provided the necessary focus to delve 
head-on into the literature on this topic – thanks to my IIASA supervisors Michael 
Obersteiner and Florian Kraxner for hosting me, and to fellow YSSPers for many 
helpful discussions and feedback. Last but not least, I am grateful to Joyeeta Gupta, 
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the project leader of our REDD-ALERT work package, who made space in the work 
package to accommodate my policy exercise, and to Emmy Bergsma who ‘covered’ 
for me other aspects of the REDD-ALERT project work. Finally, as in the ADAM 
exercise on burden-sharing, many interviewees generously gave their time and 
informed the design of the policy exercise with valuable insights and different 
perspectives on the topic.  
Measuring learning from interactive appraisals was the bold ambition underlying this 
thesis. A reading club involving Dave, Eric Massey and Gert Becker not only allowed 
for diverse culinary discoveries but also helped sharpen my initial research focus by 
provoking a critical reflection on the prevalent concepts and typologies, and the 
dearth of robust evaluations in this area. A workshop on social learning organised by 
Stockholm Environment Institute gave a further important boost through helpful 
discussions on learning with a range of experts. The most important offspring of the 
workshop was a collaborative project with Ryan Plummer, Julia Baird and Kerrie 
Pickering at Brock University in Canada. Their interest in our methodology and 
subsequent application to an interactive appraisal process in Ontario not only led 
Dave and me to discover Ontario’s wineries and the Niagara Falls, but also set in 
motion a valuable feedback loop that helped advance our typology and evaluation 
framework and refine the analysis in this thesis. Inside IVM, conversations with 
Belinda McFadgen, Eric Massey, Stefania Munaretto, Harro van Asselt and Eleftheria 
Vasileiadou, amongst others, were equally helpful in clarifying and consolidating the 
ideas put forward in this thesis.  
A fundamental precondition for a successful policy game is the right set of 
participants. I am immensely grateful to the experts some of whom travelled from 
afar to take part in what to them must have appeared a rather exotic event, and who 
launched themselves into the experience with great motivation and energy. I am 
even more grateful for their concept maps, completed surveys and follow-up 
interviews. Without them, I would have had nothing to analyse and write about. 
Great thanks are also due to the all the Master’s students who participated in the 
exercises with enthusiasm, and for their completion of the attendant evaluation 
material. I was surprised time and again how quickly they familiarised themselves 
with the topics at hand and made them their own. Léa Bigot, Felix von Blücher, 
Verena Ommer, Hye Young Shin and Timme van Melle played an important part in 
assisting the preparation and running of the policy exercises, and I thank them for 
their commitment and efforts. 
For a long time, the biggest construction site in my thesis research was the statistical 
analysis of my data. Tom Louwerse from Leiden University is my hero here, who 
patiently explained statistical concepts and methods, and provided helpful feedback 
to ensure that both analysis and reporting of the results were sound. IVM colleagues 
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Joop de Boer and Eleftheria Vasileiadou were equally very generous with advice on 
specific questions and issues.  
Amidst the distractions of project work, other publications and private life, it wasn’t 
always easy to find the necessary focus for long stretches of concentrated writing. 
Gigi and Niko & Carolin provided very welcome refuge for two writing exiles in the 
Austrian mountains and in Berlin, respectively. Generations of office mates on the 
other hand, from Thijs, Pieter and Stijn, to Derek, Aschalew, Boris, Elko, and finally 
Nicolien provided pleasant company while working and joined in for the necessary 
breaks to survive the day. Chats, coffee breaks and borrels with great friends and 
colleagues, including of course my esteemed paranimfen Eric and Harro, but also 
Hans, Eleftheria, Aysem, Sander, Agni, Mairon, Hanna, Annick, Stefania, Belinda, 
Farhad, Oskar, Heather, Jason, Justin, Trond, Emma, Brenden, Marthe, Julia, Philipp 
G., Patricia, Suzan, Tineke and Els, and many others, were equally a very important 
part of the excellent working culture at IVM. Last but not least, I would like to thank 
Frank Biermann, EPA department head, for his continuous support and faith in my 
abilities throughout my years at IVM. Unfortunately, the Shakespeare quote above 
does not apply to IVM’s fate, but I am grateful that I could experience the inspiring, 
interdisciplinary culture of the Institute at its best and am sad that future generations 
of PhD students may not have this privilege.   
The good friends I made during my years in Amsterdam will hopefully accompany me 
for a long time. Julia & Sebastiaan, Masha, Sofia, Eleni, Harro, Eric & Sabina, Ralph & 
Willeke, Laurens & Silvia, Philipp & Xenia, Marieke & Arjan, Derek – I am so glad we 
met and will meet again. Our doors in Berlin are always open to you.  
Mami & Papi – thank you for giving me the opportunity to go out into the world and 
explore, and for always supporting me in my ventures. Now having a family of my 
own, I value the loving base you have provided even more.  
Lucia, you’ll be glad to hear that there is no more ominous ‘book to write’ standing in 
between you and joint visits to the playground or the zoo. I love you and am proud of 
the confident little girl that you have become – and of course thank you for being my 
cover artist. 
Benni, you will be so relieved to see this book finished. It has tested both of us and I 
cannot thank you enough for mustering the patience to keep encouraging me until 
the end. I love you and enjoy (almost) every moment we spend together. I cannot 
wait to see what life has in store for us next.  
.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Environmental problems and complexity 
Environmental protection and restoration are not technically overwhelming – 
we probably had less of the requisite know-how for putting a craft on the moon 
in the 1950s than we do for solving major environmental problems today. In our 
society, environmental problems are democratic dilemmas. The Age of Ecology 
requires us to build seemingly impossible bridges: somehow hundreds of 
millions of individual actors must learn the ecological consequences of their 
behavior, and somehow they must use their knowledge to choose wisely 
between painful trade-offs (Press, 1994, 1). 
Much has been written about the complexity of environmental issues and of the 
challenges associated with governing them. The characterisation of environmental 
problems as ‘wicked’ (Rittel & Webber, 1973), ‘messy’ (Ackoff, 1974) or ‘ill-structured’ 
(Geurts & Vennix, 1989; Mason & Mitroff, 1981) has become so pervasive that it is 
difficult to imagine any contemporary policy issue not being labelled as such. In an 
attempt to pin down the core of the complexity notion, Axelrod & Cohen (1999, 7) 
argue that a system is complex ‘when there are strong interactions among its 
elements, so that current events heavily influence the probabilities of many kinds of 
later events’. This rings true for both the cognitive or analytical and the social 
dimension of complexity. Clark (1986) has characterised these two dimensions by 
resorting to the metaphor of the earth as a garden: not only is it difficult to 
determine what kind of garden is possible (analytical complexity), but also what 
garden we actually want (social complexity). Analytical complexity relates to the lack 
of certainty of knowledge surrounding complex issues (Roelofs, 2000). Variables 
characterising the problem are interrelated and subject to multiple feedback loops, 
problems themselves are interrelated, and available choices for intervention, their 
impacts and possible side-effects are uncertain or rapidly changing. Environmental 
problems are also complex socially. Interests diverge between those responsible and 
those affected. Perceptions differ on the causes of a problem and what should be 
done about it, resulting in political conflicts. The differing underlying values that are 
at the root of these disagreements are an inherent part of this latter dimension 
(Hickson, 1986; Roelofs, 2000). 
Even if the label of a ´complex problem´ may sometimes be too readily used, few 
would doubt that this characterisation applies to global environmental change issues, 
and particularly to climate change. To Jordan et al. (2010, 4), the latter represents a 
wicked issue ‘par excellence’ and Levin et al. (2012, 123ff) even call it ‘super-wicked’. 
Challenges relating to time and scale loom especially large in the context of climate 
change. Given current emission trends and the possibility and likelihood of reaching 
unexpected tipping points (Stocker et al., 2013), taking action is urgent, and 
Introduction 
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humankind cannot afford to wait until all uncertainties and value disagreements have 
been resolved. Yet planning for climate change often goes beyond the time horizon 
of policy-makers or organisations, and some impacts will not be felt for a long time to 
come. In terms of scale, effective mitigation (reduction of greenhouse gas emissions) 
requires behavioural changes from actors around the globe, creating significant 
collective actions problems. This also implies major equity dilemmas. The adverse 
effects of climate change will be most dire for those in the global South that have 
hardly contributed to it. At the same time, most large emitters can shield themselves 
relatively well from climate impacts.  
The need to deal with complex environmental problems has not been without 
consequences for the realms of policy and scientific research. For both, it has 
exposed the limits of traditional ‘rational’, unitary approaches and led to the 
involvement of new actor groups into core processes of knowledge production and 
governing. For science, the difficulty of unambiguously defining complex problems 
and of determining the relevant variables has led to calls for reviews of scientific 
processes and outcomes by an ‘extended peer community’ (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 
1993, 753). This model of knowledge production, also referred to as ‘mode two 
science’ (Gibbons et al., 1994), emphasises the need for input from scientists from 
other disciplines and stakeholders to enhance the social robustness of the research 
being conducted.  
In the realm of policy, there is now widespread recognition that, in addition to public 
policies (actions taken by governments in response to specific circumstances, with 
the overarching objective to expand the public good, see e.g. Howlett, 2011), it is 
governance approaches – rule-making in a variety of forms, from regulatory to 
network- and market-based, and by a variety of actors, public, hybrid and private – 
that are shaping the responses to contemporary environmental problems. And even 
where the government is the dominant actor, the importance of stakeholder-driven 
processes to inform relevant choices and decisions is increasingly recognised. These 
trends raise several questions as to their normative implications and practical 
implementation. Yet their significance cannot be overestimated. They are rooted in 
the notion that a good way of characterising the simultaneous processes of sense-
making and social negotiation is as learning. And that, given the analytical and social 
complexity of environmental problems, there is a need for such learning to go above 
and beyond what traditional modes of learning have been able to deliver (Armitage 
et al., 2009; Keen et al., 2005; Parson & Clark, 1995).  
The assumption that the processes necessary to effectively govern complex 
environmental problems can be characterised as learning is the starting point for this 
thesis. The emerging architecture of assessments, appraisals and engagement 
processes around environmental issues represents an attempt at building learning 
processes into environmental governance that are more structured and collaborative 
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and that help integrate the plurality of relevant views, norms, facts and uncertainties 
into decision-making. Yet while such processes have been implemented frequently 
over the past years, in different contexts and at different scales (Turnpenny et al., 
2009), there has been little systematic evaluation of the resulting learning effects. In 
this thesis, we aim to make headway with closing this gap in the literature by 
developing a robust, empirically workable conceptualisation of learning in and for 
environmental governance and a set of instruments to measure it. More specifically, 
we examine the learning effects of the policy exercise, a sub-form of simulation 
games that has repeatedly been used in a global change context and that has been 
associated with significant learning effects in the literature.  
The following sections address the need for learning in environmental governance 
and scholarly interest in the concept (1.2), outline different approaches to learning in 
environmental governance (1.3) and review difficulties with its conceptualisation and 
measurement (1.4). Section 1.5 presents the research questions and the approach 
taken in this thesis to address them. Section 1.6 contains an outline of the rest of this 
book.  
1.2 The need for learning 
The first to use the term ‘learning our way out’ of unsustainability was arguably 
Lester Milbrath. He used it as the title of his 1989 book, which was among the first to 
connect social learning and sustainable development (Milbrath, 1989). Since, it has 
become the standard recommendation for dealing with complex environmental 
problems; also the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) calls ‘the 
institutionalization of learning among actors […] an important aspect of success’ in 
developing more robust international climate policy (Stavins et al., 2014, 1010). 
Learning is needed regarding both the analytical and the social dimension of 
complexity: it is as much about gaining insights into drivers, dynamics and impacts of 
environmental problems and possible ways of addressing them as it is about 
understanding possible opposition to certain solutions, its implications and feasible 
alternatives. Learning will have to happen across multiple levels of governance and 
across the society as a whole, extending from the individual to local communities, 
corporations and public actors. Yet doing so successfully also requires more thorough 
study of learning processes themselves – how they can be triggered, what their 
dynamics are, and how their results can be consolidated (Blackmore, 2007; Lee, 1999; 
Leeuwis & Pyburn, 2002).  
Scholars in the policy sciences have been interested in the notion of learning in policy 
(or ‘policy learning’ or ‘policy-oriented learning’, as some prefer to call it) for some 
time. It is part of the larger debate on the role of power, interests and ideas in policy-
making. Despite Max Weber’s famous quote emphasising the role of ideas, which 
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‘like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the 
dynamic of interest’ (Weber, 2007 [1946], 280), early public policy theorists explained 
policy change through a primarily conflict-based lens – as a power struggle between 
different interests in the policy arena (Easton, 1953, 1965; cf. Freeman, 2006; Grin & 
Loeber, 2006; Parsons, 1995).  
Only from the 1960s onwards theorists increasingly acknowledged that changes in 
policy may also be rooted in shifts at the ideational level, and found the concept of 
learning to be of added value in explaining these processes. Those in power may 
incorporate new ideas or lessons learned from previous experience or other 
countries into their day-to-day activities (Etheredge, 1981; Heclo, 1974; Schön, 1973), 
or their paradigms and values may change as a result of broader shifts in society (Hall, 
1993). At an empirical level, Freeman (2006) attributes the increased interest in 
learning among policy-makers in the 1960s and 70s to two factors. First, the rapid 
social, political, economic and technological changes taking place led to a rising sense 
of uncertainty about appropriate governmental interventions. Second, there was a 
growing awareness that policy problems and possible solutions might be similar 
across countries, and that looking beyond national borders to compare experiences 
and learn from each other might prove beneficial. The following section delves in 
more detail into different approaches to learning in environmental governance.  
1.3 Approaches to learning in environmental governance 
At the most basic level, learning in environmental policy occurs ad hoc, as policy-
makers or other actors react to outside events and stimuli, and adjust their actions on 
this basis (Kingdon, 1984; Lindblom, 1959). This learning can be based on direct 
experience or can build on observations from other policy domains, other countries 
or different points in time (May, 1992). While beneficial in many instances, it may not 
be sufficient for dealing with the multiple facets of complex environmental problems 
as outlined above. Nonetheless, from an analytical viewpoint, it is worthwhile 
examining this ´default´ mode of learning as it unfolds in practice, for instance by 
means of process tracing approaches, with a view to identifying driving forces and 
conditioning factors (Busenberg, 2001; Nilsson, 2005).  
The recognition that complex environmental problems may require specific methods 
to trigger learning is at the basis of the literature on adaptive management, and, 
more recently, adaptive co-management. Proponents of adaptive management 
emphasise the benefits of ‘learning by doing’ (Holling, 1978; Lee, 1993, 1999). They 
acknowledge that policy-makers know little in advance about the effects of their 
interventions and thus emphasise the importance of incorporating the lessons 
learned into the next iteration of planning. They call for treating these interventions 
as large-scale experiments, with an emphasis on monitoring and evaluation, and also 
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on policy termination if necessary (Walters & Holling, 1990). Adaptive co-
management adds to this a focus on the role of communities and stakeholders in 
managing natural resources and to the importance of horizontal and vertical linkages 
in policy-making (Armitage et al., 2008; Armitage et al., 2009). Adaptive co-
management has been heralded by its proponents as an appropriate strategy for 
dealing with the uncertainties and complexities inherent in environmental change. 
Yet authors have also highlighted problems associated with its implementation 
(Gregory et al., 2006). For one, it may be more suited to smaller-scale interventions 
that lend themselves to centralised monitoring. Secondly, while entirely in the spirit 
of adaptive management, the ‘double-edged sword of ‘successful failures’
1
 has 
served as an institutional, political, and emotional barrier to the implementation of 
adaptive management’ (National Research Council, 2009, 76). Finally, the long-time 
horizons involved in establishing long-lived infrastructures, for instance for climate 
mitigation, limit the applicability of these approaches. An active scholarly community 
continues to research the constraints and opportunities embodied in in adaptive co-
management approaches, seeking to gradually transcend the traditionally dominant 
case study approach in favour of broader lessons learned (see e.g. Plummer et al., 
2012).  
Ex-post evaluation of programmes or policies – also practiced in adaptive 
management – is a widely applied group of approaches aimed at stimulating learning 
in environmental governance. In a meta-analysis of evaluation studies of climate 
policy, we observed how the increase in policy activity since the adoption of the 
Kyoto Protocol has been accompanied by a corresponding rise in evaluation activity 
in six European countries and at the EU level (Haug et al., 2010; Huitema et al., 2011). 
Yet when attempting to distil the broader lessons emanating from these evaluations 
for more effective future climate policy, we noted that the substantive evidence base 
that these evaluations represented was surprisingly weak (Haug et al., 2010). The 
large majority of studies were neither reflexive (i.e. questioning official policy goals) 
nor participatory in character, and very few attempted to ascertain the ultimate 
effectiveness of a policy in terms of emission reductions, arguably a key goal for 
climate mitigation measures (Haug et al., 2010; Huitema et al., 2011). Current climate 
policy evaluation practice in Europe thus falls short on three important counts – 
degree of participation, reflexivity, and focus on outcome effectiveness –, thereby 
severely limiting possibilities for policy learning. The study did not even examine the 
uptake of evaluation outcomes in policy-making, the last but crucial step to ensure 
that the learning embodied in the evaluation outcomes eventually translates into 
policy practice. This example illustrates that there is scope for more and better 
evaluation of the measures designed to address complex problems, as well as for 
studying how evaluations are carried out and how – if at all – they feed into policy-
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 [experiments that are deliberately terminated as they failed to meet the expectations 
formulated at the outset, C.H.]  
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making. Even once improved, however, the potential usefulness of ex post evaluation 
is likely to be limited especially for climate change adaptation. Not only is adaptation 
merely in its infancy as a policy field (Massey & Huitema, 2012), judging the 
effectiveness of measures is also complicated by the time lag with which many 
climate impacts are likely to be felt. And in some instances, the insights gained from 
ex post evaluation might simply come too late. 
This is where a fourth group of approaches – forward-looking ex ante assessment or 
appraisal – comes in. Owens et al. (2004, 1944) define them as ‘that family of ex ante 
techniques and procedures ... that seek to inform decision makers by predicting and 
evaluating the consequences of various activities according to certain conventions.’ 
Like evaluation, ex ante assessment can occur in different ways. It may be conducted 
through institutionalised systems directly linked to political decision-making 
processes, like environmental impact assessment (EIA) or strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA) (see e.g. Turnpenny et al., 2009) or in independent research efforts 
with the aim of producing policy-relevant insights that are not commissioned by an 
official body. As for ex post evaluation, the learning benefits from an appraisal 
depend not only on its design and quality. They also hinge on the surrounding politics, 
which may prevent the results of an otherwise successful process from being taking 
up in policy-making (Turnpenny et al., 2009). Method-wise, there is a wide spectrum 
from purely desk-based, often quantitative studies to more participatory and 
deliberative approaches (National Research Council, 2009). The US National Research 
Council argued that in the context of climate change, ‘collaborative, broadly based, 
integrated, and iterative analytic-deliberative processes’ provide the method of 
choice for organising scientific analysis to serve public decision making’ (National 
Research Council, 2009, 79). Such an approach to appraisal resembles the 
‘participatory integrated assessment’ (PIA) processes that have been implemented 
since the late 1990s (see Chapter 2).  
In this thesis, we examine the potential for policy-oriented learning from one 
particular type of ex ante assessment, the policy exercise. Policy exercises, a form of 
simulation-games, aim to produce policy-relevant insights by placing policy-makers 
and experts in a future scenario context, where they adopt the roles of key policy 
actors and negotiate and take decisions in a structured process. There are great 
claims in the literature regarding the learning potential of such approaches to policy 
development in complex, multi-actor settings (Duke & Geurts, 2004; Parson, 1997; 
Underwood & Duke, 1987). The pressure on participants to effectively share 
information and act under time pressure as well as the safe environment that a game 
constitutes and that allows for experimenting with different policy options, are often 
cited as important aspects in this regard (e.g. Parson, 1996b). However, as for other 
forms of appraisal, such claims are hardly supported by systematic empirical 
evaluations of the learning effects that may be generated (see next section). We will 
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come back to the policy exercise method, its premises, background and history in 
Chapter 2.  
1.4 Learning for environmental governance: conceptual 
ambiguities and the need for a better evidence base  
Learning in and for environmental governance is not a new topic of research. There 
has been a wealth of analyses examining learning processes and outcomes across 
different contexts and social units of analysis. Studies draw on learning theories and 
typologies from a range of disciplines. Yet also after more than twenty years, the 
literature continues to struggle with major conceptual and empirical challenges. The 
problems that authors encounter vary with the focus of the studies, ranging from 
broad accounts of learning in a policy field over several years to case studies tracing 
learning in a community or by individuals as a result of an appraisal process or other 
events. In a review of learning in foreign policy from 1994, Levy (1994) concluded 
that the ‘concept of learning is difficult to define, isolate, measure, and apply 
empirically.’ This still rings true for the environmental field today.  
At the core of these difficulties is the lack of a widely accepted, empirically workable 
definition of learning in environmental governance. Looking at the concept of social 
learning, Reed et al. (2010, no page number) deplore that some definitions employed 
in the literature ‘are so broad they could encompass almost any social process.’ This 
vagueness renders focused empirical analysis and cross-case comparison exceedingly 
difficult. Moreover, learning processes and learning outcomes are often conflated, or 
one is implicitly privileged or exclusively treated at the expense of the other. In 
studies focusing on smaller units of analysis, ‘social learning as a concept is frequently 
confused with the conditions or methods necessary to facilitate social learning, such 
as stakeholder participation’ (Reed et al., 2010, no page number). Indeed, 
participation may be a precondition or helpful mediating factor for social learning to 
occur, but this thesis argues that it is not synonymous with it. There are also many 
cases in which learning is equated with its outcomes, such as observed behavioural 
shifts or improved environmental management for smaller-scale studies, or policy 
change for larger scale ones. Yet again, the occurrence of such changes hardly 
constitutes conclusive evidence for learning as such, as they may also be due to other 
factors (May, 1992). We believe that a narrower definition of learning would help 
clarifying the relationship between independent and dependent variables.  
Another potentially problematic feature of many popular learning typologies is the 
more or less explicit hierarchy between different types of learning. Typologies tend to 
treat normative aspects of learning as superior to cognitive ones. This generalisation 
however may not always hold true and risks complicating empirical analysis of 
learning phenomena (see Chapter 2 for a more in-depth discussion). Finally, some 
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studies only consider as learning those lessons that the authors deem desirable. This 
normative basis is particularly problematic when the underlying assumptions on 
which an assessment is based are not clarified ex ante (Diduck, 2010; Levy, 1994).  
Our own conceptualisation of policy-oriented learning in environmental governance 
aims to remedy the above-mentioned challenges. Regarding the normative bias 
inherent in many learning definitions, this thesis argues that studies examining 
learning in environmental governance should primarily look out for a ‘change in 
understanding’ among the subjects concerned (see Chapter 2).
2
 It is the change that 
is important to us here, not its direction. An assessment of the potential implications 
of the learning achieved can always follow as an – analytically distinct – next step. 
Furthermore, we move away from the ´layered’ nature of learning embraced by other 
typologies. Instead, we propose a three-pronged typology that distinguishes between 
cognitive, normative, and relational learning. Cognitive learning refers to the 
acquisition of new or the better structuring of existing knowledge, normative learning 
implies a change in views, values or norms, and relational learning a better 
understanding of other’s mind sets and enhanced trust and ability to cooperate. We 
believe that this typology constitutes an improvement over existing approaches used 
in an environmental governance context. It captures its key dimensions and treats 
these equally rather than privileging one over the other (while admitting for the 
possibility of the interrelatedness of the different types). Finally, it is intuitive and 
sufficiently precise to identify phenomena that are empirically observable.  
The problems with the study of policy-oriented learning in environmental governance 
do not end with issues in the conceptual realm. Challenges on the empirical side are 
just as pronounced, if not more. With a few exceptions (Baird et al., 2014; Deyle & 
Schively Slotterback, 2009; Garmendia & Stagl, 2010; Huitema et al., 2010), studies 
that systematically evaluate and measure learning outcomes in environmental 
governance are surprisingly scarce. This is to do with the vagueness of the learning 
notion, but certainly also with the way in which evaluations in this area are 
conducted. As Rodela et al. (2012) conclude from a systematic review of 54 papers 
studying social learning, there is a tendency towards loosely reflective ex post studies 
where authors use ´hindsight´ to analyse the – exploited or missed – learning 
opportunities offered by a participatory process or other project. They attribute this 
to the relatively recent interest in the notion of social learning, which prompted 
authors to retroactively apply a ´learning lens´ to projects and data collection efforts 
originally designed with other objectives (and hence research questions) in mind. 
There is certainly a place for these studies as the reflections contained in them 
provide useful lessons for the design of future efforts in the same field. But to really 
make sense of the phenomenon of policy-oriented learning in environmental 
                                                                
2
 This does not resolve the dilemma of how to conceptualise the collective property of learning 
in group processes as opposed to individual learning, however (see Chapter 2). 
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governance, of what triggers and what impedes it, there is a critical need to move 
beyond single-case studies relying exclusively on qualitative, ex-post analysis, 
towards controlled (quasi-) experiments (see Chapter 3). This is the challenge that 
this thesis takes on.  
1.5 Research approach and questions 
We have thus far established that many environmental problems, especially in the 
context of global environmental change, are both analytically and socially complex. 
Addressing this complexity through adequate policies requires a significant extent of 
learning, by policy-makers, scientists, and eventually the public at large. Some of this 
learning happens unplanned and ad hoc. Yet this will not be sufficient for issues like 
climate change that pose unprecedented challenges in terms of scale and time. This is 
where approaches specifically geared towards learning, like ex post evaluation and ex 
ante appraisal, as well as approaches advocated in the context of adaptive (co-) 
management may have value. Yet they each present their own set of challenges, 
whether it is the type of lessons that can be drawn from them or their incorporation 
into policy-making. A better understanding of these procedures, their opportunities 
and limitations thus represents an important stepping stone towards more robust 
and ultimately also more legitimate policies to address climate change. 
In short, the goal of the present thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of 
policy-oriented learning in and for environmental governance, at both the conceptual 
and the measurement level. Using two policy exercises as an empirical case to test 
out our conceptualisation of learning and the instruments developed to evaluate it, 
we also aim to add knowledge on the opportunities and limitations of one specific 
form of appraisal that is frequently connected with significant learning effects in the 
literature. This brings us to the following three research questions: how can we better 
conceptualise policy-oriented learning in an environmental governance context? How 
can this concept be operationalised and measured empirically? And what prospects 
do policy games, more specifically policy exercises, offer for learning in this regard?  
Turning to our empirical case, we designed and ran two policy exercises on subjects 
in the realm of international climate policy. The first one was about challenges 
related distributing emission reduction commitments among member states in the 
European Union, a process commonly known as ‘burden-sharing’ or ‘effort sharing’ 
(see e.g. Haug & Jordan, 2010; Ringius, 1999). The second exercise examined options 
to set up a global fund for REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation) under the international climate regime (see e.g. Haug & Gupta, 2013; 
Streck et al., 2009). Such a fund would offer financial compensation to developing 
countries that succeed in protecting their forests, thereby avoiding emissions from 
lost forest carbon stocks. We ran both policy exercises first with groups of 
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international experts and policy-makers, and then with students in the Environment 
and Resource Management Masters programme at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 
In order to measure the cognitive, normative and relational learning effects from the 
exercises, we applied a variety of methods, including surveys, interviews and 
participant observation as well as pre- and post-concept maps drawn by 
participants.
3
 The multiple-case approach (measuring learning in four different 
participant groups), the combination of evaluation methods and the longitudinal 
nature of the assessment, with measurements taken at multiple points in time, 
clearly go beyond the current state of the art in assessing learning from 
environmental appraisals (Blackstock et al., 2007; Garmendia & Stagl, 2010).  
1.6 The rest of this thesis 
In the quest for a better conceptualisation of learning in environmental governance 
and how to measure it, this thesis proceeds as follows.  
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical underpinnings of this research through a brief 
survey of the diverse, multidisciplinary literature on learning and a thorough 
introduction to simulation gaming and policy exercises. It presents the diversity of 
views as to who learns in public policy and environmental management, what is 
learned and to what effect. The question what is learned leads us to distil what we 
consider the three key dimensions of learning – cognitive, normative, and relational – 
that form the basis for our own conceptualisation. We then describe background and 
rationale of simulation gaming and the policy exercise method, the learning effects of 
which we investigate in the empirical part of this thesis, and its possible functions for 
policy development.  
Chapter 3 highlights the methodological choices made in this thesis. It addresses case 
selection, the considerations underlying the evaluation framework used to assess the 
learning effects from the policy exercises and its elements, and the overall research 
design. It also discusses limitations in terms of research design and data availability.  
Chapter 4 describes in more detail the two policy exercises that we organised. Brief 
reflections on good practice in the design of simulation games and on the specific 
approach adopted in this regard are followed by an introduction to the policy context 
of the two exercises. The major part of this chapter is then dedicated to presenting 
the design, runs and outcomes of each exercise.  
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 Concept maps graphically depict a person´s understanding of a topic at a given point in time 
(Novak & Gowin, 1984; Novak, 1998). Comparing the maps drawn by participants prior to and 
after the policy exercise allowed us to trace the conceptual shifts and hence cognitive learning 
as a consequence of the intervention (see Chapters 3 and 5). 
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Chapters 5, 6, and 7 form the empirical core of this thesis as they analyse the learning 
effects that we observed from the policy exercises. Chapter 5 focuses on participants’ 
cognitive learning, drawing on data from the pre- and post- concept maps as well as 
self-reported data from surveys and interviews. Chapter 6 examines the extent to 
which participants learned in normative terms, comparing and cross-checking self-
reported and recorded data from surveys and interviews. Chapter 7 finally addresses 
the relational dimension, focusing primarily on the question to what extent 
participants gained a better understanding of others’ mind sets, including of the roles 
they adopted during the policy exercise.  
The concluding Chapter 8 draws the findings of this thesis together. It first 
synthesises the learning effects found, assesses factors that may have stimulated or 
hindered participants’ learning, and discusses some lessons learned for the organising 
team of the policy exercises. This is followed by a broader discussion on the role and 
potential of policy exercises as an appraisal method for addressing complex 
environmental problems. The chapter then reflect on the usefulness and limitations 
of the typology of learning developed in this thesis and the associated evaluation 
framework. Finally, we outline a research agenda, before closing with some 
reflections on the state of international climate governance.  
 12 
 
2. Learning for policy and the role of policy 
games in policy appraisal  
This chapter embeds the present research into its wider context and explain the most 
relevant concepts and the theory behind it. The first part introduces the notion of 
and rationale for learning in public policy in the sphere of environmental governance 
and examines how learning is conceptualised in the diverse and multidisciplinary 
literature that exists on this topic. Building upon these literatures, we then present 
our own alternative typology of policy-oriented learning in environmental 
governance, which is broadly applicable and useful for testing across a wide range of 
interventions.  
The chapter goes on to introduce simulation-gaming, and a sub-form of it, the policy 
exercise, the learning effects of which we measure in the empirical part of this thesis. 
We trace the historical evolution of simulation-gaming, describe the characteristics of 
the policy exercise method and previous applications in the domain of climate policy, 
and end with a summary of the claims made about the learning benefits from policy 
games.  
2.1 Learning for policy 
As Chapter 1 argued, learning is increasingly becoming a normative goal in the face of 
complex environmental problems. A rich and multifaceted literature exists on 
learning in a social context, stemming from disciplines as diverse as social psychology, 
education studies, organisation and management, policy sciences, international 
relations and environmental and natural resource management. Among these, the 
bodies of work on policy learning and on social learning are most relevant to 
informing this thesis.  
Interest in the notion of policy learning first developed in the 1960s when authors 
sought to supplement and counter existing theories focusing primarily on conflict as a 
catalyst for policy change (Bennett & Howlett, 1992). As Hugh Heclo (1974, 305-306) 
famously observed,  
 ‘Politics finds its sources not only in power but also in uncertainty — men 
collectively wondering what to do [...] Governments not only ‘power’ [...] they 
also puzzle. Policy making is a form of collective puzzlement on society's behalf; 
it entails both deciding and knowing [...] Much political interaction has 
constituted a process of social learning expressed through policy.’ 
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Core notions of the policy learning literature will be more closely examined in the 
following sections. The concept of social learning in turn finds its early roots with 
Bandura (1977), who defined it as the continuous and iterative interaction of an 
individual with the outside world. This initial focus was soon expanded to become 
part of a broader paradigm that emphasises the importance of joint, interactive 
learning of actors as a key element to an interactive, participatory approach to 
decision making and problem solving, often in the context of natural resources 
management (Leeuwis & Pyburn, 2002; Muro & Jeffrey, 2012; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007; 
Schusler et al., 2003). Social learning literature has strongly informed our notion of 
relational learning, which is discussed further in Section 2.1.3. 
Interest in the concept of learning is thus widely shared; yet authors look at largely 
distinct phenomena, and at different levels, when analysing learning. The observation 
by Parson and Clark (1995, 429) that the literature shares neither a common 
disciplinary background nor a theoretical perspective rings as true today as it did 
almost twenty years ago. A review of the key themes and perspectives present in the 
literature on learning in an environmental governance context thus constitutes a key 
stepping stone before delving into developing our own conceptualisation (see Section 
2.1.4). In their review of developments in the policy learning literature until the early 
1990s, Bennett and Howlett (1992) use three axes to organise the field: who learns; 
what is learned; and to what effect. We emulate this effective structure in the 
following sections. Before turning to the question what is learned, which will remain 
a central theme throughout this thesis, we first discuss the other two questions – 
‘who learns’ and ‘to what effect’. 
2.1.1 Who learns? The issue of the social unit of analysis 
Policy-oriented learning happens at different scales; Diduck (2010), in his effort at  
‘untangling the learning dimension of adaptive capacity’, distinguishes between five 
different conceptions of learning, and related units of analysis: Individual learning, 
action group learning, organisational learning, network learning, and societal learning.  
At the largest scale, societal learning, accounts focus on ‘democratic processes by 
which core societal institutions are modified in response to social and environmental 
change ‘ (Diduck, 2010). Authors differ, however, in whom exactly they identify to be 
the agents of change, or who ‘the society’ in question is composed of. At one end of 
the spectrum, there are authors who focus on learning by governmental 
organisations and their leaders (e.g. Etheredge, 1981). Others (e.g. Hall, 1993) 
observe learning processes as complex interactions between state officials and 
societal forces. According to a last group, most prominently represented by Sabatier, 
learning occurs in a policy subsystem within and across different advocacy coalitions 
(Sabatier, 1987, 1988, 1998). Medium-scale analyses examine learning in networks 
and organisations, including the notion of the ‘learning organization’ (Senge, 1990) 
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and the features and approaches that facilitate or impede it. Finally, a substantial 
body of work focuses on smaller social units of analysis, such as groups or individuals, 
who learn in the context of participatory processes or workshops. 
The unit of analysis also touches on the question concerning the relationship 
between individual and collective learning. This is a dilemma which many authors 
avoid to make explicit or touch upon only superficially. People learn individually. Yet 
at the same time, many authors, especially in the social and organisational learning 
fields, consider learning an emergent property from social interaction and use it as a 
convenient shorthand for a collective where learning is taking place. Especially in 
organisational science, authors place emphasis on this collective element. According 
to them, most learning in organisations takes place through the incremental 
adaptation of routines (Cyert & March, 1963) that are engrained in the collective and 
are ‘independent of the individual actors who execute them’ (Levitt & March, 1988, 
320).
  
For Eiser (1986), choosing between collective and individual learning comes down to 
a philosophical difference in approach: some authors regard the social context as 
merely an external stimulus to learning by individuals, whereas others see it as an 
arena for individuals to learn together and develop shared meaning. In the context of 
organisational learning, Argyris and Schön (1980) describe organisational learning as 
a metaphor: ‘organizational learning is not the same thing as individual learning […] 
Organizations do not literally remember, think, or learn […] There is no organizational 
learning without individual learning’ (Argyris and Schön, 1980, 9-11, 20). Hedberg 
(1981, 3) concurs: ‘it is individuals who act and who learn from acting; organizations 
are the stages where acting takes place.’ This leads Levy (Levy, 1994, 291) to argue 
for an analysis of learning at the level of the individual, cautioning that the ‘the 
reification of learning to the collective level [...] is not analytically viable.’  
While acknowledging the potential ‘emergent property’ nature of some learning 
events, especially when embedded in an existing social network, this thesis 
nonetheless opts for a focus on learning at the individual level. This is partly because 
any potential collective learning rests upon individual learning as a pre-condition, 
even according to the proponents of collective learning approaches. Moreover, in 
view of the empirics of this research project, which brings together individuals for a 
one-off event, a focus on the collective did not appear adequate. 
2.1.2 Learning to what effect?  
Another guidepost that Bennett and Howlett (1992) use is the question ‘to what 
effect’ learning is taking place. In the context of policy learning, the occurrence of 
learning is often linked to concrete evidence for policy or institutional change (e.g. 
Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Busenberg, 2001; Jarosz & Nye, 1993). For some authors 
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this is a defining element: ‘learning occurs when understanding, insight and 
explanations are connected with action’ (Argyris, 2003, 1179). However, directly 
equating learning with policy change entails a risk of empirical bias. If the occurrence 
of policy change determines the cases that are examined, one risks missing out 
others where learning happened, but change was inhibited by other factors – which 
would be very interesting to investigate in their own right. Furthermore, in some 
instances, learning may also serve to validate existing policies when the knowledge 
base for a certain course of action has improved (Huitema et al., 2007; Levy, 1994) – 
or it may simply not translate in a change that can easily be observed from the 
outside (Mathews, 1994).  
Requiring learning to be linked to observable policy change gives rise to other pitfalls. 
For one, making the connection between learning, for instance through a 
participatory process, and policy change that can be clearly traced back to the 
‘learning event’ is difficult. Even where such events are clearly linked to a decision-
making context, their impact on policy-making is far from assured. Thus, Huitema et 
al. (2010) argue that these processes are better evaluated against the goals that they 
were set to achieve (for instance raising awareness, or improving the quality of 
decision-making) than against policy change as the sole and most important yardstick. 
The social learning literature is divided on the question whether resulting action – not 
necessarily equating policy change – is a necessary condition for ascertaining social 
learning in the first place. Some authors like Pahl-Wostl (2006) and Blackmore (2007) 
insist that social learning needs to transcend the cognitive realm and result in joint 
practices and collective action. To us, this confuses the process with the desired end 
result. Learning occurs as individuals’ understanding of the situation, their belief 
systems and intentions to act change as a consequence of their experience; whether 
this leads to changed behaviour is a distinct question as other intervening variables 
independent from the learning process may prevent it (Muro & Jeffrey, 2008; Reed et 
al., 2010). In the following, we will therefore conceptualise learning as a change in 
understanding.  
The definition of what counts as such a ‘change in understanding’ also begs the 
question of the ‘directionality’ of learning. Parson and Clark (1995, 456) put it this 
way:  
‘What counts as learning? Any change in the phenomena studied, or only 
certain changes? If only certain changes, then what criteria distinguish learning 
change from nonlearning change? Short of calling any change learning, one 
might say that only change in response to identifiable stimuli or information is 
learning; or more restrictively still, that the change must follow rationally 
(defined somehow) from the stimulus.’      
For many authors writing about social learning from an adaptive (co)management 
perspective or in an action research context, social learning per definition contains a 
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normative prescription. They implicitly or explicitly equate learning with ‘learning 
towards sustainability’, in its broadest or in a narrower sense (e.g. Garmendia & Stagl, 
2010; Tábara & Pahl-Wostl, 2007). This line of reasoning has its equivalent in the 
policy learning literature, with for instance Stein arguing that an ‘evaluation of the 
structure and content of cognitive change’ is ‘[i]nescapably built into the concept of 
political learning’ (Stein, 1994, 171). Argyris and Schön (1980) equally invoke the 
inherently normative character of theories of effective learning.  
These authors apply what could be termed an ‘accuracy criterion’ (Levy, 1994, 294) to 
the concept of learning: only learning that is judged as empirically correct or 
desirable in normative terms counts as ‘real’ learning (ibid.). The upside to such an 
approach may be that it helps sharpen the analytical focus as to what empirical 
phenomena to look out for. Yet it entails inevitable biases as observers evaluate 
outcomes on the basis of their own frames and normative assumptions (Levy, 1994). 
At a minimum, this calls for the criteria and underlying assumptions to be made 
explicit in the studies using such an approach. This, however, is rarely the case in 
practice. The lack of widely accepted standards to evaluate learning based on criteria 
such as accuracy, efficiency or sustainability leads Diduck (2010, 206) to warn of a 
‘real danger of analysts using the term learning in so self-serving a manner that it 
becomes synonymous with the accrual of outcomes that the analyst deems correct.’ 
For these reasons, we will consider any change in understanding as learning and not 
assume any particular direction of change in this study (Nilsson & Swartling, 2009).  
Having briefly sketched out the various angles and perspectives under which 
Bennett’s and Howlett’s questions on the learning agent and the effects of learning 
have been treated in the literature, we will now turn to their third question - the 
object of learning. What exactly is it that authors are talking about when they are 
analysing policy learning and social learning?  
2.1.3 What is learned - the object of learning 
In the policy learning, but also in the social learning literature, the object of learning 
has mostly been discussed in terms of different levels or types of learning. Table 1 
presents an overview of the conceptualisations of a number of authors from the 
policy, organisational and social learning literatures. Other scholars use the same 
concepts or terms with slight adjustments.  
Implicit in all typologies is a hierarchy from the first – more technical, less reflexive – 
level of learning to higher-order forms. Furthermore, all frameworks contain a more 
cognitive and a more normative, critical learning dimension, the latter often being 
associated with the higher learning levels. Whereas most authors distinguish 
between two levels, some frameworks also add a third. In some cases (e.g. Argyris & 
Schön, 1980), that third level is associated with a meta-dimension (‘learning how to 
Learning for policy and the role of policy games in policy appraisal 
 
17 
 
learn’),
4
 while in others it contains an action-based orientation which effectively 
connects this highest learning level with (deep) policy change (Armitage et al., 2008; 
Pahl-Wostl, 2009).  
 
Relevant 
studies  
Learning concept 
employed 
Levels of learning identified 
Lindblom 
(1968) 
Policy learning Instrumental learning: new insights into policy options 
in the case of a given policy problem and a given 
solution context 
Political learning: new insights not only into solutions, 
but also the problem itself and the context in which 
decisions take place 
Argyris and 
Schön (1980, 
1996) 
Social learning Single-loop learning: discovering and correcting errors 
without changing underlying norms, policies and 
objectives 
Double-loop learning: discovering and correcting 
errors in a way that does involve the modification of 
underlying norms, policies and objectives 
Deutero-learning: ‘learning how to learn’ (see 
footnote on previous page).  
Senge (1990) Organizational 
learning 
Adaptive learning: ‘survival learning’, focuses on 
solving problems in the present without examining 
the appropriateness of current learning behaviours 
Generative learning: learning that requires systems 
thinking, emphasising continuous experimentation 
and feedback on the way how problems are defined 
and solved. 
Hall (1993) Policy learning First-order learning: learning about the settings of 
policy instruments 
Second-order learning: learning about techniques or 
policy instruments used to attain certain policy goals 
Third-order learning: new insights into overall goals of 
policy, amounting to a paradigm change 
Mezirow 
(1995) 
Transformative 
learning 
Instrumental learning: the acquisition of skills and 
knowledge (the ‘how’ and the ‘what’) 
Communicative learning: reflection on the 
assumptions imbedded in the social discourse 
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 Argyris’ and Schön’s definition of deutero learning contains some conceptual ambiguities. 
Sometimes, it is described as a meta-dimension to both single-loop and double-loop learning 
(e.g. Argyris, 2003), whereas elsewhere (e.g. Argyris & Schön, 1996), it appears to be more of a 
form of double-loop learning. Similarly, it remains unclear if the term refers to the process of 
reflection and inquiry, or the structural conditions that make such an inquiry possible (cf. 
Visser, 2007). 
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(‘learning what people mean’) 
Transformative learning: ‘The process of using a prior 
interpretation to construe a new or revised 
interpretation of the meaning of one’s experience in 
order to guide future action’ (Mezirow, 1996, 162) 
Glasbergen 
(1996) 
Social learning Technical learning: search for new policy instruments 
in the context of fixed policy objectives 
Conceptual learning: Redefining policy goals and 
adjusting problem definitions and strategies 
Armitage et al. 
(2008), 
building on 
King and 
Jiggins (2002) 
and Keen et al. 
(2005) 
Social learning Single-loop learning: Identiﬁcation of alternative 
strategies and actions to resolve speciﬁc problems 
and improve certain outcomes 
Double-loop learning: Challenging existing worldviews 
and underlying values  
Triple-loop learning: amending underlying governance 
norms and protocols  
Table 1. Levels of learning across the social, policy and organizational learning literatures. 
Exactly what kind of learning is located at what level differs to some extent between 
the frameworks (cf. Armitage et al., 2008, 89). While for Hall (1993) for instance, 
consideration of alternative policy instruments already implies second-order learning, 
others (e.g. Glasbergen, 1996) subsume this under the first level of learning. Similarly, 
in some typologies, the first level is exclusively associated with cognitive learning; in 
others, cognitive and normative elements are mixed up across the framework. Last 
but not least, sometimes, the types are simply used as different categories by which 
to characterise learning processes, whereas other authors (e.g. Glasbergen, 1996; 
Pahl-Wostl, 2009) see them as both evolutionary (one kind of learning leads to the 
other) and cumulative (one builds on the experience of the former).  
Even though a more or less implicit hierarchy moving from lower-order to higher-
order learning types is ubiquitous in the literature, such an understanding of learning 
poses a number of difficulties. First, it seems doubtful that the normative, reflective 
type of learning is inherently more valuable than more cognitive types (as in the 
definition of Armitage et al., 2008, in the table above). Cognitive learning on its own 
may well generate fundamental effects (cf. Owens, 2004): for instance, a different 
perception of the problem (a cognitive process) may not result in a normative shift, 
but enable a virtuous cycle of yet more cognitive learning. At the same time, 
normative learning may not always be beneficial to problem solving. Taking an 
example of international climate policy, giving up on the hope that big emitters like 
China eventually play their part in greenhouse gas mitigation may reduce motivation 
to take action at home. This normative shift consequently slims rather than increases 
the chance of successfully tackling climate change. Also the interrelation between 
cognitive and normative learning is more complex than the one-way connection of 
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cognitive learning giving rise to normative learning assumed by some authors. In the 
reverse, normative learning may also open opportunities for cognitive progress. 
Again using the example of international climate policy, coming to accept the right of 
developing countries to grow their emissions might lead to devising a more positive, 
inducement-based approach. Finally, the implicit preference for normative learning 
risks inducing a bias in empirical research, leading authors to focus on seeking out 
evidence for normative shifts, while potentially neglecting cognitive changes which 
may be just as important and desirable. In sum, there is a need for more neutral 
wording when describing types of learning. For this reason, the learning typology 
developed in this thesis treats normative and cognitive learning on an equal footing, 
without privileging one over the other (see Section 2.1.4).  
Moreover, it is interesting to note that current conceptualisations – even the ones 
that focus on social learning – do not explicitly distinguish an important aspect of 
learning, which is relational. Relational learning, which focuses on the relationship 
between individuals in a learning situation, is mentioned in the literature, yet it is 
often conflated with other forms or levels of learning. Hisschemöller et al. (2001) and 
Pahl-Wostl (2009) for instance assume that ‘higher’ levels of learning combine at 
once changes in normative frameworks and improved relations or better 
understandings between stakeholders and participants. Conceptually, this does not 
seem very logical. Relational forms of learning can occur independently from other 
forms of learning (one can despise a teacher and continue to do so for a long time, 
but learn a lot from him or her in cognitive terms). Moreover, developing a better 
awareness and understanding of how another stakeholder thinks might enhance the 
respect for that stakeholder, but does not necessarily result in changes in one’s own 
normative framework. 
This leads us to propose a three-pronged typology of learning effects, differentiating 
between cognitive, normative and relational learning (see Haug et al., 2011; Huitema, 
et al., 2010; compare Webler et al., 1995). In the following three sections, we will 
explore the elements and outcomes commonly associated with each of these three 
dimensions in greater detail, before distilling from this our own definition of the 
learning types.  
2.1.3.1 The cognitive dimension of learning 
In any social context, the transmission of information between individuals is a core 
component of the cognitive dimension of learning (Crona & Parker, 2012; Newig & 
Pahl-Wostl, 2010; Reed et al., 2010). It occurs through communication and exchange 
between actors, which is why diversity of knowledge and expertise is often 
considered key to the success of appraisal processes. In an investigation into the role 
of knowledge for achieving environmentally friendly behaviour, Kaiser and Fuhrer 
(2003) distinguish between three types of relevant knowledge: (1) declarative 
knowledge, which includes insights into how the system works and into the state of 
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the problem (cf. Schahn, 1996); (2) procedural knowledge, which relates to 
behavioural options and to learning how to reach a particular goal; (3) and 
effectiveness knowledge, which refers to knowing about the relative effectiveness of 
different strategies to reach that same goal. Levy draws the lines somewhat 
differently: he differentiates between (1) causal learning – insights into cause-effect 
relationships and ‘the optimal strategies under various conditions’ (Levy, 1994, 285) 
and (2) diagnostic learning, ‘changes in beliefs about the definition of the situation or 
the preferences, intentions, or relative capabilities of others’ (ibid.). According to 
Levy (1994), any cognitive learning can be probabilistic as well as deterministic – it 
does not necessarily involve absolute changes in beliefs or understanding, but also 
changes in the degree of confidence about the knowledge that one has.  
Levy’s reference to cause-effect relationships and Kaiser and Fuhrer’s ‘insights into 
the state of the problem’ point to a second key process in the domain of cognitive 
learning: the act of defining and structuring the problem. Problem structuring is a 
process that pertains both to individuals and collectives confronted with the need for 
decision-making under complexity. The process can be conceived as two counter-
acting movements, ‘aspect differentiation’ and ‘aspect integration’ (Joldersma & 
Roelofs, 2004, 701f).
5
 Aspect differentiation refers to the ability to perceive a 
problem in its wider context as it relates to other issues and processes. The necessity 
of a broad view of the problem and of its embedding into the wider system 
constitutes a fundamental premise of systems analysis (Geurts & Vennix, 1989). At 
the same time, aspect differentiation also evokes the need to take into account the 
variety of views and perceptions that different actors have on a particular issue, 
which may have significant implications for the feasibility and effectiveness for 
problem-solving options (Roelofs, 2000; van de Kerkhof, 2004).  
Both in individuals and collectives tasked with decision-making, at some point in the 
problem structuring process, aspect differentiation is likely to give way to aspect 
integration (cf. Roelofs, 2000). Connecting loose pieces of information and identifying 
causal relationships provides a sense of order and transparency and enables a clearer 
articulation of the problem and the steps to address it (Mason & Mitroff, 1981; 
Rohrbaugh & Eden, 1990). This combination and integration of various aspects into a 
more or less coherent whole constitutes a vital process of sense-making at the level 
of the individual; at the level of the collective, it helps with reducing complexity so as 
                                                                
5
 This conceptualisation also corresponds to the notion of government learning developed by 
Etheredge and Short (1983). According to them, learning by state officials manifests itself in 
three ways: first, a greater ability for differentiation; second, a greater ability for organization 
and hierarchical integration. The third indicator ‘increased capacity for reflective thought, 
perspective on the form and nature of the contents of thought, and on the choice of 
structuring principles’ adds a reflexive meta-perspective to the first two (Etheredge and Short, 
1983, 42). 
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to create ‘processable problems’ that can be assigned to specific parts of the 
bureaucracy (Williams & Matheny, 1995).  
Greater (acceptance of) cognitive complexity and improved ability for systems 
thinking are often considered important goals for, or attributes of, cognitive learning. 
For Tetlock, one of the proponents for a cognitive structural approach to learning in 
foreign policy, ‘learning involves change in the cognitive structure of one’s image of 
the international environment […] in the direction of greater complexity […]’ (Tetlock, 
1991, 22). Yet the conclusion that increasing cognitive complexity necessarily equates 
learning may not always hold true. For one, a more complex cognitive structure may 
not actually result in a more accurate understanding of the world or in enhanced 
effectiveness at reaching one’s goals. There may even be a risk of paralysis if aspect 
differentiation is not followed by integration and sense-making (Levy, 1994, 294f). 
Therefore, rather than increased cognitive complexity per se, the notion of more 
holistic or systems thinking may be a more appropriate objective or indicator for 
cognitive learning. Systems thinking, which implies seeking to understand where 
there are possible points of intervention in the system and what might be their 
repercussions on other part of it, is frequently evoked in the literature on social 
learning in a natural resource management context and is considered key to 
understanding complex management problems (Daniels & Walker, 1996; Kay & 
Schneider, 1994; Maarleveld & Dangbegnon, 2002). Garmendia and Stagl (2010) 
made an improved ability for holistic thinking an explicit indicator in their framework 
to assess social learning from participatory appraisals. Webler et al. (1995) see it as 
part of their criterion of ‘cognitive enhancement’ that such processes are supposed 
to stimulate among participants.  
Summarising the discussion above, we can conclude that cognitive learning 
encompasses either the assimilation of new knowledge and facts or the improved 
structuring of existing knowledge, which may result in a better ability at holistic, 
systems thinking. With this, we move on to the second dimension of learning, which 
is normative.  
2.1.3.2. The normative dimension of learning 
The normative dimension of learning in a policy context concerns shifts in the norms, 
values and paradigms that guide the decision-making processes of individuals and 
collectives (Brown & Vergragt, 2008) In constructivist terms, this kind of learning 
occurs when claims are ‘deconstructed’ and lose their factual status through re-
identification of their social origins (Jasanoff, 1990, 13). Normative learning is often 
considered as being of a higher value than cognitive learning, as reflected in terms 
like double-loop or second-order learning (cf. Argyris & Schön, 1980; Hall, 1993) 
(Argyris and Schön, 1980; Hall, 1993). Yet as pointed out earlier, this hierarchical 
notion does not hold in all cases and sometimes inhibits nuanced empirical analysis. 
We would argue that normative changes are not per se of a higher order, but can 
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occur at different levels, from the revision of a viewpoint on a particular issue to a 
fundamental paradigm shift. Normative learning can thus vary both in terms of the 
abstraction of the norm that is being revised, from very limited and concrete to very 
far-reaching and broad (this is the logic underlying Hall’s learning typology), and its 
scope and degree of social embeddedness (Schön & Rein, 1995, 33f).  
Normative learning occurs through processes of reflection and self-evaluation and 
therefore has strong links to the literatures on frames, reflexivity and deliberation. 
Theorists vary in their optimism about the possible extent or means for higher-order 
normative learning or reframing. A Habermasian perspective and a Foucauldian 
perspective can be distinguished as two ends of the spectrum. In his theory of 
communicative action, Habermas depicts the ideal speech situation, ‘where public 
decisions are reached by autonomous citizens in a process of unconstrained 
exchange of opinion’ and where a truthful, free and fair contest of arguments 
resolves differences in perspective, as key to a democratic society (Habermas, 1984, 
102). For Foucault on the other hand, discourses as impersonal systems impose a 
rigid structure on what can be said and thought (Foucault, 1981), thus severely 
limiting opportunities for normative learning.  
The Foucauldian notion is to some extent present in the literature on frames. At the 
most general level, frames (Schön & Rein, 1994), belief systems (Sabatier, 1987) or 
paradigms (Hall, 1993) can be understood as interpretive schemas or clusters of ideas 
that shape broad attitudes and orientations towards a problem (Surel, 2000). Often, 
they are tacit and thus escape argumentation and reasoned persuasion. Frames can 
be seen as processes of questioning ‘that structure the world by delimiting the field 
of possible answers’ (Turnbull, 2005, 102), providing individuals with a crucial ‘mental 
grappling hook’ (Hoppe, 2010, 181). They are socially co-constructed, i.e. constituted 
by and changing through the interactions of multiple actors (Putnam & Holmer, 1992; 
Surel, 2000). Schön and Rein (1994, 26) describe two complementary processes of 
framing and naming, which allow individuals to selectively single out and ‘name’ a 
few key aspects and causal relationships from their complex environment and 
thereby enable a ‘normative leap from data to recommendations, from facts to 
values, from ‘is’ to ‘ought’.’ At the same time, the ‘relativist trap’ that a frame 
represents makes frame reflection tremendously difficult; if frames determine what 
we perceive and how we perceive it, how can evaluation and comparison across 
frames ever be possible (Schön & Rein, 1994)? Yet as Schön and Rein (1994, 57) 
themselves admit, ‘we know that people do sometimes change their minds, even in 
fundamental ways, and we know of not-so-rare events in actual policy disputes, 
where positions have been reframed [...] to open up to accommodation controversies 
that had at first seemed hopelessly intractable.’ Based on their own empirical 
material, they admit for the possibility of ‘situated frame reflection’ (Schön and Rein, 
1994, 174). They conclude that normative learning may take place rather on the basis 
of concrete experiences in the context of specific problems and practices than via 
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reflection about abstract higher-order values with a view to uncover implicit and 
taken-for-granted assumptions (ibid.). Reframing is thus not seen as a process where 
one paradigm comes to neatly replace another, but one that initially involves doubt 
about an existing frame that does not match actual experiences. These doubts then 
lead to a re-ordering of elements and of new associations, and eventually result in 
the emergence of a new, distinct paradigm or frame (Kuhn, 1962; Laws & Rein, 2003; 
Surel, 2000).  
Hajer, building on a Foucauldian notion of discourse, but also drawing on concepts 
from communication theory, puts forward a related, yet distinct perspective. In his 
view, individuals do not adhere to firm belief systems or frames, but have ‘vague, 
contradictory, and unstable ‘value positions’ (Hajer, 1995, 71). These can be 
influenced and fundamentally altered through the emergence of new story lines if 
these succeed in changing people’s views on their own role and on the potential for 
changes to be made. Story lines are understood as linguistic, multi-interpretable 
devices which serve to reduce discursive complexity and which bind together 
discourse coalitions competing for dominance in the policy arena. Discourse 
coalitions are thus not held together by interests or strong beliefs, but merely by 
their adherence (for various reasons) to a common storyline (Hajer, 1995). The last 
point is where Hajer differs from Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 
1987, 1988, 1998). The advocacy coalition framework is at its core a theory of policy 
change, but accords ‘policy-oriented learning’ an important role in this process – and 
the latter is what is of interest to us here. An advocacy coalition in Sabatier’s 
framework shares a belief in a joint ‘policy core’. Learning takes place both within 
and between coalitions. Importantly, where learning occurs, it is mostly instrumental 
in nature: ‘policy-oriented learning […] is an ongoing process of search and 
adaptation motivated by the desire to realize core policy beliefs’ (Sabatier, 1988, 151). 
The likelihood of normative learning is inversely related to the degree of commitment 
to a belief. Learning therefore mostly concerns the secondary aspect of one’s belief 
system (ibid.). Sabatier is very sceptical about the possibility to change the ‘deep core’ 
or even the ‘policy core’ of advocacy coalitions. He does accept the possibility that 
such a change might happen, but thinks it extremely rare, likening it to a ‘religious 
conversion’ (Sabatier, 1998, 104). Peter Hall is somewhat more optimistic in this 
regard. In his view, learning can extend beyond learning about implementation and 
how to better reach one’s goals to the level of policy goals. In his analysis of 
economic policy-making in Britain, he identifies a type of third-order learning, which 
is ‘marked by the radical changes in the overarching terms of policy discourse 
associated with a ‘paradigm shift’ (Hall, 1993, 279) and encompasses a shift in 
fundamental beliefs and values underlying public policy (cf. Weiss, 1977). Third-order 
learning occurs only under special circumstances, and when it happens, usually 
affects not only governmental circles, but society at large (Hall, 1993). 
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Other authors in the deliberative and participatory policy analysis tradition attribute 
a much more central role to normative learning and deliberation in the policy process, 
a perspective that is embraced in this thesis. Dryzek made an important contribution 
in this regard and we elaborate some more on his work as it is representative for this 
line of thinking. As done earlier by Renn et al. (1995), Dryzek translates Habermas’ 
abstract communicative ideal to a more concrete, applied level. The notion of 
authentic deliberation – which Dryzek defines as requiring communication that 
induces reflection in a non-coercive fashion (Dryzek, 2000) – is central to his model of 
deliberative democracy: ‘one defining feature of deliberative democracy is that 
individuals participating in democratic processes are amenable to changing their 
minds and preferences as a result of the reflection induced by deliberation’ (Dryzek, 
2000). Dryzek acknowledges the importance of discourses as frames of reference that 
allow for organising disjointed pieces of information into coherent story lines and 
allow those who subscribe to a particular discourse to communicate in a meaningful 
way. Yet, contrary to Foucault, he is convinced that engagement is possible also 
across the boundaries of different discourses. He believes that individuals are no 
prisoners of the discourses that they identify with, even if these have shaped their 
thinking to a significant extent (Dryzek, 2000). Much of the literature on participatory 
appraisal follows this line of argument (Garmendia & Stagl, 2010; Maarleveld & 
Dangbegnon, 2002; Muro & Jeffrey, 2008; van de Kerkhof, 2006).  
Thus, to summarise, this thesis considers normative learning, which it understands to 
comprise shifts in viewpoints, values and paradigms that may vary in their degree of 
abstraction and social embeddedness, a key feature to improving environmental 
governance. Which factors may facilitate such learning? Not surprisingly, a new and 
uncertain environment – prompted by a novel issue, a crisis, or severe policy failure – 
is considered to aid motivation to analyse new information and revise existing 
viewpoints (Checkel, 2001). In terms of the types of individuals most prone to 
normative learning, evidence from social psychology suggests that there is a u-
shaped relationship between the complexity of one’s belief system on a certain 
subject and the extent of certainty about one’s ideas on it. Whereas experts and total 
novices are generally more reluctant to alter their perception, those with a 
moderately complex belief system tend to be less sure of their convictions and thus 
display the greatest potential for normative learning (Chi et al., 1988; cf. Levy, 1994). 
Finally, experts on participatory appraisal find that the kind of appraisal method 
matters for the extent of normative learning it provokes among participants. Van de 
Kerkhof (2004, 79f) argues that those methods involving a high degree of 
participation (like a policy Delphi exercise or certain applications of simulation 
gaming) may be more apt to stimulate normative learning than methods that rely on 
more consultative modes of involvement (which, according to her, may serve better 
to stimulate creativity and cognitive learning). Finally, and again not entirely 
surprisingly, a sufficient level of issue-related (and thus not personal) conflict is said 
to be beneficial for normative learning in stakeholder exercises (Cuppen, 2009).  
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After this exploration of the two dimensions of learning – cognitive and normative – 
that form the core of the policy learning literature, we now turn to a main 
contribution made mainly by writers on social learning. Their focus on smaller social 
units of analysis has led them to take a more thorough look at the inter-personal, 
relational dimension of learning.  
2.1.3.3 The relational dimension of learning  
As noted earlier, much of the literature on social learning developed in the context of 
natural resource management and environmental appraisal. The focus on relatively 
small groups of actors who are – or become – familiar with each other and who need 
to collaborate explains the emphasis that this strand of writings puts on the relational 
side of learning. The conscious departure from the cognition-focused approach of 
writings on policy learning is reflected in the quote on the definition of social learning 
used in the HarmoniCOP project: ‘social learning must be conceived as more than just 
cognitive learning. Learning together to manage together has also to do with changes 
in attitudes, beliefs, skills, capacities and actions in and among the counterparts’ 
(Craps, 2003, 8). Similarly, Webler et al. (1995) propose to analyse two components 
of social learning; next to ‘cognitive enhancement’, studies should also examine the 
‘moral development’ of participants. Whilst the term may smack of normative 
learning, criteria for the latter category include being able to take on the perspective 
of others and developing a sense of solidarity with the group (Webler et al., 1995, 
446) – issues firmly in the realm of relational learning.  
Writers in this strand of literature take significant inspiration from a variety of 
learning theories from the realms of (adult) education and social psychology. Notions 
like experiential learning emphasise the direct exposure to the phenomena being 
studied (Kolb, 1984), similar to the concepts of situated or embedded learning, which 
focus on the fact that individuals learn best through interactive situations where 
there is an immediate ‘need to know’, and in the process engage in and foment 
‘communities of practice’ (Lave & Wenger, 1991). All of them fit the small group or 
community context in which many of the social learning studies are taking place.  
At the most general level, the relational dimension of learning is about how the 
relationships of participants, but also their sense of self and their identity change in 
the course of a group process. One of the most important aspects in this regard 
relates to participants’ understanding of each other’s viewpoints, arguments and 
underlying frames. Especially when faced with complex, unstructured problems, 
stakeholders are often unaware of their own, but also of the wide variety of 
alternative perspectives that others may have on this issue (Hisschemöller et al., 
2001, 62). According to the deliberation literature, as citizens consider the arguments 
of other citizens, they increase their understanding, empathy with, and tolerance of 
the variety of perspectives one can have on the public good (Gutmann & Thompson, 
1996; Warren, 1996). As Mathews (1994, 235) puts it, ‘deliberation doesn’t 
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necessarily change personal positions, but it does change attitudes about opposing 
points of view.’ An orientation towards authentic dialogue as well as mutual respect – 
enabling the ‘constructive interaction [...] with the persons with whom one disagrees’ 
(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 81) – may be helpful in this regard. Pearce and 
Littlejohn (1997) describe dialogue as an orientation to conflict that is open to 
changing not just what one believes but also how one talks and even thinks about an 
issue. It involves at least temporarily putting to rest conflict about contrasting 
worldviews and instead making an effort to collaboratively reflect on them 
(Burkhalter et al., 2002). One of the outcomes of such an attitude is what Forester 
(Forester, 1999, 107) terms ‘diplomatic recognition’: taking the other seriously and 
treating his concerns as equally legitimate as one’s own.  
Improved understanding is often expected to result in a positive change of attitude 
among the individuals involved (Garmendia & Stagl, 2010, 1715) and supposed to 
lead to the forging of new, or the transformation of existing relationships (Muro & 
Jeffrey, 2012), including the emergence of new networks and communities of 
practice. As people develop trust in each other, they embark on a ‘virtuous circle of 
anticipation and action whose initiation always requires a leap of faith beyond the 
available evidence’ (Schön & Rein, 1994, 179). The development of trust is closely 
related to the emergence of social capital (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003). Social capital, 
‘networks together with shared norms, values and understanding that facilitate co-
operation within or among groups’ (OECD, 2001, 41), can be both a driving factor and 
an outcome of relational learning: ‘where there is evidence of ongoing or continuous 
social learning, then social capital may be produced and/or increased’ (Plummer & 
FitzGibbon, 2007, 56). Finally, stronger ties within a group and increased trust also 
boost its potential for joint initiatives and collaboration (Armitage et al., 2008; 
Blackmore, 2007; Forester, 1999; Garmendia & Stagl, 2010). Learning is thus not only 
at the root of individual behavioural change (although by no means a necessary or 
sufficient condition for it), but arguably also an important driver for action at the 
level of the collective. Better understanding of one another may give rise to new 
opportunities for cooperation that seemed elusive earlier (Schusler et al., 2003). 
Relational learning, however, does not only shape relationships, it can also have a 
significant impact on one’s sense of identity. Increased self-confidence or a sense of 
empowerment are often reported as learning outcomes of participatory processes 
(Rist et al., 2006), not necessarily in the sense of stakeholders gaining a more 
optimistic outlook that their voice is heard in the policy process, but in terms of 
understanding and forming an opinion about complex issues which one previously 
thought beyond one’s reach (Huitema et al., 2010). Relational learning can further 
touch upon how individuals perceive themselves in relation to the wider community: 
‘it is in the process of learning about the viewpoints of the others that stakeholders 
can [...] see how their particular concerns and issues affect, and are affected by, the 
larger whole of which they are part’ (Tippett et al., 2005, 292). The realisation that 
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there are shared values may give rise to a stronger sense of belonging to political 
units, as reflected in Webler et al.’s assessment of the impacts of a participatory 
process on waste siting in Switzerland on the participating stakeholders: ‘many 
learned something about what it meant to be a citizen’ (Webler et al., 1995, 458).
6
  
2.1.4 Policy-oriented learning in environmental governance – a typology 
In developing our own typology of learning in and for environmental governance, we 
build on the bodies of literature reviewed above, while aiming to address some of the 
perceived shortcomings of existing conceptualisations of learning types and their 
operationalisation. We understand policy-oriented learning at its core to be a ‘change 
in understanding’, which may – but does not necessarily have to – result in change 
that is observable to the outside world. The first two learning types in our 
conceptualisation, cognitive and normative learning, have their roots in the writings 
on learning in public policy and organisational theory. The last, relational learning, 
builds on the notion of social learning as it is frequently employed in the domain of 
natural resources management. We prefer to steer clear of a ‘levelled’ understanding 
of learning, treating the different types of learning side-by-side in a non-hierarchical 
manner. Analysing learning effects in terms of their nature (cognitive, normative, or 
relational) rather than their perceived value seems both less biased and more 
systematic from an empirical viewpoint. Table 2 below contains the definition of each 
learning type in our three-pronged typology. Finally, on the question of the social unit 
of analysis, given its empirics, this thesis focuses on individual learning.  
Type of learning Definition 
Cognitive learning The acquisition of new knowledge and facts, or the improved 
structuring of existing knowledge, systems thinking 
Normative learning A shift in views, values, or paradigms 
Relational learning Improved understanding of mind sets of others, enhanced 
trust and ability to cooperate 
Table 2. Types of learning in environmental governance. 
Having thus established the notion of learning that will guide the empirical research 
in this thesis, we proceed to introducing simulation gaming, the appraisal method 
whose learning benefits we will examine in the following.  
                                                                
6
 Huitema et al. (2007) report similar outcomes of a series of citizen juries organised in the 
Netherlands. They conclude however that this positive effect depends on the degree to which 
the authorities take the citizens’ recommendations seriously.  
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2.2 Simulation gaming as a tool to stimulate policy-oriented 
learning 
2.2.1 Complex environmental problems and integrated assessment 
Policy exercises, the appraisal method we focus on in this study, belong to the realm 
of integrated assessment. Since the 1970s, researchers and practitioners alike had 
become increasingly aware that the complexity of global environmental change 
might not be usefully captured by strictly disciplinary approaches and methods. This 
led to the emergence of integrated assessment (IA) – an umbrella term for a range of 
techniques that, despite many different interpretations and definitions, share two 
basic elements: interdisciplinarity and decision-support (Rotmans, 1998, 155). The 
term ‘assessment’ invokes the objective of producing policy-relevant information, 
rather than generating knowledge for its own sake. ‘Integrated’ refers to the fact 
‘that it brings together a broader set of areas, methods, styles of study, or degrees of 
certainty, than would typically characterize a study of the same issue within the 
bounds of a single research discipline’ (Hisschemöller et al., 2001, 58). Approaches 
that would meet these objectives have existed for much longer. As a distinctive 
strand of research and a community, however, IA developed only from the 1980s 
onwards. It aimed at filling a gap in two regards: firstly, it sought to account for 
previously neglected complex feedback and interaction mechanisms in coupled 
human-environmental systems. Secondly, the objective was to develop frameworks 
that would allow for testing policy options and trade-offs between various strategies 
(Rotmans & Van Asselt, 2003, 240). IA is thus often about boundary work between 
various scientific domains and between the domains of science and policy (cf. Gieryn, 
1983). 
Looking at the subjects covered by IA processes, past efforts have addressed a range 
of different functions, from risk and options assessment to goal and strategy 
formulation (Kloprogge & Sluijs, 2006; Toth & Hizsnyik, 1998). Important advances 
have been made in IA modelling over the past decades and IA models have occupied 
a prominent role for instance in assessments of the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). Yet they continue to face technical as well as theoretical limitations. 
Model-based analyses at a large scale, heavily relying on ‘economy of representation’ 
(Parson, 1997, 271), cannot expand the range of options under consideration nor can 
they assess contingencies or strategic or behavioural uncertainty (ibid.). Therefore, 
model-supported approaches to IA have come to be supplemented with a more 
participatory strand focusing on the involvement of relevant stakeholders or citizens 
into the assessment process, through delphi exercises, focus groups, policy exercises 
or other forms of participatory appraisal (Toth, 2003).  
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Its proponents claim that participatory impact assessment (PIA) is rooted in the 
tradition of post-normal science
7
 and responds to the perceived need for extended 
peer-review in the face of the complexities of global environmental change 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; see Chapter 1). It is based on the notion that the inclusion 
of more perspectives and multiple sources of knowledge serves to enrich the 
assessment and ultimately results in more robust decision-making (Salter et al., 2010). 
PIA projects to date have mainly addressed stakeholders, often expending 
considerable effort to include a diverse set of viewpoints into the process (ibid). In a 
few cases, most prominently citizen juries, the approach has been broadened to 
include or explicitly target lay persons as participants. At the same time, it is not 
unusual for PIA processes to include or even to exclusively consist of scientists. After 
all, an assessment of policy options requires a critical evaluation of the available 
knowledge base, and vice versa (Hisschemöller et al., 2001, 63). 
Van Asselt and Rijkens-Klomp (2002) map methods for PIA along two axes: the goal of 
application and the type of targeted output. Regarding the latter category, some 
methods specifically aim at uncovering and articulating the diversity of perspectives 
on a particular issue or to test strategies in a safe environment. In others, PIA is a 
means of achieving closure by reaching consensus among participants on the issue at 
hand (ibid). Concerning the goal of a PIA process, in some cases, the primary 
objective may be the process itself and the resulting empowerment of the individuals 
participating in it. In others, PIA is first and foremost a means to improve the quality 
of decision-making. However, there are few instances to date where there is 
evidence that the outputs of a PIA process have had a direct impact on policy-making 
(Kloprogge & Sluijs, 2006; Salter et al., 2010). This has to do with the issue and 
difficulties of boundary work; while the results might in principle be valuable to 
decision-making, institutional obstacles prevent them from being taken up. However, 
many projects have also been quite methodologically-oriented and experimental in 
nature, aiming at method development and at improving PIA practice (Salter et al., 
2010). Salter et al. (2010) agree with others that one of the most important results in 
terms of process is the social learning that PIA exercise can stimulate among 
participants, policy-makers, and the organising team. They emphasise that evidence 
to this end is hard to obtain and in most instances where it is reported, largely 
anecdotal in character.  
The rationale for involving stakeholders in PIA projects can be either primarily 
argumentative or cognitive (Hisschemöller et al., 2001). An argumentative approach 
to PIA focuses on the clarification of stakeholders’ perspectives and underlying 
assumptions through structured dialogue, which is seen as key to integrating 
                                                                
7
 Post-normal science is a term coined by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1991, 1993) with which they 
aim to characterise a method of inquiry that is suited for cases where ‘facts are uncertain, 
values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent’ (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993, p. 744). 
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knowledge and to resolving controversies (Cuppen, 2009; van de Kerkhof, 2004). By 
contrast, the cognitive approach rests on the perceived tendency of policy-makers to 
neglect long-term considerations and lay knowledge. In this logic, PIA exercises aim 
to open up policy-makers’ perspectives and to encourage unconstrained and creative 
thinking, often by creating a degree of distance between policy-makers and the issue 
they are dealing with, for instance through role play, by moving the problem into the 
future or lifting it to a higher level of abstraction (Hisschemöller et al., 2001; van de 
Kerkhof, 2004).  
While the cognitive and the argumentative approach to PIA are by no means 
mutually exclusive, the former represents the main rationale underlying the policy 
exercise approach, the method at the core of the present study. The next section will 
briefly review the history of simulation gaming, the family of approaches to which the 
policy exercise belongs. Outside of the domain of the environment, these have had a 
long history that we will briefly touch upon before going into more detail on the 
specifics of policy exercises.  
2.2.2 Historical overview  
The origins of policy games lie in the military sphere, with some authors tracing the 
origin of modern war gaming as far back as early 19
th
 century Prussia (Caffrey, 2000). 
After the Second World War, war gaming evolved from a more narrow scope – the 
‘art of rehearsing for war’ (Mayer, 2009, 827), simulating, testing and exploring 
military postures and strategies in a socio-technical environment – to a more variable 
strategic tool to aid military decision-making under conditions of complexity and 
uncertainty. Around the same time, from the 1950s onwards, gaming-simulation 
methods spilled over from the military domain to related fields like international 
relations and crisis management. 
A growing realisation of the limitations of formalised methods and computer 
modelling in the 1960s and 1970s led to an increased focus on ‘softer’ methods for 
investigating complex socio-political problems, like scenario analysis and the Delphi 
method (Mayer, 2009). Simulation games were considered particularly useful in this 
regard, given their ability to combine quantitative and qualitative data (ibid.). Policy 
gaming may be most suited to environments about which an intermediate degree of 
information is available. In other words, knowledge about a subject needs to be 
sufficient for designing a simulation that achieves the necessary degree of 
representational fidelity, yet the issue is too complex for less costly, time-intensive 
methods to provide salient insights into options and solutions (Parson & Ward, 1998). 
The 1960s also saw first applications of simulation-gaming outside the military-
sphere, for business and strategy development. The RAND Corporation played a 
pivotal role in developing and piloting these methods, including simulation gaming, 
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which, from the 1970s onwards, started to be applied also to social and 
environmental issues. A second hub of the development of simulation-gaming was 
the University of Michigan, where Richard Duke set up a series of simulation games 
primarily on urban planning issues. Yet these, while focused on policy and planning, 
were used primarily in a training context, and had only very weak links to policy-
making (Mayer, 2009). Overall, the development of simulation gaming can be seen as 
part of a broader trend in the decision sciences in dealing with complexity, and 
weighing the opportunities and constraints of formal versus less formal approaches 
to policy analysis (ibid.).  
Simulation gaming had thus expanded its realm of application from a narrow military 
context to a much wider range of problems (Duke, 1974). This extension seemed to 
have a certain logic (Underwood & Duke, 1987, 294) as policy games were deemed 
particularly suitable to deal with crisis situations in strategic multi-actor contexts as 
well as with situations where there was a major need for institutional reform (Parson 
& Ward, 1998, 125). Over time, policy gaming applications have taken multiple 
shapes, from rigid, computer-supported formats and simulations to more flexible 
‘free-form’ games. Policy exercises belong to the latter category.  
What characterises a policy game? Authors tend to agree that policy games, and 
consequently also policy exercises, rely on two basic ingredients: first, participants or 
participant teams that take decisions independently from one another and without 
full information (Schelling, 1964) and second, a set of rules and an objective that 
guides their behaviour (Parson, 1996). There also seems to be agreement that games 
are a higher-order term than simulations. The latter ‘involves the representation of a 
system or organism by another system or model, which is designed to have relevant 
behavioral similarity with the original system’ (Brewer, 1974, 3). In this sense, all 
policy games are simulations, yet simulations often lack the requirement of 
‘independent decision centers’ (Schelling, 1964, 31) to be considered as games. 
Klabbers consequently suggests to do away with the hybrid terminology of 
simulation-games, gaming/simulation, etc. and to ‘call a game a game’ (Klabbers, 
2009, 459). 
According to Parson (1997), policy games draw their usefulness from combining two 
characteristics, representation and deliberation. The basis for any policy game is a 
simplified model of reality or the ‘system of reference’, which, however, retains the 
main actors, relationships and cause-effect chains (ibid.). Policy games, like game 
theory and modelling exercises, thus aim at reducing complexity through structured 
abstraction. At the same time, by relying on interaction between real-life 
stakeholders instead of agents with predefined preferences, policy games 
incorporate a strong deliberative element. Participants jointly explore the future 
‘possibility space’, building up a shared understanding of key concepts and searching 
creatively for solutions (Joldersma et al., 1995). Bots and van Daalen (2007) describe 
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six different functions that games can fulfil in policy development in the context of 
natural resources management: ‘research and analyze’ (games as a laboratory), 
‘design and recommend’ (games as a virtual design studio for policy options), 
‘provide strategic advice’ (games as ‘practice ring’ for a client), ‘mediate’ (games as 
facilitators in a consensus-seeking process), ‘democratize’ (games as a virtual 
consultation forum), and ‘clarify values and arguments’ (games as virtual 
parliaments). As we will see in the following, policy exercises fit most neatly into the 
‘design and recommend’ (games as a virtual design studio for policy options) category, 
but may also produce benefits for the other functions.  
2.2.3 The policy exercise format and its applications to climate change 
issues 
The idea of a policy exercise was first advocated by Brewer (1986), responding to the 
need for adapting the method of model-based gaming from a military or business 
context to the challenges of long-term policy development in complex social-
ecological systems. Brewer defined a policy exercise as a ‘deliberate procedure in 
which goals and objectives are systematically clarified and strategic alternatives are 
invented and evaluated in terms of the values at stake. The exercise is a preparatory 
activity for effective participation in official decision processes; its outcomes are not 
official decisions’ (Brewer, 1986, 468). Toth (1988a, 1988b) subsequently made an 
attempt to operationalise the concept and codify its design process. In Toth’s words, 
‘at the heart of the process [of a policy exercise] are scenario writing of ‘future 
histories’ and scenario analysis via the interactive formulation and testing of 
alternative policies that respond to challenges in the scenarios. These scenario-based 
activities take place in an organisational setting reflecting the institutional features of 
the problem at hand’ (Toth, 1988a, 237). Yet the specific approach and design steps 
that Toth advocates do not seem to have found widespread application by policy 
exercise practitioners, or at least this has not been documented (Mayer, 2009).  
While the term policy exercise has been interpreted differently and the format has 
varied from application to application, policy exercises do share some common 
elements. First of all, the structure of policy exercises is generally less rigid than for 
other types of policy games. Their primary goal is to advance thinking about 
unstructured, messy problems for which the set of relevant choices, cause-effect 
relationships and outcomes is controversial or unclear. Thus, while participants in a 
policy exercise, like in other forms of games, play roles and are tasked to make plans 
and decisions under a fictitious scenario, the storyline is often richer and more 
elaborate. A hypothetical future setting aims at removing participants from their day-
to-day reality and to encourage them to think creatively, be open to and search for 
new insights and ideas (Parson, 1997). Moreover, policy exercises rarely involve fixed 
scoring systems that reward or penalise actions by participants. Instead, a control 
team is often used to provide feedback on the decisions taken by the players and to 
update the scenario in between rounds (Duinker et al., 1993; Parson, 1995; Toth & 
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Hizsnyik, 2008). Even more important than the interim feedback is the joint 
evaluation of the dynamics and outcomes of the exercise by participants and the 
organising team following the event (van Asselt & Rijkens-Klomp, 2002). Finally, given 
its open format, the right choice of participants may be even more crucial for a policy 
exercise than for other games. This is often interpreted as implying that participants 
should have significant expertise and experience in order to be able to contribute 
meaningfully to the event and to ensure a sufficient degree of behavioural similarity 
to real policy-making processes (Parson, 1997). 
In terms of applications of the method, the Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) played an important pioneering role in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Other 
groups, like the Stockholm Environment Institute, have been active in the field as well. 
Also in the Netherlands, several ‘gaming style’ (Mayer, 2009, 839) policy exercises 
were implemented throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Policy exercises have been used 
on issues related to environmental policy, health, education, and regulatory policy 
reform (see Duke & Geurts, 2004, for examples). A number of applications have 
focused on various aspects of climate policy. Table 3 provides an overview.  
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When Organised by Focus of the exercise 
1990 Jill Jäger et al., Stockholm 
Environment Institute (Jäger, 
Sonntag, & Bernard, 1990) 
International climate policy  
1992 Ferenc Toth, funded by the 
United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) (Toth, 
1992)  
Adaptation options in South 
East Asia under different 
climate impact scenarios 
1993 Jan H. Klabbers et al., Dutch 
National Research Program 
on Global Air Pollution and 
Climate Change (NRP) 
(Klabbers et al., 1995) 
Policy options for climate 
policy 
1995 Ted Parson, Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) (Parson, 1995) 
Global climate negotiations - 
mitigation 
1997 Bernd Kasemir et al., EU 
research project ULYSSES 
(Kasemir et al., 2003) 
Potential of venture capital 
for climate policy 
2004 Kate Lonsdale et al., EU 
research project ATLANTIS 
(Lonsdale et al., 2008) 
Responses to extreme sea 
level rise in the Thames 
region  
2008 Kurt M. Campbell et al., 
Center for a New American 
Security (Burke & 
Parthemore, 2009) 
Security implications of future 
climate change for the United 
States 
2008/2009 Andrew Jones et al., 
Sustainability Institute, 
United States (Jones, 2009) 
Global climate negotiations - 
mitigation 
Since 2011 Red Cross Climate Centre 
(Bachofen et al., 2013; 
Mendler de Suarez et al., 
2012)  
Various games on climate risk 
management, including using 
climate information, disaster 
preparedness, and health 
issues  
Table 3. Past policy exercises focusing on climate change issues. 
2.2.4 Policy games and exercises and their potential for learning 
The rise of policy exercises reflects the hope and belief that such approaches would 
help policy-makers and scientists better understand real-world processes. The policy 
games literature accordingly features a great number of claims as to how games 
would support learning (see also Sections 5.1, 6.1, and 7.1). In the realm of cognitive 
learning, one benefit that is almost universally mentioned is the potential of policy 
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games to share and disseminate knowledge. The need for participants to take 
collective decisions and accomplish tasks under time pressure is said to foster a more 
intense exchange of information than would be possible in other workshop formats 
or forms of group work (Parson, 1997). Jones (1964) emphasises the speed with 
which information initially held by one person enters into common knowledge in a 
gaming situation. Schelling (1964, 23) explains this as follows:  
‘games are intensely stimulating, people are very active; ideas and conjectures 
get tossed around and analysed by a highly motivated group of people; a great 
deal of expertise is collected in a single room [...] people discover facts, ideas, 
possibilities, capabilities and arguments [...]’ 
Knowledge integration is another aspect that is frequently cited. It can take many 
forms: between different forms of knowledge, between quantitative and qualitative 
information, between models and strategic or behavioural principles (Parson, 1996b), 
and between different disciplines and different perspectives on an issue that diverse 
participants bring to the table (Brewer, 1986; Kriz, 2003; Underwood & Duke, 1987). 
The process of knowledge integration is said to have one crucial co-benefit, which 
Duke (1974, 11) describes as ‘gestalt awareness’, and which, according to Duke and 
Geurts (2004) constitutes the foremost objective of any policy game. The simulation 
character of a game supposedly aids participants in grasping the scope and depth of 
the issue at hand, as well as the different ways of reflecting on it (Schelling, 1964). 
Games thus are expected to provide a ‘potentially powerful variety amplifier [...] to 
develop systems awareness of the relevant issues surrounding a policy’ (Ryan, 2000, 
361). Duke considers gaming as the most advanced mode of communication (the title 
of his 1974 book refers to gaming as the ‘future’s language’). According to him, 
gaming enables a ‘multilogue’ among participants, allowing them to communicate at 
a sophisticated level and conveying messages that are rich in meaning (Duke, 1974, 
55).  
Still in the realm of cognitive learning, policy games have been lauded for stimulating 
creativity among participants and for acting as effective incubators of new ideas and 
hypotheses. Parson points to the ‘pressure, relevance, and distance’ inherent in 
gaming formats as key to bringing this about (Parson, 1996b, 241). The actions and 
decisions taken by the participants add an element of surprise and unpredictability to 
the gaming process that may lead to new insights into risks and contingencies, policy 
options or strategies (ibid.). But games may also help in recognising the ‘hidden face 
in the picture’ – insights into process and issues at the periphery of the topic that is 
being simulated (Schelling, 1964, 30). The results may deliver interesting input and 
hypotheses for further research as well as practical lessons for policy-making (Toth, 
1988a). Yet policy games may not just generate new ideas, they may also allow for 
interacting testing and experimenting with various options, policy processes, 
institutional arrangements and actor constellations (Underwood & Duke, 1987; Van 
der Meer & Geurts, 1995). The notion of the ‘safe environment’ that a game provides 
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is of importance here and represents a necessary precondition for experimentation 
(Mayer, 2009, 825). The possibility of building variations into the scenarios, rules, 
roles and participants of a game and of comparing the implications of these 
differences between runs lends more robustness to the futures aspect of analysis 
through gaming. As time is usually condensed in a gaming situation, the unfolding of 
a sequence of actions, events and their outcomes can be simulated and later 
analysed and discussed during the debriefing session (Vissers et al., 1995).  
Comparatively less has been written about the normative and relational learning 
potential of policy games. Although one of the functions of policy games listed by 
Bots and van Dalen (2007) is ‘mediation’, overcoming disagreements and consensus-
building or shifting viewpoints and values is not something that is much referred to in 
the theoretical literature on policy games, or listed as an explicit objective in many 
accounts of past applications of the method. Yet, where a policy game involves the 
development of new hypotheses or is used to test policy options or processes as 
described above, this may well involve normative learning for some or even all the 
participants, aside from the obvious cognitive learning benefits. Moreover, there is 
the argument that playing out antagonistic roles in a policy game may help 
participants to clarify underlying arguments and mind sets that otherwise remain 
implicit in policy discussions (Parson, 1996b; Underwood & Duke, 1987). While this 
may not yet constitute normative learning as such, it certainly represents an 
important precondition for it.  
In terms of relational learning, it is argued that by adopting a role that is different 
from their own in reality, participants may gain a better their understanding of their 
opponents’ mind sets, realise what determines their thinking and what constraints 
they are operating under (Van der Meer & Geurts, 1995).
 8
 Moreover, the intensely 
social experience in joint problem-solving that policy games provide supposedly 
creates ‘good fellowship’, and ‘lead[s] to remarkably good relations afterwards’ 
(Schelling, 1964, 25), even where individuals had fiercely opposed each other over 
the course of the game. The shared experiences form a common frame of reference 
that is said to enable participants to communicate more meaningfully after the game 
(Schelling, 1964, 28).  
Overall, strong claims regarding their learning benefits characterise many of the 
writings on policy games. Yet remarkably few works support these claims by 
systematic evaluations of actual game runs. We will address this gap in more detail in 
Chapter 3. For now, we can summarise that the theoretical literature expects policy 
                                                                
8
 This view, however, is qualified by Nemeth et al. (2001), who, based on social psychological 
research in group processes, find that devil’s advocate mechanisms like policy games are less 
effective in eliciting viewpoints and fostering a frank exchange of arguments than situations 
where an authentic conflict exists.  
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games to deliver particularly in the domain of cognitive, but also, especially if 
participants adopt roles that differ from their own in reality – in the domains of 
normative and relational learning. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 will examine in more detail to 
what extent the learning effects from the policy exercise runs evaluated in this thesis 
conform to these expectations.   
2.3 Summary 
This chapter argues that the notion of learning in and for environmental governance 
builds on several bodies of literature, of which the policy sciences, organisational 
theory, and natural resources and adaptive management are considered most 
relevant to the present work. Analyses of learning span a range of social units of 
analysis, from the level of the individual to policy-making systems at large. There are 
different views in the literature as to whether learning needs to result in an 
observable behavioural or policy change, and whether only certain types of change 
qualify as learning. Contrary to many typologies which embrace a hierarchical 
understanding of learning, this thesis argues that differentiating between cognitive, 
normative and relational learning may be a more appropriate way of conceptualising 
learning in an environmental governance context. Learning is conceptualised as a 
change in understanding which in the first instance occurs at the level of the 
individual. Cognitive learning is defined here as the acquisition of new knowledge and 
facts, or the better structuring of existing knowledge, enabling more holistic or 
systems thinking. Normative learning refers to shifts in views, values or paradigms, 
which may vary in their degree of abstraction and social embeddedness. Relational 
learning finally involves a better understanding of others’ mind sets, the 
development of trust and/or a better ability to cooperate.  
The second part of the chapter placed the policy exercise, the appraisal method that 
is at the core of the empirical research in this thesis, into its wider context. Policy 
games and policy exercises belong to the tradition of integrated assessment. 
Originally developed in a military context, over time the method has been applied to 
an ever wider range of problems in strategic multi-actor contexts. The policy exercise, 
a sub form of the policy game, has often been the method of choice of issues of 
global environmental change as it responded to the need of adjusting model-based 
games to the challenges of long-term policy development in socio-ecological systems. 
Typically, participants in a policy game assume roles and take decisions in a 
structured setting that represents a simplified model of the system of reference that 
the game is supposed to represent. There are many claims in the literature as to the 
great learning potential policy games offer to participants, from improved knowledge 
integration to stimulating creativity for developing novel policy options, but also 
normative and relational benefits are mentioned.  
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3. Measuring participants’ learning in policy 
exercises 
This chapter sets out to achieve four objectives. First, it critically assesses the state of 
the art regarding evaluations of participants’ learning effects from participatory 
appraisal exercises. Second, it presents the efforts undertaken in this study to 
improve this state of the art, outlining several innovations in the evaluation 
framework and measurement tools. Third, it introduces the two policy exercises 
which later serve as empirical cases for our attempts to assess the learning effects of 
policy games. Finally, it discusses the remaining limitations in terms of research 
design and measurements.  
3.1 The scarcity of systematic attempts at measuring learning 
in appraisals 
Given the cost, time and effort involved in designing, setting up and running 
participatory appraisal exercises, one would expect a significant degree of evaluation 
activity to accompany them. Yet while claims are often made about the significant 
learning potential of such processes for participants (see Chapter 2), the lack of 
robust assessments in this area is striking. In a systematic review of analyses of social 
learning in a natural resource management context, Rodela et al. (2012) find hardly 
any studies in their sample that would qualify as evaluations in terms of research 
design, whereas quite a number of papers use ‘hindsight’ in reflecting on the extent 
of social learning through an appraisal process in an ex-post manner. Blackstock et al. 
(2007, 729) equally comment that, despite a rise in participatory projects on 
sustainability and the burgeoning literature on evaluation,  
‘there appears to be no corresponding systematic evaluation of their impact or 
much sustained reflection on the lessons learnt … Until such literature exists, the 
assumptions regarding the substantive, instrumental and normative benefits of 
PR [participatory research, C.H.], outlined above, remain unexplored.’  
Over the past few years, however, some attempts have been made to start 
addressing this gap. Among the first were van de Kerkhof (2004) and Cuppen (2009). 
Cuppen draws on pre- and post-measurements using Q methodology to map a 
change of perspectives over the course of a stakeholder dialogue. Yet both have 
operated broad conceptualisations of learning and, in Cuppen’s case, have not 
explored learning dynamics in greater, qualitative detail. Schively (2007) and Deyle 
and Schively Slotterback (2009) have also done work in this area, seeking to measure 
group learning in participatory planning processes, using pre- and post-
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questionnaires. Garmendia and Stagl (2010) adopted a similar approach to evaluate 
social learning outcomes of sustainability appraisals. Muro and Jeffrey (2012), finally, 
used a postal survey to assess social learning from two participatory river basin 
management initiatives, measuring cognitive and relational changes as well as the 
extent of consensus-building over the course of the process. Especially the 
endeavours by Garmendia and Stagl and Muro and Jeffrey resulted in relatively 
sophisticated operationalisations of social learning and have raised the bar in this 
area. Yet their reliance on only one evaluation method – written surveys – and the 
lack of pre-measurements in Muro’s and Jeffrey’s case – leaves them with a less-
than-complete picture of learning processes and outcomes as well as their underlying 
dynamics.  
The lack of robust evaluations of learning outcomes from appraisal processes in 
general is much the same if not more acute for policy games. The lion share of work 
done on the effects of policy games has taken place in educational contexts, i.e. on 
games as a teaching tool (Duke & Geurts, 2004; Ulrich, 1997), which present a 
specific set of issues and challenges. Most accounts of policy games in other settings, 
with the exception of a few more systematic studies (Duffhues et al., 2014; Mayer et 
al., 2014; Zhou, 2014; Bekebrede, 2010; Roelofs, 2000; de Caluwé, 1997), present 
largely anecdotal evidence of satisfaction, drawing on a few quotes of participants or 
on short ex post evaluation surveys (c.f. Duke & Geurts, 2004), often leaving aside the 
question of the broader impact of the game. This is also related to the context in 
which gaming exercises usually take place; as Duke and Geurts (2004, 211) remark, in 
many cases  
‘research efforts have to be interwoven with the uses of games in applied 
settings. As a consequence, most empirical research on policy gaming is a 
compromise and it is often quite limited from a research-design perspective.’  
It is interesting to note that while all the studies referred to above find some 
evidence for learning in the appraisals they investigated, their results are clearly 
more limited than those reported in similar analyses drawing only on interviews or 
participant observation. As Armitage et al. (2008, 87) comment, ‘[t]hat individual and 
group learning is slow, inconsistent and/or unexpected […] should come as no 
surprise, despite the value placed on learning as a goal and a process.’ But it may not 
only be that learning in such exercises or processes is happening to a lesser extent 
than designers and organisers assume; detecting learning where it occurs is certainly 
part of the challenge. Crookall and Thorngate (2009, 19), looking at policy games 
from a learning perspective, frame it in the following way: ‘it is easier to ‘see’ 
participants’ progress than to measure it; we intuitively sense that simulation/ games 
help people to learn, even if it is difficult to ‘prove’.’ Such statements, however, 
highly unsatisfactory from a research perspective, only underscore the need for more 
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efforts to systematically assess of the effects of these methods, so as to be able to 
further confirm or qualify these intuitions.  
In conclusion, despite some progress there is still a significant gap when it comes to 
systematically measuring learning effects from appraisal processes in environmental 
governance. This thesis aims to further conceptual and methodological progress in 
this area by devising and testing an evaluation framework that captures different 
dimensions of learning through various instruments. This approach could become a 
standard to be applied more widely, providing both commissioning agents and 
designers of appraisals with valuable feedback as to the benefits and limitations of 
their chosen approaches, also with a view to facilitate cross-case comparison. The 
next section presents some broader considerations on how to best measure learning, 
before outlining the evaluation framework developed in this thesis in more detail.  
3.2 Tools for measuring learning 
3.2.1 Some overarching considerations 
What tools to choose to measure learning? Blackstock et al. (2007) recommend a 
combination of recorded (such as documents and field observations) and reported 
data (such as interviews and surveys) for this purpose. They further plead for a strong 
qualitative component in such investigations, in order to allow for the  
‘study of a case in depth and detail, capturing the richness of people's 
perceptions and experiences in their own terms and developing an analytical 
understanding through the aggregation of these individual accounts’ 
(Blackstock et al., 2007, 732).  
The evaluation framework devised in this thesis  conforms to these 
recommendations.
9
 The measurements, which combine surveys and concept maps 
with participant observations and interviews, mix recorded and reported as well as 
qualitative and quantitative data. As stipulated by Patton (1990), this thesis thus 
makes use of both method and data triangulation. Moreover, it carefully 
differentiates between different types of learning. In doing so, we break new ground 
in learning from policy games and other types of appraisals, which mostly relied on 
just one or two evaluation instruments and which were usually less explicit about 
exactly what types of learning they were measuring. 
                                                                
9
 See also Mayer et al. (2014) for their comprehensive framework for the evaluation of 
simulation games.  
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Another crucial question in the context of evaluating learning from appraisals is the 
question at which point(s) in time to apply the measurements. Ideally, data should be 
‘gathered at multiple points throughout the process’ (Blackstock et al., 2007, 732) 
and, most importantly, capture the situation before and after the treatment – in our 
case, the policy exercise – to strengthen the internal validity of the research. We did 
this by means of pre- and post-questionnaires as well as pre- and post- concept maps 
(see Figure 1 for a timeline of the whole evaluation effort). Ideally, there should also 
be a further evaluative moment at a later stage to account for the fact that some 
learning might occur only upon reflection, sometime after the exercise. When using 
recorded measurements, the specific learning effect of the exercise may however be 
difficult to distinguish from the impact of other experiences at this stage. Therefore, 
we relied on self-reported data through interviews with participants for this purpose.  
 
Figure 1. Timeline of the evaluation framework. 
A final issue in measuring the learning effect of appraisals exercises, already invoked 
in Chapter 2, relates to the question of the appropriate level of analysis. While 
learning occurs through intense interactions in a social setting, measurements are in 
principle only possible at the level of the individual. This tension is unlikely be 
resolved completely, but a combination of group-based and individual assessments 
may go some way in addressing it. In our research design, the debriefing sessions 
following each exercise allowed for a joint process of sense-making among 
participants while interviews, surveys, and concept maps captured participants’ 
individual perceptions and attitudes.
10
 Protocols from the debriefings have also 
informed the analysis of learning effects in the subsequent chapters.  
                                                                
10
 As discussed in Chapter 2, the present thesis studies learning at the individual level, and the 
group means used in the statistical analysis of survey and concept maps are simply 
aggregations of measurements at the level of the individual. This does not rule out the 
possibility of additional learning as an emergent property from the collective learning 
experience participants underwent in the policy exercise, which in turn may have added to 
learning at the individual level (and hence impacted group means). It is however impossible to 
filter this out with the research design and methods employed. 
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Building on these general considerations, the following section describes the 
different measurement instruments used in this research in greater detail. Table 4 
provides an indication of the focus of each instrument with regard to analysing the 
three types of learning introduced in Chapter 2.  
Table 4. Measurement instruments and types of learning. Dark grey shades indicate that a 
particular tool provided ‘important evidence’ on a type of learning, whereas light grey shades 
indicate that a tool served as a ‘supplementary data source’ that helped confirm or nuance 
findings obtained from other sources.   
3.2.2 The evaluation framework in detail 
Concept maps 
The most innovative element in our set of instruments to measure learning is the use 
of concept maps. A concept map is a structural representation ‘consisting of nodes 
representing concepts and […] lines denoting the relation between a pair of nodes’ 
(Ruiz-Primo & Shavelson, 1996, 1). Concept maps, also known as mind maps, are 
related to other methods such as causal or cognitive maps. They have been used for a 
variety of purposes, from creative brainstorming to project management, and as 
planning tools. Yet they also have a history as devices for assessment, especially in 
higher education (Novak, 1998; Ruiz-Primo & Shavelson, 1996). Various 
methodologies have been developed for tracing learning through concept maps, 
among others by Morine-Dershimer (1993).  
How were the maps used in the research for this study? Immediately prior to and 
after each policy exercise, participants were asked to draw concept maps of what 
they considered to be key aspects of the topic they had been deliberating about, 
‘burden-sharing in European climate policy’ and ‘setting up a global REDD fund’. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the pre- and post-concept map of one expert participant in the 
exercise on EU burden-sharing. Comparing changes between the pre- and post-
concepts maps based on a methodology developed by Morine-Dershimer (1993) 
allowed to detect how the concepts mentioned by participants gained or lost in 
importance, or were elaborated in more or less detail from the pre- to post-maps. 
The method relies on a coding of the items on the maps and is based on two key 
 Cognitive learning Normative learning Relational learning 
Concept maps    
Interviews    
Surveys       
Participant observations    
Debriefing    
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principles, (1) centrality – the proximity of certain concepts to the core of the map, 
which can be taken as an indicator how salient they are in the perception of the 
author and (2) specificity – the detail with which certain concepts are elaborated on 
the map, expressed through the proportional frequency with which these occur. A 
comparison of shifts in the centrality and specificity of concepts from the pre- to the 
post-measurements therefore allows tracing changes in the structuring of knowledge 
as well as newly perceived relevance of certain aspects. The assessment methodology 
is explained in more detail in Chapter 5, which focuses on the cognitive learning 
effects of the policy exercises.  
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Figure 2. Concept map by one expert participant before the policy exercise on burden-sharing. 
 
 
Figure 3. Concept map by the same participant after the policy exercise. 
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Surveys 
Survey data, consisting of a pre- and a post-exercise questionnaire, fulfilled several 
functions in the research design. Pre-questionnaires, which participants were asked 
to complete online about one week prior to the exercise, first inquired about 
participants’ professional backgrounds, their motivation for participating in the policy 
exercise, their knowledge on various aspects of the topic that was being simulated, 
and if and how they had prepared for the policy exercise.  
Beyond this, pre- and post-questionnaires both contained the same set of normative 
statements concerning, depending on the exercise, either EU-internal burden-sharing 
or REDD, to which participants were asked to express their agreement or 
disagreement on a bipolar likert scale. The objective of this part of the survey was to 
measure normative changes from the pre- to the post-measurement, a technique 
which has been used in similar settings for instance by Schively (2007), Groves et al. 
(2008), Deyle and Schively Slotterback (2009), Huitema et al. (2010), and Garmendia 
and Stagl (2010). Like Schively (2007) and Garmendia and Stagl (2010), we opted for a 
panel research design, where pre-test and post-test responses of individual 
participants were matched. While this sacrificed their anonymity, and may have 
reinforced testing biases like the Hawthorne effect,
11
 the possibility to trace 
individual changes from pre- to post-measurement was considered important enough 
to warrant this. The normative statements were presented in matrix formatting, but 
the directionality of their content was deliberately mixed, in order to avoid a 
‘response set’, where individuals tick boxes without properly considering their 
meaning (Ruane, 2005).  
Post-questionnaires further contained a number of self-assessment questions with 
regard to cognitive, normative, and relational learning through the exercise. Except 
for an open question, which prompted participants to formulate the three most 
important insights they were taking away from the exercise, most questions were 
presented in closed-ended format, to reduce the number of non-responses (Ruane, 
2005) and to facilitate subsequent analysis (Czaja & Blair, 2005). Neutral response 
categories were generally not included in the sets of possible answers, in order to 
prevent those participants who might not immediately have a strong preference for 
one of the options from taking the ‘easy way out’ (Czaja & Blair, 2005, 78). The 
wording of some survey questions was adjusted slightly for the second policy exercise, 
based on experience with the first, but remained similar enough to allow for 
comparison and common analysis. 
                                                                
11
 The Hawthorne effect describes a situation where the participants in an experiment behave 
differently not as a consequence of the experimental manipulation but because they are aware 
that their actions are being observed (Draper, 2006).  
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The data analysis was conducted using SPSS. Apart from a descriptive analysis of the 
variables, we mainly used analysis of variances to test for shifts in group means from 
pre-test to post-test as well as for differences among the different cohorts 
participating in the policy exercise. Moreover, correlation analysis served to 
investigate the impact of other factors that may have helped or impeded the learning 
process.  
Interviews 
Interviews formed an important part of the evaluation framework, and were 
intended to provide the qualitative richness that Blackstock et al. (2007) called for. By 
conducting ex post interviews with the participants, we sought to complement the 
insights on participants’ self-reported learning gained from the survey data. Our 
interviews focused in particular on the domain of relational learning (which, given its 
´soft´ nature, was more difficult to explore through other tools), as well as the futures’ 
element of the policy exercise and the perceived novelty and usefulness of its 
outcomes. A sample interview guide for one policy exercise run is included in Annex 
1.A. Since we did not have the capacity to interview all participants after the runs, we 
took care to interview a set of respondents which was representative in terms of the 
professional (or, for the students, academic) backgrounds present at the exercise. 
They took place two to four weeks after the policy exercise, wherever possible in 
person but otherwise by phone. We considered this an adequate time span to both 
allow for some reflection after the policy exercise while preventing that other 
experiences would drown out specific memories of it.  
Process observations and tape recordings 
As with our interviews, our process observations also concentrated primarily on the 
relational dimension of the policy exercise. During the exercises with professionals, 
two members of the organising team took notes on the interactions between 
participants based on an observation protocol, focusing mainly on the style of 
interactions and on activity patterns of individual participants. We were particularly 
interested to what extent participants identified with their roles, how they dealt with 
the constraints imposed by the scenario, and with the futures context of the exercise 
in general. The recordings were made with the prior consent of all participants, and 
the presence of the small tape recorders was quickly forgotten over the course of the 
day. 
Debriefing 
At the end of each run, a debriefing session allowed participants to share their 
experiences and to engage in a discussion of what happened during the exercise, 
what the implications were, and what they were taking away from it. Typically, 
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debriefings of simulation games should address three key aspects (Lederman, 1984, 
1992): validity (i.e. the extent of relevant behavioural similarity achieved between the 
exercise and reality), reliability (in terms of the sequence of events and actions taken 
by participants, and to what extent they were logical and predictable) and utility – i.e. 
the benefits of the exercise, in terms of learning and otherwise. We dealt with each 
of these issues in turn, in an open discussion format moderated by the chair of the 
exercise (for the questions on content) and the facilitator (for the questions on 
process). The sessions were tape-recorded and notes were taken by the organising 
team. A guide for a debriefing session is included in Annex 1.B. 
In conclusion, we used a wide range of evaluation instruments to assess and cross-
validate our three dimensions of learning. The insights gained from the survey data, 
the concept maps, and the ex post interviews were the most important in informing 
our analysis of the learning effects from the policy exercise which will be presented in 
the subsequent chapters. The ‘softer’ observations on the dynamics of the policy 
exercise process and the debriefing were however instrumental to yielding additional 
insights. In the subsequent analysis, we will clearly indicate which evaluation 
instruments we rely upon. We now turn to introducing our empirical cases, two 
policy exercises designed to explore two pivotal aspects of international climate 
policy.  
3.3 Research design  
3.3.1 Two policy exercises on international climate policy 
The set-up of this study follows a multiple-case research design. We draw on a total 
of four runs of two different policy exercises. For lack of thorough empirical studies 
on learning from policy games (see previous section), we could not base our case 
selection on established hypotheses. The themes of the two policy exercises were 
nonetheless chosen very deliberately. Both deal with topical issues in international 
climate policy, and both address unresolved, complex puzzles, yet which that are 
limited enough in scope to allow for advancing knowledge within one day, the 
duration of the policy exercise. The first policy exercise focused on EU-internal 
burden-sharing – the question how future greenhouse gas reduction commitments 
should be allocated among member states of the European Union (EU). The subject 
of the second policy exercise was the design of a fund to be established under the 
global climate regime to compensate developing countries for reducing their 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (‘REDD’).  
Policy exercises are considered well suited to addressing institutional questions in 
complex multi-actor settings as they provide a deliberative yet structured venue for 
interactions among their participants (Parson, 1996b). Issues relating international 
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climate policy certainly fit this description and have been addressed in such settings a 
number of times already (for examples, see Table 3 in Chapter 2). A key aspect that 
burden-sharing and REDD finance have in common is their strong equity implications: 
poorer, less developed countries will only commit to climate mitigation if it is 
adequately supported by their wealthier counterparts. Moreover, the two topics 
embody central elements of the global climate regime: the burden-sharing issue 
exemplifies the core of the targets-and-timetables debate, and REDD finance hones 
in on the discussion on the so-called flexible mechanisms, where industrialised 
countries pay (or implement projects in) developing countries for reducing their 
emissions.  
While comparable in the significance that issues of international equity take, the two 
issues differ in one crucial aspect that may also have an effect on the different types 
of learning that we can expect from the runs: their position in the policy cycle. The 
stages model of the policy cycle divides the policy process into separate steps of 
agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making, implementation and evaluation. 
While discredited as empirically inaccurate in its assumption of a linearity of the 
policy process (Sabatier, 2007), this model still serves as a useful basic heuristic to 
describe the state of maturity of a policy (Jann & Wegrich, 2007). Following this logic, 
burden-sharing approaches to climate change mitigation can be considered more 
mature insofar as such approaches have been discussed and implemented in 
European – and international – climate policy since the early 1990s. REDD on the 
other hand has made it onto the agenda of the global climate negotiations only 
recently and currently finds itself at the policy formulation stage. This difference in 
maturity of the topic may have implications for the potential for participants’ 
cognitive and normative learning, as we discuss in Chapters 5 and 6.   
We held two runs of each policy exercise, one with a group of policy-makers and 
experts, and one with Master’s students in Environment and Resource Management 
at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
12
 The differences in background between the 
expert and the student group allowed us to study possible relationships between 
different levels of experience and expertise and the various types of learning taking 
place in the policy exercise. The runs with students thus served to strengthen the 
external validity of the study by expanding the number of observations and repeating 
the intervention under slightly varying conditions. At the same time, the design of the 
exercise on EU burden-sharing and on REDD finance was kept as similar as possible in 
order to keep variations that might have an impact on the dependent variable to a 
minimum. Both policy exercises were embedded within larger collaborative research 
projects under the EU Sixth and Seventh Framework Programme. The burden-sharing 
                                                                
12
 http://www.vu.nl/en/programmes/international-masters/programmes/e-f/environment-
and-resource-management/index.asp  
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exercise was organised in the context of the ADAM Project (‘ADaptation And 
Mitigation Strategies: supporting future European climate policy’).
13
 The REDD-ALERT 
project (‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation through 
Alternative Landuses in Rainforests of the Tropics’)
14
 provided the setting for the 
exercise on REDD financing. More details on the design and set-up of the two policy 
exercises are provided in Chapter 4.  
The topics of the exercises were high on the international political agenda at the time 
of the expert runs. This, together with the visibility and reputation of the overarching 
research projects and the fact that we successfully recruited well-known chairs for 
both events, enabled us to attract two groups of very knowledgeable, experienced 
mid-career experts and policy-makers to the workshops. Prior to the exercises, 
scoping interviews with key stakeholders had helped us sharpen the focus and 
questions to be addressed in the workshops and contributed to identifying key 
experts and policy-makers to be invited. 22 experts from ten, mostly European 
countries participated in the burden-sharing exercise. The REDD exercise included an 
even more international group of 17 experts, with representation from three 
different continents and a variety of backgrounds. Participant lists for both events are 
provided in Annex 1.C.  
Experts from think tanks and academia made up the single largest group of 
participants in both policy exercises, with other participants coming from non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), consultancy, policy-making, and the private 
sector. Based on the information they provided in the ex-ante surveys, participants’ 
self-reported level of expertise on the issue discussed at the workshop (European 
climate policy/burden-sharing and REDD, respectively) varied from medium to very 
high. Attracting national and EU level policy-makers to the events proved 
unfortunately difficult despite significant efforts on our part – a challenge which is 
not unusual for PIA endeavours (Toth, 2003). Busy agendas and the difficulty of 
convincing higher echelons of the hierarchy of the usefulness of travelling to a 
workshop that may not be perceived as key for day-to-day work are the likely reasons. 
In the end, however, a few individuals with long-standing experience in policy-making 
did participate in both events. In the burden-sharing case, we managed to attract a 
rather crucial actor in this policy domain, the expert at the European Commission in 
charge of the burden-sharing portfolio who at the time was managing the negotiation 
process of the ‘effort sharing decision’ on EU-internal post-2012 burden-sharing.  
For the students, participation in the policy exercise was a compulsory part of the 
Environmental Policy module in their master’s course Environment and Resource 
                                                                
13
 Contract No. 018476-GOCE 
14
 Project No: 226310 
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Management. Students in this course come from a variety of academic backgrounds 
(ranging from engineering to philosophy) and from a wide range of nationalities. 
While the Master’s students of the 2009/2010 academic year participated in the 
policy exercise on burden-sharing, those studying for their Master’s in 2010/2011 
took part in the exercise on REDD financing. In total, 65 students joined the burden-
sharing exercise (divided into three different groups over the course of two days), 
and 86 participated in the REDD exercise (divided into four different groups over two 
days).  
3.3.2 Examining the resulting learning effects 
We examined the learning effects resulting from the policy exercise runs from several 
angles. Because the participants in the two student groups and in the two expert 
groups can be considered quite similar, we were able to systematically compare 
learning effects along two axes. On the one hand, we were able to isolate the effects 
of high (experts) vs. relatively low expertise (students). On the other hand, we were 
able to compare the impact of a ‘mature’ policy topic (EU burden-sharing) vs. that of 
a novel topic (REDD financing). Figure 4 below visualises these two dimensions, along 
which we have aggregated and disaggregated our empirical data in the following 
chapters. We also sought to examine the possible impact that a number of contextual 
factors may have had on participants’ learning, such as their professional and 
academic backgrounds, their reasons for participating in the policy exercise 
(applicable only for the expert groups), as well as the roles they assumed during the 
intervention.  
 
Figure 4. Policy exercise runs and axes along which they are compared. 
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While the limited existing literature on the learning effects from policy games does 
not provide any basis for hypothesis-testing, the following table formulates a number 
of tentative propositions on what we expected participants might learn from the 
exercises, as well as possible relationships between the analytical matrix sketched 
out above and the cognitive, normative and relational learning effects from the policy 
exercises. We will come back to these in the empirical chapters 5, 6 and 7, as well as 
in the concluding chapter 8 (see Table 22 for a summary of the findings in this regard).  
 Expected learning foci 
within the three learning 
types 
Expected 
differences 
between 
expert and 
student 
groups 
Expected 
differences 
between the 
more mature 
policy issue 
(EU burden-
sharing) and 
the less 
mature one 
(REDD 
financing) 
Expected 
relevance of 
contextual 
factors 
Cognitive 
learning 
Understanding/awareness 
of policy options and their 
feasibility; both for 
current and future policy; 
policy dynamics 
(especially for students) 
Higher for 
students than 
for experts 
Higher for 
REDD 
financing 
(only for 
expert 
groups) 
Higher for 
participants 
with lower 
baseline 
knowledge; for 
experts further 
removed from 
policy-making 
and students 
with less 
related 
academic 
backgrounds;   
Normative 
learning 
Changes in the perception 
of the desirability and 
feasibility of policy 
options and design 
features; no expectation 
of normative convergence 
Higher for 
students than 
for experts 
Higher for 
REDD 
financing 
(only for 
expert 
groups) 
Higher for 
participants 
with lower 
baseline 
knowledge; 
higher for roles 
further 
removed from 
reality 
Relational 
learning 
Perspectives and interests 
of the countries 
represented in the policy 
exercise 
Higher for 
students than 
for experts 
No 
differences 
anticipated 
No specific 
expectations 
Table 5. Propositions on the learning effects of the policy exercises.  
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3.4 Scope and limits of the study  
Given the dearth of studies seeking to systematically evaluate learning effects from 
policy games, the research presented in this thesis is largely exploratory in character. 
Its goal is to gain insights into a relatively new and little researched phenomenon 
(Mouton & Marais, 1988; Ruane, 2005). The fact that we have analysed two 
comparable policy exercises and conducted two runs of each, however, enhances the 
generalisability of our findings (Stebbins, 2001; R. K. Yin, 2003). Furthermore, the 
external and internal validity of the research is underpinned by a pre-test–post-test 
design. Different, alternately independent tools (surveys, interviews, process 
observations, and concept maps) are used to ascertain that changes in the dependent 
variable (cognition, attitude, views of participants) are indeed attributable to 
participation in the policy exercise.  
In terms of scope, it is important to underline that the present thesis focuses on 
participants’ learning from the policy exercises. The question to what extent, if at all, 
the lessons learnt from the expert workshops may have filtered through to policy-
making is beyond its scope. Moreover, while the final chapter includes some 
reflections on the experiences of the organising team in developing and running the 
policy exercises, this study does not attempt to compile a comprehensive evaluation 
of the events, beyond the learning effects they generated. The same goes for the 
lessons that the exercises hold for simulation gaming as a discipline. Finally, while the 
nearly identical design of the policy exercises on EU burden-sharing and on REDD 
enhanced the robustness of between-group comparisons of learning effects, it may 
also limit the generalisability of the findings for policy exercises that are designed 
differently (although our set-up can be regarded as fairly typical for this type of 
appraisal).  
This thesis also faces a number of limitations with regard to research design and data 
availability. First, a control group would have strengthened the research design. It 
would have increased the certainty that the differences between pre- and post-
measurements can indeed be attributed to the ‘treatment’, i.e. participation in the 
policy exercise. We have sought to compensate for this by taking the pre- and post-
measurements as close in time as possible to the policy exercise itself (in order to 
minimise the effect of other, potentially confounding factors). We also cross-checked 
them with self-reported information from post-surveys and interviews. Setting up a 
fully equivalent control group would have been very difficult, given the international 
provenance of participants and their diverse backgrounds. We initially considered 
approaching individuals who had been invited but had declined to participate in the 
policy exercise to partake in a control group. Yet we eventually abandoned the idea 
as it would have been hard to ensure equivalence between the two groups (given 
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that the decision to participate was essentially a ‘self-selecting’ criterion) and also to 
secure their commitment for the measurements.
15
 
One might also have considered comparing the learning effects from the policy 
exercise with those of another method, for instance a more conventional seminar or 
a Delphi exercise. While such an approach would have introduced an additional level 
of variation on the independent variable it would have implied added methodological 
and logistical challenges (e.g. the difficulty of recruiting two comparable and 
sufficiently large groups of experts to partake in an intervention on the same topic, as 
well as timing the two exercises to take place more or less simultaneously). We 
therefore opted for a more ‘within-case’ research design with variation in terms of 
the topic of the exercise and the level of expertise of the participants. 
 A third, unrelated limitation in the research design is the fact that the organising 
team was also responsible for the evaluation of the policy exercises, implying the risk 
of evaluator bias. Finally, the data collected itself has limitations. Measuring learning 
– in any context – is a complex task, even more so in a setting as ours, where 
relatively high-powered and knowledgeable professionals come together for a short 
time span and are required to invest a lot in terms of concentration and input. Self-
reported measures in such a context inevitably face biases. Participants may both 
over-estimate learning in an effort to be courteous to the workshop host and/or 
underestimate learning effects because of a reluctance to admit to learning in a field 
where they consider themselves experts. At a more practical level, the surveys and 
concept maps were a task that came on top of a strenuous workshop, which took 
these professionals off their busy day-to-day schedule. This had repercussions for the 
response rate, especially the post-measurements: after a long day, many participants 
wanted to get home without any further delay. This problem was particularly marked 
for the policy exercise on burden-sharing: while the response rate for the ex-ante 
concepts maps was close to 100%, the rate afterwards was considerably lower. In the 
end, this effectively resulted in comparable ex ante and ex post concept maps from 
only five participants. For the REDD exercise, the picture was slightly more positive; in 
total, we received complete sets of pre- and post- concept maps from nine out of 
                                                                
15
 One might also contest that the validity of measurements in the student exercises might 
have benefitted from exercise participation being voluntary, or against financial reward. 
However, this would have introduced additional bias in terms of motivation, which could be 
avoided by the whole class of master students being required to attend the exercise. It was 
made clear to the students at the outset that the exercise was placed outside the regular 
curriculum of the course and that while  participation in it was mandatory, there would be no 
grading of the level of participation or of the responses in the survey and interviews, and that 
these would not be shared with the main instructor of the course.  
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fifteen participants.
16
 For the pre- and post-surveys of both exercises, the responses 
rates were 65 and 78% respectively.
17
 As a consequence, sample sizes used in 
statistical tests reported in later chapters were quite small in a number of instances, 
which may have prevented us from picking up medium-sized or small statistical 
effects in the data. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has argued that, despite the rise of interactive appraisals in 
environmental governance, systematic evaluations of their learning effects are still 
largely lacking. The efforts thus far undertaken to address this gap fall short on 
several counts: the appraisals sometimes do not sufficiently distinguish between 
different types of learning, but above all they rarely involve a sufficient set of 
measurement tools and controls to allow for robust findings. The present thesis aims 
to set a higher conceptual and methodological standard in this respect by devising a 
comprehensive evaluation framework that captures the cognitive, normative and 
relational dimension of learning in environmental governance. This framework makes 
use of a variety of measurement instruments (concept maps, surveys, interviews, 
participant observations, collective debriefing) employed at multiple points in time. It 
thereby complies with the standards stipulated in the evaluation literature, which 
underscore that that assessments of learning should combine multiple methods and 
data sources and measure learning longitudinally. Two policy exercises on topics in 
international climate policy provide the empirical case for applying this framework. 
Addressing the issues of EU burden-sharing and REDD financing, both treat complex, 
unresolved puzzles that have a strong multi-actor, equity dimension. Both exercises 
were run twice, once with international experts and once with Master’s students. 
This multiple-case research design allows for comparing learning effects across the 
different groups, by disaggregating and aggregating the resulting evaluation data 
along two axes: the maturity of the topic of the exercise (EU burden-sharing being a 
‘mature’ policy topic, whereas REDD financing being more ‘novel’) and the level of 
expertise of the participants. Finally, the chapter underlined the limitations of the 
research in terms of scope and research design. Regarding its scope, the thesis 
focused firmly on participants’ learning, and did not attempt a comprehensive 
evaluation of the policy exercises in general. In terms of data and research design, 
the lack of a fully equivalent control group and the limited response rates for the 
                                                                
16
 For the expert runs of both the burden-sharing and the REDD exercise, we excluded two and 
three individuals respectively from the evaluation as they had been involved into the research 
process leading up to the policy exercise and thus presented a risk of bias.  
17
 The response rate was less of an issue for the student runs as participation in the exercise 
and the surrounding activities was mandatory for them. The response rates here were over 
80%.   
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post-exercise surveys and concept maps in the expert groups represent the most 
important constraints.   
 56 
 
4. Simulating future climate policy – the ADAM 
and the REDD-ALERT policy exercise 
Whereas the two preceding chapters provided the theoretical and methodological 
backdrop to this research, this chapter describes the thesis’ empirical context and 
content – the two policy exercises on international climate policy that we organised 
and ran. The chapter starts out with some general considerations about good 
practice in game design and the specific approach taken in this regard. It then turns 
to introduce the context of the topic that was explored in the two exercises, EU 
burden-sharing and REDD financing. The main part of the chapter then describes the 
design and set-up of the exercises, reviewing the outcomes and broader findings that 
emerged from the different runs.  
4.1 The game design process 
Designing policy games has been described as both an analytical and a creative 
process (Klabbers, 2006). The analytical aspect relates to the care that needs to be 
taken to create a model of reality that captures key dynamics of the system of 
reference in order for a game to yield valid results. Yet the process of scenario-
writing and the translation of the system of reference into game elements and 
paraphernalia also require a substantial amount of creativity on behalf of the game 
designers.  
Good practice stipulates an iterative, multi-step approach to the design of simulation-
games, where the specific objectives of the game are gradually specified and the pilot 
design is tested and fine-tuned before the actual run. (Duke & Geurts, 2004; Duke, 
1974; Greenblat & Duke, 1975; Salen & Zimmerman, 2006). The present study 
followed a five-step procedure to game design advocated by Duke (Duke & Geurts, 
2004; Duke, 1974). In total, more than half a year of preparation effort went into the 
design of each policy exercise, including in-depth background research on their topic, 
interviews with experts in these areas, and discussions with simulation-gaming 
experts to test preliminary ideas on game design. After a first preparatory phase, 
which involved clarifying the context of the larger research projects and the role that 
our policy exercises would play in them, the next stage was dedicated to problem 
specification, resulting in a ‘narrowly defined concern that the problem is to address’ 
(Duke & Geurts, 2004, 281). This was captured in a concise ‘problem statement’ that 
we drew up and discussed within the organising team for both exercises. The 
subsequent step consisted in establishing clear goals and objectives for the policy 
game to guide the design process. Advancing knowledge on designing appropriate 
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policy instruments for EU-internal burden-sharing and REDD financing, respectively, 
were agreed as the overarching goals for the two exercises at hand. The objective 
was to explore different options for designing policy on these issues, identify trade-
offs and synergies between them, and test their political feasibility. The problem 
specification stage was followed by a thorough systems analysis of the issue to be 
simulated. This systems analysis, based on a systematic literature and document 
review, forms the grid for constructing a model of reality in the game. In our case, we 
spent several months on desk-based background research into the topic of each 
policy exercise, studying the policy context and the dynamics surrounding the various 
policy options under discussion. We also conducted a number of scoping interviews 
with key experts and stakeholders (10 for the first, and 9 for the second policy 
exercise). These helped complement the insights gleaned from the desk study, 
especially regarding key actors and their positions, as well as to update us on the 
latest policy developments.  
The truly creative process commenced in the next step, when the key elements 
identified in the systems analysis needed to be translated into gaming elements. We 
had to decide which elements of the systems would be integrated into the scenario 
and role descriptions and which ones would be left out. Moreover, the design team 
pondered how and by what means real-life processes could be translated into steps 
of play and game procedures. A concept report incorporating an overview of the 
system and a detailed description of the set-up of the exercise provided the basis for 
elaborating the various gaming elements and for building a game prototype. The 
prototype was then tested and fine-tuned with the project team before the actual 
runs with professionals and students. The following two sections introduce the topics 
of the two exercises, before describing each of them in detail.  
4.2 Policy context of the two exercises 
Policy exercises aim to shed light on topical, long-term policy or management 
problems (see Chapter 2). As shown in Figure 4 outlining the research design above, 
our exercises both focus on the realm of international climate policy, in the first case 
at the European level (burden-sharing) and in the second at the global level (REDD) .  
4.2.1 Burden-sharing as a cornerstone of European climate policy 
With the question of burden-sharing, the first policy exercise tackled an issue which is 
prevalent in global climate policy discussions, but which also forms a key element of 
the European climate policy architecture: the challenge of distributing greenhouse 
gas emission reduction efforts among countries, or, in our case, among EU Member 
States. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the European Community signed up to a joint 
emission reduction objective, which subsequently needed to be translated into 
Simulating future climate policy – the ADAM and REDD-ALERT exercises 
 
58 
 
targets for individual Member States. This process used to been known as ‘burden-
sharing’, but has been relabelled into ‘effort sharing’ in EU policy discussions 
addressing this question for the post-2012 period.
18 
Burden-sharing poses the crucial 
dilemma of striking a balance between reducing emissions where they are most cost-
effective, and accounting for questions of equity: richer member states might 
reasonably be asked to shoulder relatively greater costs. Increasing differences in 
wealth and capacity within an expanding Union on the one hand, and the need for 
ever more stringent emission reduction commitments on the other suggest that the 
basic underlying problem of how to allocate burdens is there to stay in European 
climate policy (Haug & Jordan, 2010).  
The scope of the EU burden-sharing mechanism has changed over time. While the 
1998 Burden-Sharing Agreement for the period up to 2012 covered emissions from 
the whole of the European economy, the Commission’s set of legislative proposals for 
the EU climate and energy package for the period 2012-2020 effectively divided the 
relevant target groups into two parts, depending on whether they were inside or 
outside of the EU Emission Trading System (ETS). The ETS covers industrial emissions 
through a ‘cap and trade’ system, a market-based regime which is principally 
targeted at cost effectiveness. Under the Commission’s new approach, effort sharing 
only applies to the emissions outside the EU ETS (dubbed ‘non-trading sectors’). 
Together, these non-trading sectors were expected to cover around 60% of EU 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
At the time of the expert run of our policy exercise, the subject was highly topical as 
negotiations on the climate and energy package were still ongoing, the intended 
centrepiece of the EU’s efforts to cut emissions over the period 2012-2020, which 
also includes a decision on ‘effort sharing’. Our goal, however, was to look even 
further ahead and explore how this policy domain could evolve after 2020. Crucial 
questions in the design of burden-sharing arrangements relate to the base year from 
which emission reductions are accounted for, the criteria on which to base the 
targets, as well as a variety of issues with regard to implementation, monitoring and 
enforcement.  
4.2.2 REDD financing to compensated developing countries for reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
The main aim of the second policy exercise, which was part of the EU research 
project REDD-ALERT, was to advance knowledge and stimulate discussion on one key 
aspect of the current debate on designing a mechanism to reduce emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) under the global climate regime. The 
                                                                
18
 In the following, we use the terms ´burden sharing´ and ´effort sharing´ interchangeably. 
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concept of REDD
19
 first entered the international climate negotiations at the 11th 
Conference of the Parties in Montreal in 2005, when a group of countries, led by 
Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, submitted a proposal aimed at reducing emissions 
from tropical deforestation through a market-based approach. The premise 
underlying the proposal as well as the broader concept of REDD was to provide an 
incentive to developing countries to reduce their deforestation rates; in the event 
that they succeeded, they should obtain financial compensation (Humphreys, 2008). 
Since 2005, REDD has become a crucial issue in the ongoing effort to design a global 
post-2012 climate policy architecture. Industrialised countries are attracted by its 
professed potential for cost-effective mitigation (cf. Stern, 2006), although realising it 
may be less straightforward (Corbera et al., 2010; Gregersen et al., 2010). At the 
same time, many developing countries, especially smaller ones, consider it a key 
bargaining chip in their quest to receive climate financing (Haug & Gupta, 2013; Haug 
& Pattberg, 2008).  
After several years of negotiations, there is widespread agreement that the 
implementation of REDD should follow a ‘phased approach’. This would involve 
moving from an initial stage focusing on preparing for the implementation of REDD 
(‘REDD-readiness’) via a performance-based fund to the end vision of a greenhouse-
gas-based instrument that ‘rewards performance on the basis of quantified forest 
emissions and removals against agreed reference levels’ (Angelsen et al., 2009). 
Currently, we find ourselves in the first of these three phases, with many initiatives 
and partnerships ongoing to increase countries’ capacities and preparedness for 
REDD implementation. Various analyses have already sought to forecast the third 
phase, namely the prospects for, and consequences of, integrating REDD into the 
global carbon market (Obersteiner et al., 2009; Ogonowski et al., 2007; Stockwell et 
al., 2009). With the REDD-ALERT policy exercise, the goal was to focus on the second, 
currently little explored interim phase from about 2015 onwards, when REDD funding 
may already be results-based, but a fully reliable GHG-based accounting mechanism 
is still absent. While funding during this phase could also continue to be disbursed 
through multiple funds, we chose to concentrate on a scenario where the various 
funding initiatives converge into one global, concerted fund approach.  
After this short introduction to their policy context, the following sections will 
describe the ADAM and REDD-ALERT policy exercises in more detail. The section on 
the ADAM policy exercise provides a broader introduction to the function of 
scenarios, roles and policy element cards as well as the structure of our exercises, 
and the choices we made on these issues. The section on the REDD-Alert exercise, 
                                                                
19
 Over the last few years, the term ‘REDD’ has increasingly come to be replaced by ‘REDD+’ or 
even ‘REDD++’, denoting either a wider scope for REDD or heightened attention to the 
importance of social and environmental safeguards in REDD implementation. However, for 
reasons of simplicity, we refer to ‘REDD’ throughout this book.  
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which largely replicated the design of the exercise on burden-sharing, will highlight 
only those points that were specific to that event or that differed from the first 
exercise.  
4.3 The ADAM policy exercise on burden-sharing in EU climate 
policy 
4.3.1 Design of the ADAM policy exercise 
As argued earlier in Chapters 2 and 3, the nature of the topics to be explored – design 
and feasibility of future policy in complex multi-actor settings beset with multiple 
uncertainties – made the policy exercise format a natural choice for the two 
interventions. Policy exercises are flexibly structured interfaces between scientists, 
experts and policy-makers, aimed at eliciting and synthesising relevant knowledge 
from a variety of disciplines (Toth & Hizsnyik, 2008). Typically, they draw heavily on 
scenario development and analysis, making use of participants’ experience and 
expertise in exploring future policy choices (Toth & Hizsnyik, 2008). 
The aim of the ADAM policy exercise was to appraise options for future EU burden-
sharing arrangements in the medium term. Over the course of one full working day 
and under the guidance of a skilled facilitator, participants were tasked to negotiate 
the features of a burden-sharing agreement that would allocate emission reduction 
commitments among EU member states for the period beyond 2020. The exercise 
was presented in the form of a simplified EU policy-making cycle, with scenarios, role 
descriptions and sets of ‘policy element cards’ as key inputs. The policy exercise was 
preceded by a dinner on the eve of the workshop, during which the basic approach 
and objectives were outlined. Moreover, one of the architects of the previous EU 
burden-sharing agreement - a former chief climate negotiator of the Netherlands - 
gave a talk on his experience at the time, and participants had the chance to get to 
know each other.  
Scenarios 
The purpose of a scenario in a policy exercise is to provide a specific background and 
context for teams’ decision-making and to focus attention on the key issues, 
problems and decisions to be highlighted for examination (Parson, 1995). A scenario 
should therefore provide enough information to frame the discussion, but should 
avoid overwhelming participants with excessive detail and over-determining the 
outcomes. During a policy exercise, participants may walk forward or backward in 
time through one or more scenarios (Toth, 1988a). In deciding on the number of 
cycles or scenarios, there is a trade-off between exploring and comparing different 
alternative ‘futures’ (or moving through the system in several steps) and the time 
available for one cycle and decision-making within it.   
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Given the limited duration of the policy exercise (one working day), it was decided to 
probe more deeply into one single scenario set in 2018 instead of walking through 
several scenarios over time. In order to explore how different political and economic 
circumstances could affect the outcomes of the simulation, participants were divided 
into two subgroups that went through the same steps of play yet were confronted 
with two scenarios that differed in some crucial aspects. Thus, the scenario in the 
first group reported a high degree of international cooperation on climate change 
under a successful successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. In the other scenario, 
emissions abatement was occurring through a variety of uncoordinated bilateral and 
multilateral initiatives and efforts at various levels (see Box 1 for a summary, and 
Annex 1.D for the full scenarios). 
Roles 
In deciding about roles and role descriptions, designers of a policy exercise typically 
balance two aspects: on the one hand, roles serve to create distance for participants 
from their day-to-day work so as to better enable them to examine broader, long-
term strategic issues and to look at the wider picture. On the other, roles should 
maintain key aspects of the real-life position and institutional constraints that actors 
are subject to, so as to not render the policy exercise totally irrelevant (Toth, 1988a).  
The ‘Kyoto to Kingston’ scenario was set in the year 2018 and reported the 
conclusion of a post-2012 climate agreement, in Kingston, Jamaica in 2010. It 
assumed that the international climate policy landscape had changed dramatically, 
with the United States as a new green climate policy leader, and significant mitigation 
action taking place in the BRIC countries. In the EU, by contrast, the 2009 climate and 
energy package had not delivered on its promise, with effort-sharing in particular 
proving largely ineffective and controversial among member states. Devising an 
ambitious yet realistic mitigation strategy for the post-2020 era was thus of utmost 
importance for the EU to regain its international leadership role on climate change. At 
the European Council meeting that the exercise sought to simulate, a start was to be 
made with the conclusion of an ambitious and effective post-2020 burden-sharing 
agreement.  
The ‘Coat with many colours’ scenario differed from the above in two key aspects. It 
assumed that a post-2012 protocol had been concluded in Copenhagen, but had 
failed to attract sufficient ratifications. In its place, a multitude of multi- and bilateral 
initiatives had sprung up, with the UNFCCC having transformed into a clearinghouse. 
EU-internally, while the Kyoto to Kingston scenario had reported significant 
deficiencies in the functioning of the EU ETS, the assumption here was that the 
system had finally started to live up to its promise.  
 
Box 1. Summaries of the two scenarios of the burden-sharing exercise. 
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Germany in 2018: Robust economic growth over the last decade. Climate policy 
remains a priority. More or less on track in effort-sharing domain, relying on external 
carbon credits. Currently holds EU presidency, thus keen to secure an ambitious 
agreement. 
Sweden in 2018: Impressive climate policy record over the last decade, one of the 
rare success stories in effort-sharing. Yet mitigation potentials increasingly 
exhausted. Population remains supportive of climate policy, yet expects other 
countries to step up their efforts as well.  
Spain in 2018: has suffered a severe economic downturn. Climate policy has taken a 
backseat among more pressing concerns. Not on track in effort-sharing domain, but 
large abatement potentials are still available. Impacts of climate change increasingly 
felt in agriculture and tourism.  
Poland in 2018: has seen high economic growth between 2008-2018, but remains a 
‘problem child’ for EU climate policy. Currently pending infringement proceedings for 
non-compliance in effort-sharing domain, exacerbated by cold winters in 2015/16. 
Argues that in hindsight effort-sharing target was excessively strict.  
EU Commission in 2018: after the success of the 2009 adoption of the EU climate and 
energy package, increasingly strained relations between member states and the 
Commission on climate change issues, due to a number of reasons. Keen on an 
ambitious agreement that projects the EU’s international leadership and that allows 
for transparent management and accounting internally.  
For the EU burden-sharing exercise, participants were divided into five teams within 
each of the two scenario groups. The teams represented senior policy-makers of four 
EU member states (Germany, Poland, Spain and Sweden) and the European 
Commission. In order to allow for deliberation inside the country teams and to keep 
the negotiations manageable for a one-day workshop, only a limited number of 
countries were represented in the exercise. At the same time, these actors were 
carefully chosen so that they would preserve the representation of the key interests 
and conflict lines on EU burden-sharing within the Union. Before the policy exercise, 
participants received short role descriptions summarising important developments in 
their country’s climate policy and economic outlook over the last decade (see Box 2 
and Annex 1.E). This information allowed them to deduce the issues that had priority 
for them in the negotiations. Moreover, a professional journalist published regular 
news bulletins’ on progress in negotiations and on positions adopted by Parties.  
A crucial choice facing game designers is whether participants should play roles that 
are close to their own in reality or whether one should encourage role switching. One 
might call this dilemma one of dramatic distance. Roles approximating participants’ 
real-life occupations ensure that they are played realistically and that all relevant 
Box 2. Summary of role descriptions for the EU burden sharing exercise. 
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knowledge is brought to the table. Yet they may also prevent a fresh look at the 
issues at hand, thereby reducing the potential for normative and relational learning, 
which might be stronger when participants find themselves in unfamiliar roles. At the 
same time, the benefits of role-switches are somewhat contested in the social 
learning literature. Nemeth et al. (2001) find that they suppress authentic and 
constructive conflict by unrealistically assuaging opposing viewpoints. Our policy 
exercises opted for a middle ground in this regard. In assigning the roles, care was 
taken to as far as possible match participants’ own backgrounds with the nationalities 
they were representing. However, as the professional occupations of the participants 
matched the profile of actual policy-makers and negotiators in only few cases, a 
significant degree of dramatic distance was maintained in all instances.  
Policy element cards 
How to frame and bound the subject matter to be examined over the course of a 
policy exercise is another issue requiring careful reflection. In addition to scenario 
and role descriptions, ‘policy element cards’ served to provide structure and focus to 
the discussions. The coloured cards contained different options for the central 
features of an EU-internal burden-sharing agreement which participants were asked 
to negotiate over the course of the exercise. The options were developed based on 
the various legislative proposals on EU effort-sharing that were being discussed in 
Brussels at the time as well as position papers and ideas advocated by think tanks and 
NGOs, not only in the EU, but also in the international climate policy context. 
Participants were free to amend cards or invent new options on blank cards however 
they saw fit. 
In total, there were seven design features of a burden-sharing agreement on which a 
decision was required as well as the option to suggest additional EU policies for the 
effort sharing domain (see Annex 1.F for the complete set of options):  
1. Criteria: Which criteria or indicators should form the basis for allocating 
emission reduction commitments among member states? 
2. Base year: From which reference point should emission reductions be 
measured? 
3. Limits to external credits: What share of their targets should member states 
be allowed to meet through external carbon credits?  
4. Quality of external credits: What should be the quality requirements for such 
credits?  
5. Compliance and enforcement: What should be the rules in case of non-
compliance and who should enforce them?  
6. Internal flexibility: How much flexibility should there be inside the effort 
sharing domain, i.e. in terms of trading of excess reductions between 
member states, banking and borrowing of emission reductions ?  
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Structure of the ADAM policy exercise: 
1. National Decision-making. 
Country teams define their 
national position on burden-
sharing. 
2. Commission presents its proposal 
for a burden-sharing agreement to 
country teams. 
3. Plenary negotiations based on the 
Commission’s proposal. 
7. Interaction with the EU ETS: What should be the rules for external flexibility, 
i.e. the interaction of the effort sharing domain with the EU ETS? 
8. Proposals for new policy initiatives [optional element]: What additional EU-
level policies and measure should be initiated for the effort sharing domain?  
The focus on analysing the design features of the burden-sharing agreement rather 
than the quantitative emission reduction targets of member states was chosen 
deliberately. It was based on the concern that otherwise, haggling over numbers 
grounded primarily in scenario assumptions would quickly come to dominate the 
exercise and yield only limited useful insights. Initially, the organising team 
considered underpinning the exercise with real-time model runs, for instance based 
on the FAIR model developed by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. 
However, experience from a previous policy exercise prompted us to opt for a purely 
qualitative exercise. In that case, understanding the assumptions of the model had 
taken time away from deliberations, and concerns about the models’ reliability had 
been used strategically in the negotiations (Parson, 1995),  
Steps of play 
The policy exercise consisted of three different phases, simulating a simplified EU 
policy-making cycle (see Box 3). In the first phase, country teams were tasked to 
develop their national position on burden-sharing, while the European Commission, 
reflecting its legal right of initiative, was 
asked to prepare a proposal as the 
basis for later negotiations. Initially, to 
help participants get into their roles, 
each country team was to choose up to 
five ‘success criteria’ from a list that in 
their view reflected best what their 
team would consider a successful 
agreement on EU burden-sharing. Then, 
teams began with their main task for 
the morning session, which consisted of 
selecting their preferred option(s) from 
the set of ‘policy element cards’ (or 
inventing their own alternatives) for each 
design feature of the post-2020 EU burden-sharing agreement. The selected cards 
were glued on a cardboard template, with a justification added for each of them. 
Finally, in a last step, country teams were asked to rank which features they intended 
to prioritise in the negotiations. Throughout this first block, country teams were free 
to consult with one other, as well as with the European Commission.  
The next phase saw the Commission present its proposal to the country teams. The 
country teams and the journalist then had an opportunity to ask for clarifications or 
Box 3.  Steps of play 
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pose questions before the group moved into negotiation mode for the afternoon 
session. This final plenary session was chaired by Germany, identified in the exercise 
scenario as the EU presidency in charge of leading the negotiations. The task in the 
plenary was to reach an agreement on all features of the burden-sharing agreement. 
Country teams first commented on the Commission’s proposal and proposed 
amendments by attaching post-its to the Commission’s proposal posted onto a wall. 
Then the actual negotiations started, alternating between plenary negotiations and 
informal discussions in smaller groups. Throughout the process, participants were, 
aided by the policy element cards, encouraged to focus on ideas rather than 
negotiation text. In the end, reflecting the rule of qualified majority voting in place in 
the EU, either consensus by all four countries or by three out of four countries and 
the Commission was required to adopt the agreement. After agreement had been 
reached, the last step of the exercise had country teams return to the success criteria 
they had selected at the beginning of the day. They evaluated to what extent the 
agreement met their objectives, thus already preparing for the discussions during the 
debriefing.  
4.3.2 Runs and outcomes of the ADAM policy exercise 
As discussed in Chapter 3, two runs were held of each policy exercise, first with a 
group of international experts, and then with a class of Master’s students in 
Environment and Resource Management. We do not discuss the game runs with the 
students at much length here. The reason is that the runs with students primarily 
served to measure the effects in terms of the different learning types, and to 
examine whether and how these differed from those in the expert groups. The 
substantive outcomes of these runs, by contrast, are far less interesting because they 
could not fully incorporate and do justice to all the options that arose and because 
outcomes were far more reflective of particular students’ motivation and 
negotiations skills than was true for the expert run.  
Run with experts 
The expert run of the ADAM policy exercise was held on 28 October 2008, involving 
23 international participants. They were tasked to negotiate a burden-sharing 
agreement covering eight design features (see Tables 6 and 7). The two sub-groups 
who played the exercise in parallel faced two differences in terms of scenario design 
(group A’s ‘Kyoto to Kingston’ scenario featured a unified global climate regime 
combined with an underperforming EU ETS for; group B’s ‘Coat with many colours’ 
featured a fragmented climate regime combined with a strong EU ETS). As the day 
went on, game dynamics evolved quite differently in the two groups. In the morning, 
the groups still followed largely similar patterns. After a first phase where teams 
worked individually to make sense of the game material and its implications for their 
country’s position on burden-sharing, interactions between teams increased in the 
second half of the morning when countries started to consult with their counterparts 
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and with the Commission. In both groups, this was initially prompted by the 
European Commission, who sought to collect countries’ views in preparation of the 
draft agreement that it was due to present by mid-day.  
The draft effort-sharing agreement that the Commission eventually presented in 
Group A followed a slightly different logic than the proposal put forward in Group B 
(see Table 6). By departing from a wealth-based distribution of mitigation burdens 
and by choosing an earlier base year, the proposal in Group A placed more emphasis 
on equity considerations and on past performance records of member states than 
the one in Group B. The quality requirements and limits for the use of external 
carbon credits were more stringent as well, emphasising domestic reductions over 
flexibility mechanisms. In Group B on the other hand, the Commission team 
emphasised maximum flexibility in the effort-sharing domain, by allowing for the 
trading of excess reductions among member states and by proposing rather generous 
rules on external carbon credits. Overall, the two Commission proposals mostly used 
the pre-prepared options on the policy element cards that participants had at their 
disposal. Only in the subsequent phase did groups start to rely more on their own 
ideas in amending and combining options. 
 Commission proposal 
Group A, ‘From Kyoto to 
Kingston’ 
Commission proposal 
Group B, ‘Coat with 
many colours’ 
Criteria for effort-sharing: Which 
criteria or indicators should form 
the basis for allocating emission 
reduction commitments among 
member states? 
Based on relative GDP per 
capita of member states 
Aiming at converging per 
capita emissions in effort-
sharing sectors by 2030, 
GDP-adjusted 
Base year: From which reference 
point should emission reductions be 
measured? 
Average yearly emissions 
between 2004 and 2006 
Average yearly emissions 
between 2012-2016 
Internal flexibility: How much 
flexibility should there be inside the 
effort sharing domain, i.e. in terms 
of trading of excess reductions 
between member states, banking 
and borrowing of emission 
reductions ?  
MS shall comply with 
interim targets set for 2025 
and the end target 2030. 
A member state can trade 
excess reductions in the 
effort-sharing sector with 
other member states 
Member states shall 
comply with their targets 
in a linear manner 
Quality of external credits: What 
should be the quality requirements 
for such credits? 
Only credits with Gold 
Standard or equivalent 
quality standard are 
admissible 
 
All types of credits 
recognised by the 
UNFCCC are eligible. 
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Limits to external credits: What 
share of their targets should 
member states be allowed to meet 
through external carbon credits? 
Yearly quota of 10% per 
member state of external 
carbon credits; remaining 
non-used quota may be 
passed on to other 
member states 
Limit of total effort 30% 
Compliance and enforcement: 
What should be the rules in case of 
non-compliance and who should 
enforce them? 
Authority administering 
compliance regime: 
Commission 
Authority administering 
compliance regime: 
European Environment 
agency; infringement 
procedure under EU law 
applies 
Interaction with EU ETS: What 
should be the rules for external 
flexibility, i.e. the interaction of the 
effort sharing domain with the EU 
ETS? 
No exchange between EU 
ETS and effort-sharing 
domain. 
No exchange between EU 
ETS and effort-sharing 
domain. Coverage of EU 
ETS extended to 
agriculture. 
New EU policy initiatives: What 
additional EU-level policies and 
measure should be initiated for the 
effort sharing domain? 
Vision 2030; ‘DGTR’ – 
Distributed Generation for 
Transport and the 
Residential Sector 
Stimulate modal shift in 
the transport sector. 
Technology investment 
funds. 
Table 6. Draft effort-sharing agreement proposed by the Commission in the two groups. 
Outcomes of the expert run 
Comparing the outcomes from the two groups (see Table 7 below), there are a 
number of striking similarities. Both agreements accept all internationally recognised 
types of external credits, with limits of three per cent of a country’s national 
emissions in the base year for Group B, and ten per cent for Group A, respectively. In 
both cases, the Commission remains in charge of the non-compliance procedure, and 
penalties are levied on offenders – an outcome which, interestingly, provides more 
´teeth´ to the agreement than the original proposals by the two Commission teams. 
Both groups opt to keep the EU ETS and the effort-sharing domains relatively 
separate, even if the final compromise in Group A allows for a ‘limited’ exchange, 
without specifying what exactly this entails. Slight differences concern the issue of 
internal flexibility: only Group B permits trading of excess reductions among member 
states, but both groups endorse interim targets before the binding endpoint of the 
agreement in 2030 (in the form of the requirement of a linear reduction path in one 
case, and of binding interim targets in the other). Furthermore, concerns about the 
costs of adaptation to climate change have found their way into the agreement in 
Group B: penalties for non-compliance are to be used for adaptation needs, and the 
Commission is requested to elaborate proposals for the earmarking of auctioning 
revenues for adaptation, as well as proposals for improved adaptation policies in 
general. In both groups, the question of criteria for burden-sharing constituted a 
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major bone of contention in the negotiations. Group A eventually chose relative 
efficiency of emissions per unit of economic output as the key criterion,
20
 arguing 
that this rendered the choice of a base year irrelevant as the indicators were to be 
continuously updated. Group B settled on a combination of criteria to satisfy the dual 
objectives of cost-effectiveness and equity. Their indicator was composed of the 
marginal abatement costs per member state (accounting for 50%), GDP per capita 
(30%) and emissions per capita (20%). When proposing this, the German presidency 
argued that trends in marginal abatement costs were to be reviewed in 2024, and 
that, assuming these converged across the Community, emissions per capita would 
become the most important criterion in the longer term.  
 Final agreement on post-2020 
effort sharing 
Group A, ‘From Kyoto to Kingston’ 
Final agreement on post-2020 
effort sharing 
Group B, ‘Coat with many 
colours’ 
Criteria for effort-
sharing 
Relative efficiency of emissions 
per unit of economic output. 
Combined indicator, 50% based 
on marginal abatement costs, 
30% on GDP per capita, and 20% 
on emissions per capita. Review 
of trends in marginal abatement 
costs in 2024. 
Base year [Considered irrelevant, given the 
criterion chosen, see above] 
Average yearly emissions 
between 2014-16. 
Internal flexibility Interim targets set for the years 
2023, 2026 and 2028, but only 
the latter two are binding.  
A member state can trade excess 
reductions in the effort-sharing 
sector with other member states 
Member states shall comply with 
their targets in a linear manner. 
Quality of external 
credits 
All types of credits recognised 
by the UNFCCC are eligible. 
All types of credits recognised 
under the Kingston Protocol are 
eligible. 
Limits to external 
credits 
Yearly quota of 10% per 
member state of external 
carbon credits; remaining 
unused quota can be banked or 
passed on to other member 
states.  
 
Yearly quota of 3% of external 
carbon credits per member state; 
remaining unused quota can be 
banked or passed on to other 
member states. 
                                                                
20
 Relative emission efficiency per unit of economic output appears to refer to what is 
commonly understood by carbon intensity - the amount of emissions of carbon dioxide per 
unit of GDP (Allwood et al., 2014) 
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Compliance and 
enforcement 
Authority administering 
compliance regime: 
Commission. Fines to be 
deducted from member states’ 
allocations from EU structural 
funds.  
Authority administering 
compliance regime: Commission. 
Fines equivalent to penalty 
payments under the EU-ETS, 
revenues to be used for 
adaptation measures 
(Commission to present 
proposal). 
Interaction with EU 
ETS 
‘Limited’ exchange between EU 
ETS and effort-sharing domain. 
No exchange between EU ETS 
and effort-sharing domain. 
Commission to present 
assessment of the feasibility of 
including the transport sector 
into the EU ETS by 2019, as well 
as possibilities for earmarking 
auctioning revenues for 
adaptation measures. 
New EU policy 
initiatives 
Commission invited to present 
proposals for new policy 
initiatives and commitments in 
the transport and building 
sectors.  
Commission to assess to what 
extent existing cohesion 
instruments and funds contribute 
to low-carbon society, and on 
that basis develop proposals for 
new policy initiatives, as well as 
improved adaptation measures. 
In doing so, should pay special 
attention to the building sector 
and to the needs of countries 
with low GDP. 
Table 7. Agreements reached in the two expert groups. 
These outcomes were considered by and large realistic by participants during the 
debriefing. They added, however, that including more quantitative information (such 
as assumptions about the EU’s and other countries’ mitigation targets, energy trends, 
prices, and abatement costs) in the scenarios and role descriptions would have 
further increased the plausibility of the policy exercise. Participants however 
expressed support for our decision to run the exercise without modelling support, 
sharing our view that this would have distracted from the core of the discussions. 
One aspect that was discussed at some length was the relative similarity of the 
outcomes reached in the two groups, despite the differences in the underlying policy 
scenarios, a result that neither the organising team nor the participants had expected. 
The latter attributed this mainly to the way in which the exercise was set up. The fact 
that only EU member states were represented and that these were never confronted 
with the consequences of their actions in the international arena may have prompted 
a rather introspective, EU-internal outlook, in which the differing international 
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context did not play a major role in decision-making. We had asked the professional 
journalist that played the role of the press to emphasise the global dimension by 
publishing international news items and by questioning participants on the 
international implications of their decisions. Yet this turned out less effective than 
hoped. The journalist was soon overlooked in the heat of the negotiations, also 
because her activity carried no direct consequences for the game.  
Based on the debriefing and the ex-post survey, participants were generally quite 
positive about the event. In the ex post interviews, participants stated that the policy 
exercise had created an atmosphere ‘full of fun and respect’ in a very active 
workshop format that made it impossible for participants ‘to stay out of the 
discussions or give very little input’ and which meant that everyone was ‘forced to 
share their expertise’. A point of criticism, however, related to the policy element 
cards. While it was felt that they had been useful for structuring discussions, 
participants argued that fewer design features and a smaller set of pre-prepared 
options might have allowed for more in-depth discussions and might have stimulated 
participants’ creativity even more. The final Chapter 8 reflects in greater detail on the 
strengths and shortcomings in the design of the policy exercise. 
The student runs 
Given the large number of master students registered for the module that included 
the policy exercise, we divided the group and ran the exercise twice on two different 
days in February and March of 2010. The first run involved around 40 students 
playing in two sub-groups, identical to the set-up of the expert run. On the second 
day, around 20 students simulated the ‘From Kyoto to Kingston’ scenario only. In 
general, the students coped well with the complex material they were confronted 
with. Teams familiarised themselves relatively quickly with the scenario and role 
descriptions and started devising their strategy. Yet particularly in the negotiation 
phase in the afternoon, it was noticeable how much process and outcomes of the run 
were determined by the individuals taking part in it. Thus, whereas the ‘Kyoto to 
Kingston’ group on the first day negotiated most of the time in plenary and sought to 
resolve differences in viewpoints in an orderly, bureaucratic fashion, discussions in 
the ‘Coat with many colours’ group evolved mainly in small caucus settings, with 
parties attempting to strong-arm their opponents and deliberately spreading 
misinformation. The outcomes reflect this to some extent; for instance, due mainly to 
the negotiating skills of the Swedish team, the goal of economically efficient 
abatement largely prevailed over equity considerations in the agreement reached in 
the ‘Coat with many colours’ group. The Spanish and Polish teams realised only 
during the debriefing that this implied that they would have to carry the brunt of the 
burden in greenhouse gas abatement. Thus, whereas according to the debriefing, 
students considered the exercise valuable part of their curriculum, the limited 
background knowledge of the groups also meant that the negotiation outcomes were 
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not exactly realistic, nor had they the potential to produce insights relevant to future 
climate governance.   
4.4 The REDD-ALERT policy exercise on REDD financing 
4.4.1 Design of the REDD-ALERT exercise 
For the exercise on REDD financing, we sought to replicate the set-up of the policy 
exercise on EU burden-sharing to the greatest possible extent, in order to minimise 
variations in the learning effect of the two policy exercises stemming from design 
differences. Moreover, the aims of the two exercises, the decision-making context, 
and actor dynamics of the two topics that we simulated were quite similar. The REDD 
workshop however deviated from the first exercise in relying on a single scenario. 
During the debriefing sessions of the burden-sharing exercise, experts and students 
alike had commented that they did not feel that going through two scenarios in 
parallel had yielded any insights into possible impacts of differing international 
contexts for EU policy developments. This view was largely shared by the organising 
team; Chapter 8 reflects further on this issue. As a consequence, we abandoned the 
second scenario/ two group approach for the REDD-ALERT policy exercise.  
As with the burden-sharing exercise, the REDD-ALERT policy exercise lasted for one 
full working day, preceded by a workshop dinner. Its overall objective was to evaluate 
and test the feasibility of various options for designing a global REDD fund that would 
compensate developing countries for action on deforestation and forest degradation 
that would result in emission reductions. Again, policy element cards served to 
structure the discussions to this end. In total, eight design features of a global REDD 
fund were to be negotiated (see Annex 1.H for a full overview of all policy options):  
1. Capitalisation and replenishment: Where should the finance for the fund 
come from?  
2. Accounting for co-benefits: Should high(er) social/environmental co-benefits 
of REDD activities be rewarded, and if so, how?  
3. Eligibility criteria: How should specific funding needs be prioritised in view of 
overall funding constraints?  
4. Fund administration: Who should manage the fund?  
5. Verification: Who should verify that REDD activities are realised and result in 
actual emission reductions?  
6. Payment size: How should the level of payment to REDD countries be 
determined?  
7. Modalities for upfront financing: Should REDD countries have access to 
upfront financing and if so, how should this organised?  
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8. [Optional] Recommendation on the transition of REDD into the global carbon 
market. 
While figures and precise amounts to be committed to the fund would usually 
feature prominently in this kind of negotiations, we avoided placing much emphasis 
on them (just as in the ADAM policy exercise) as we doubted that haggling over 
fictitious scenario assumptions would yield many useful insights. Instead, we focused 
on those qualitative design elements that would have an important bearing on the 
fund’s functioning.  
We retained the structure of the ADAM exercise and divided the day into three 
phases – national decision-making, presentation of a proposal for a global REDD fund, 
and negotiations in plenary. Mirroring the ADAM exercise design, the REDD exercise 
included five country teams and a journalist representing the press. It was framed as 
a pre-meeting to the 2015 UN climate summit in Santiago de Chile. The scenario (see 
Box 4 for a summary, and Annex 1.G for the full version) specified that Brazil had 
called together a small group of crucial actors (the United States, the European Union, 
Brazil, India, and Cameroon) to develop a joint proposal for a REDD fund that could 
subsequently guide the negotiations in Santiago de Chile. Our decision to frame the 
exercise as a pre-meeting instead of the actual negotiations reflected the limited 
number of parties that could be credibly represented in our simulation. It would have 
been impossible to capture the diversity of interests present in UN plenary 
negotiations, especially since we wanted participants to play in teams to increase the 
depth of deliberations informing countries’ positions, and to maintain the similarity 
to the set-up of the ADAM exercise.  
 
Box 4. Summary of the scenario for the REDD exercise.  
The role descriptions are summarised in Box 5 whereas the full versions can be found 
in Annex 1.H. The decision-making mode in the REDD-ALERT exercise was consensus-
based, in line with what would be customary in this kind of international setting. This, 
The scenario started from the assumption that the climate negotiations in South 
Africa in 2011 had resulted in an international post-2012 agreement (in the form of 
a set of COP decisions) covering all parts of the Bali Action Plan including REDD. 
Now, in 2015, COP21 in Santiago de Chile was called to begin operationalising the 
‘REDD window’ under a yet-to-be defined Global Green Climate Fund. Regarding 
REDD, the scenario reported that an adjusted historical baseline approach to 
reference level setting had been endorsed, as well as primarily national level 
monitoring and reporting. The specific setting of the policy exercise was a pre-
meeting to the Santiago summit called by Brazil. The purpose of the meeting was to 
come up with a ‘joint proposal for a REDD fund’ that could subsequently guide the 
negotiations in Santiago de Chile. 
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along with the fact that the exercise was framed as a preparatory meeting and not an 
actual negotiation, had an impact on the results of the run, as we will see below.  
 
Box 5. Summary of the role descriptions for the REDD exercise.  
4.4.2 Runs and outcomes of the REDD-ALERT exercise 
Run with experts 
The REDD-ALERT policy exercise took place on 17 November 2010 in Amsterdam, 
involving 17 international participants. Country teams spent the morning defining 
their national position on the design of a global REDD+ fund. After an initial phase in 
which the teams worked individually to familiarise themselves with the material and 
to establish their country´s negotiating priorities, Brazil, as the host of the meeting, 
was the first to reach out to other Parties, starting a series of bilateral consultations. 
At mid-day, Brazil presented a ´non-paper´ which contained its proposal for a global 
REDD+ fund (see Table 8) and which was to form the basis for plenary discussions in 
the afternoon. The Brazilian proposal represented an attempt at striking a balance 
between satisfying developed countries’ emphasis on a strictly performance-based 
fund on the one hand, and the interest of developing countries in securing sufficient 
levels of financing and in safeguarding the sovereignty over their resources and 
national development on the other. The former is reflected in relatively strict 
modalities proposed for verification (to be conducted by independent entities, rather 
US in 2015: has re-engaged with the international climate regime, more activity on 
climate policy also domestically. Keen to see progress on REDD, but strictly 
performance-based, under a trusted international institution, and mainly relying on 
funding from carbon markets and the private sector. 
EU in 2015: has stagnated politically and economically, climate change provides a key 
EU narrative. Positive climate policy record domestically, yet dismal in disbursing 
international climate funding. Wants REDD to develop into a robust and efficient 
mechanism, equipped with sufficient environmental and social safeguards.  
India in 2015: has evolved into a G77 leader of sorts in the climate negotiations, also 
more proactive climate policy domestically. Stands to gain little from REDD, given its 
limited forest cover. Keen on preventing REDD credits from crowding out other 
international offsets, but recognises its importance as a trendsetter for an equitable 
governance structure of the Global Green Climate Fund (GGCF).  
Brazil in 2015: strong performance over the past 5 years, economically and politically, 
inside and outside of the climate regime. Continues its pioneering role on REDD and has 
achieved a drastic reduction in its deforestation rate. Opposed to large-scale use of 
REDD credits for compliance, trusts in a global, performance-based approach.  
Cameroon in 2015: solid economic growth, political stagnation. Asian infrastructure 
invest ents and logging companies have led to significant deforestation, and related 
environmental impacts. Key objective for Santiago is to ensure predictable long-term 
financing of the GGCF, with direct access to funding, and avoiding overly bureaucratic 
procedures.  
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than based on countries’ own reporting), the latter for instance in the determination 
of the payment size for achieved REDD reductions.  
  Proposal by Brazil 
Fund capitalisation and 
replenishment: Where should the 
money for the fund come from? 
Revenues from auctioning emission rights in national 
emissions trading schemes as well as climate change 
bonds issued by developing country governments 
Accounting for co-benefits: Should 
high(er) social/environmental 
benefits of REDD activities be 
rewarded, and if so, how?  
All REDD units must be certified for high co-benefits by 
an independent third-party verifier 
Eligibility criteria: How to 
prioritise specific funding needs in 
view of overall constrained 
funding? 
Dedicated funding windows for different stages of 
REDD+ readiness, accounting for specific situations. 
Fund administration: Who should 
manage the fund?  
Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
Verification: Who should verify 
that REDD activities are realised 
and result in actual emission 
reductions? 
Accredited independent entities, similar to Designated 
Operational Entities under the Clean Development 
Mechanism. 
Payment size: How to determine 
the level of payment to REDD 
countries? 
Based on countries’ own estimate of implementation 
costs, subject to review by an international panel, based 
on internationally accepted criteria. 
Modalities for upfront financing: 
Should REDD countries have access 
to upfront financing and if so, how 
should this be organised? 
Upfront payments to be issued as loans, transformed 
into grants if targets set out in national REDD+ strategies 
are met and verified. 
Optional: Recommendation on the 
Transition of REDD into the global 
carbon market 
REDD+ fund acts as an ‘investment reserve’ (Obersteiner 
et al., 2009), purchasing yet-to-be-created REDD+ units 
upfront, then banking MRV-based credits until the fund’s 
governing body decides that credits can be sold to the 
carbon market. 
Table 8. Proposal by Brazil for a global REDD fund. 
The ensuing plenary negotiations exposed the fundamental differences between 
parties on the basic rationale and functioning of a REDD fund. The United States on 
the one hand and Cameroon, often supported by India, on the other, occupied the 
two most extreme positions. The former was keen to see the fund operating as 
efficiently as possible, and to channel investments where they were most likely to 
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yield a return in terms of verified emission reductions from deforestation. The latter 
underscored the need for a comprehensive REDD system which would allow less 
developed countries to ´catch up´ on REDD-readiness and benefit equally from the 
mechanism. Brazil sought to move the process forward by separating issues on which 
consensus seemed in reach and others which were more deeply divisive. However, as 
time got short in the afternoon, parties realised that they would not be able to 
achieve consensus on all issues up for decision. Brazil as the chair of the meeting thus 
resorted to pushing for agreement on principles where more far-reaching consensus 
remained elusive.  
Outcomes of the expert run 
Table 9 summarises the ‘joint vision for a global REDD fund’ agreed by all teams. 
Owing to the consensus requirement, but arguably also to the style of chairing of 
Brazil, the vision is quite vague in many aspects. Even for design features where all 
but one country agreed, the final wording was watered down to receive unanimous 
backing of the whole group. Most concrete are the outcomes on verification of 
countries’ performance under the REDD mechanism. This process is to be conducted 
by independent entities, similar to the arrangements under the CDM. The modalities 
for determining the payment size were also comparatively specific. Countries 
moreover endorsed a loan-grant mechanism for upfront payments; REDD countries 
could obtain upfront financing as loans which would be transformed into grants once 
the targets set out in the national REDD strategies had been met and verified. The 
question which body should administer the fund was fiercely debated over the 
course of the day; the final compromise endorsed the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) as an interim financial mechanism, mirroring earlier decisions taken for other 
funds under the international climate regime. Countries also agreed on the long-term 
need for carbon market financing to keep REDD viable, yet without specifying how 
the transition from a fund to a market-based approach should be engineered. On the 
issue of eligibility criteria – who should be able to benefit from the fund –, the teams 
could only agree that it should take account of countries’ different stages of 
development and REDD-readiness. Not surprisingly, it was the issue of fund 
capitalisation and replenishment where countries’ positions were farthest apart. 
Agreement on specific sources of financing or commitments for certain country 
groups remained elusive; countries merely settled for the vague formula that finance 
for the global REDD fund should be ‘stable, predictable, long-term, and sufficient’.  
 
 Joint vision for a global REDD fund 
Fund capitalisation and 
replenishment 
Principles of stable, predictable, long-term, and sufficient 
funding. 
Eligibility criteria Taking account of different stages of development and 
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different stages of REDD-readiness. 
Fund administration Criteria: efficient and credible/accountable to all parties. Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) proposed as interim mechanism.  
Verification To be operationalised as a priority. Carried out by accredited 
independent entities, who are accountable to the UNFCCC 
Determination of payment 
size 
Based on countries’ own estimate of implementation costs, 
subject to review by an international panel, based on 
internationally accepted criteria. 
Modalities for upfront 
financing 
Loan-grant mechanism, taking account of LDCs. 
Transition of REDD into the 
global carbon market 
Carbon market financing needed to keep REDD viable in the 
long term.  
Table 9. Joint vision for a global REDD fund agreed by all teams. 
Country teams´ own evaluations to what extent this outcome met the success criteria 
that they had defined for themselves at the beginning of the day did not reveal great 
enthusiasm about the results reached.
21
 India and Cameroon were slightly more 
positive than the EU, Brazil and US, yet compared to the average evaluations in the 
ADAM exercise (where both sub- groups evaluated their results with an average of 
4.0 out of 5.0), the overall average of 2.98 out of 5.0 for the REDD-ALERT exercise 
seems quite low.  
Nonetheless, based on the debriefing, participants found the results of the simulation 
to be plausible and they stressed that also in reality, agreement on principles would 
likely precede the operationalisation of a global REDD+ fund. Interestingly, in contrast 
to the other expert group, participants in the REDD exercise were positive without 
reservation about the policy element cards as a structuring device. As one participant 
commented during the debriefing, ‘the cards helped bring some order into my 
thinking and our discussions on this issue which is still somewhat far from day-to-day 
business in the [UN climate, C.H.] negotiations.’ On the whole, the policy exercise 
method was felt to have worked well to enable lively exchange and substantive 
discussions, although some participants expressed doubts about the extent to which 
they had succeeded in projecting themselves to the year 2015, as stipulated in the 
exercise scenario. 
                                                                
21
 Immediately after the exercise, country teams had been asked to revisit the sheet on which 
they had selected the five key criteria defining their country’s success in the upcoming 
negotiations at the beginning of the day, and to rate on a scale from 1 to 5 to what extent the 
outcome reached satisfied each of the criteria. 
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The student runs 
The student runs of the REDD exercise were held in November 2010, with a total of 
four groups going through the exercise on two different days. Given the technical 
complexity of REDD and the fact that this topic had not yet been treated in the 
master course that the students were following, we decided to somewhat narrow 
down the scope of the negotiations by reducing the design features to be discussed 
from eight to six. Hence, the questions of the ‘determination of payment size’ and 
the ‘modalities for upfront financing’ were omitted from the exercise. This proved a 
sensible decision as most country teams needed considerable time in the morning 
session to comprehend the basic concepts underlying REDD and their implications for 
their country´s position, and would have been hard pressed to analyse additional 
issues and options.  
On the whole, the student groups went to greater length in trying to negotiate a 
concrete outcome than the expert group. Three out of four had agreed on a joint 
vision at the end of the afternoon session, while some features remained pending in 
the fourth group. Like in the expert run, the questions of how to capitalise the fund 
and whether and how to account for social and environmental co-benefits of REDD 
received most attention in the student simulations. The student groups negotiated 
very different outcomes, depending primarily on country teams´ interpretations of 
their roles, as well as their persuasiveness and perseverance during the negotiations. 
For instance, in one group, the US team strayed somewhat from its role description 
by displaying an exceptionally green-minded, multilateral orientation. In this case, the 
US eventually gave in to pressure from other parties and committed to mandatory 
contributions to the fund on a GDP per capita basis, a position   far removed from the 
typical US stance in global climate politics. As in the case of the ADAM exercise, the 
substantive results of the student runs thus did not reflect fully realistic negotiation 
dynamics.  
4.5 Summary  
The two policy exercises we organised covered two crucial topics in the debate over 
how best to mitigate climate change. The discussions on both burden-sharing and the 
efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation entail pivotal 
trade-offs between efficiency and equity considerations that lead to predictably 
opposing interests at both the EU and global levels. During the design phase, we 
ensured that the set-up of the two respective policy exercises was largely similar, so 
as to minimise the effect that variation in the exercise design might have on learning 
outcomes. We subsequently ran these exercises with both expert and student groups. 
Whereas individual expertise and negotiation skills played a considerable role among 
both experts and students, negotiation dynamics were more realistic in the expert 
groups, leading to substantively more relevant (and plausible) results. This chapter 
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therefore focused on summarising the results from the expert runs. That does not 
mean that the student runs were not interesting however. As the subsequent three 
chapters on the different learning effects will show, the learning potential of policy 
exercises might actually be greater for students. 
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5. Cognitive learning 
5.1 Introduction 
Stimulating cognitive learning, among participants but if possible also in the wider 
policy community, is a core objective when designing and running policy exercises. 
This chapter describes the findings for this first type of learning effects in our 
typology. Cognitive learning was defined in Chapter 2 as the acquisition of new 
knowledge, the better structuring of existing knowledge or enhanced ability at 
systems thinking. In the context of this thesis, ‘new knowledge’ is considered to 
encompass insights into relevant facts, causal relationships or dynamics that are new 
to an individual participant of the policy exercise. Writings on simulation gaming and 
policy exercises claim that policy exercises also have the potential to produce 
knowledge that is ‘new to the world’ – whether this concerns the development of 
novel policy options, innovations to the policy process, or previously ignored cause-
effect relationships (Geurts et al., 2007; Parson, 1996b; Underwood & Duke, 1987). 
This latter aspect not only represents a very high yardstick, but is also difficult to 
assess empirically; we reflect on this question for our own policy exercises in Section 
5.3 below. 
Integrating knowledge from different sources, developing a holistic view of a problem 
in all its dimensions, quickly exchanging and verifying facts, establishing priorities for 
action, developing a long-term perspective – the list of alleged cognitive learning 
benefits of policy games and exercises in the literature is long (see also Chapter 2). 
Often-cited reasons for their ability to stimulate cognitive learning are the time 
pressure that participants experience during a policy exercise and the concrete tasks 
they need to resolve. This ‘requirement to act’ arguably leads participants to ‘use 
available sources of knowledge more aggressively, integrate them more broadly, and 
to organize them more coherently to support their required decision’ than in 
conventional workshop settings (Parson, 1996b, 244). By experimenting with 
different policy options, participants can gain knowledge about how these options 
are perceived by other stakeholders, what criteria might be applied to evaluate them 
as well as their possible effects (Brewer, 1986; Parson, 1996b). Some authors also 
stress the potential of these methods to uncover the ‘hidden face in the picture’ 
(Jones, 1964; Schelling, 1964), for instance by revealing unintended consequences of 
a particular course of action or by drawing attention to previously ignored aspects of 
the problem (Brewer, 1986; Mayer, 2009). Finally, the scenario element inherent in 
policy exercises may enhance a long-term orientation in participants’ thinking about a 
problem, especially if they walk forward in time through several rounds of scenario-
building (Geurts et al., 2007).  
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Obviously, the type and extent of the cognitive learning benefits of a policy game 
depend on its specific objectives and hence its design. As the focus of our own policy 
exercises was on assessing different policy options and their feasibility for EU burden-
sharing and REDD, the expectation was that insights on these matters would 
constitute a key area of participants’ cognitive learning. Arguably, this would extend 
both to current policy – since the discussions during the exercise would necessarily 
reflect back on the effects and implications of present policy design – as well as 
future developments, given the future setting of the policy exercise. Moreover, we 
expected to find learning about policy dynamics especially in the student groups that 
were less familiar with the policy-making processes (EU decision-making and global 
negotiations) simulated in the two exercises. Finally, this chapter aims to generate 
insights into the ‘knowledge structuring’ dimension of cognitive learning. As Chapter 
2 argued, cognitive learning involves not just the assimilation of new factual 
knowledge, but also the improved ability to structure existing knowledge. This may 
manifest itself on the one hand through a more differentiated mental map, i.e. 
through more associations and more causal connections in relation to a specific 
aspect. On the other hand, improved knowledge structuring may also involve better 
being able to synthesise information, i.e. making sound decisions on what may or 
may not be relevant in a particular context.   
In terms of differences between the four groups, in line with the propositions on 
expected learning outcomes presented in Chapter 3, it seemed logical to expect 
higher levels of cognitive learning from the students compared to the expert groups, 
given their lower level of prior expertise. The impact of a one-day intervention on the 
expert participants, all of whom with years of experience on the subject, would 
conceivably be more limited. As a second proposition, it was assumed that the 
difference in terms of topic – EU burden-sharing vs. REDD financing – would, if at all, 
matter only for the expert groups. This is because, whereas both topics were equally 
unfamiliar to the students, REDD financing as the more unstructured topic that leaves 
more space for ‘blue sky’ solutions and creative thinking (see Chapter3) might offer 
greater potential for cognitive learning in the expert group.   
In analysing cognitive learning, we drew on a number of different data sources. 
Comparison of concept maps drawn prior to and after the exercise allowed for 
insights in participants’ conceptual change as a consequence of the exercise as well 
as on knowledge structuring. Furthermore, we make use of self-reported information 
on cognitive learning from post-questionnaires and interviews with participants, 
drawing on our own systematic observations during the workshops in order to 
explain the patterns that we find. The structure of this chapter reflects this. We begin 
by introducing the notion of concept maps and different ways of using and analysing 
them. We then describe the way in which we have employed them in our research 
and subsequently report on the outcomes for the four participant groups. 
Subsequently, we move on to discussing our findings on participants’ self-reported 
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cognitive learning, based on survey and interview data. Finally, we reflect on the 
relevance of various contextual factors for the levels of cognitive learning that we 
found.  
5.2 Tracing recorded cognitive change using concept maps  
5.2.1 Concept maps as a knowledge structuring tool 
Concept maps are a graphical device for representing knowledge on a certain content 
domain and in this sense related to other, similar methods like mind maps and 
cognitive maps.
22
 A concept map typically comprises nodes representing concepts 
and linking lines which stand for relationships between these concepts. Concept 
mapping is a popular tool not only in education, but also in business and 
governmental contexts, and has been used for a variety of purposes, from instruction 
and assessment to knowledge elicitation and capture, to group brainstorming (Cañas 
et al., 2003).  
The notion of concept maps goes back to work by Novak and Gowin (Novak & Gowin, 
1984; Novak, 1998), who developed them as a methodological extension of Ausubel’s 
work on learning psychology (Ausubel, 1962). This theory assumes that learning 
occurs as a person integrates new propositions and concepts into his or her existing 
normative and conceptual framework, thus enhancing his or her cognitive structure. 
Concept maps make some of the main elements of this assimilation process visible: 
first, there is the process of subsumption, which refers to the semi-hierarchical 
structure of knowledge, where broader concepts subsume more specific ones, thus 
serving as an ordering device. A second element, integrative reconciliation, implies 
the fitting of new propositions into the existing framework, with the latter being 
modified where necessary. Finally, progressive differentiation describes how new 
concepts add to the complexity of the cognitive framework by creating new branches, 
or adding more levels of hierarchy. In an assessment context, concept maps make 
these processes visible as they ‘tap into a learner’s cognitive structure and to 
externalize, for both the learner and the teacher to see, what the learner already 
knows’ (Novak & Gowin, 1984, 40). This structural aspect of knowledge, which 
assumes that having significant expertise in a domain implies knowledge that is highly 
                                                                
22
 The distinction between mind maps, concept maps, and cognitive maps is fluid, and usage of 
the terms differs somewhat between authors. Mind maps, initially conceived by Buzan and 
Buzan (1993), are tree-shaped constructs departing radially from a central idea. They are 
primarily used for stimulating creativity in brainstorming or for planning purposes. Cognitive 
mapping was first promoted by Colin Eden and his colleagues (Colin Eden, 2004; Rohrbaugh & 
Eden, 1990) in an operations research context and is often referred to as the process of 
developing shared mental models in groups.  
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integrated and structured around central concepts, is widely recognised in cognitive 
learning theory (e.g. Glaser & Bassok, 1989; Ruiz-Primo & Shavelson, 1996).  
Concept maps as an assessment tool have so far been almost exclusively used in an 
education context, ranging from high school students (Kinchin et al., 2000; Rice et al., 
1998; Yin et al., 2005) to university courses ranging from educational psychology to 
biology and nursing (All & Havens, 1997; Derbentseva et al., 2007; McClture et al., 
1999). To our knowledge, the only earlier application inn a context similar to ours was 
by Huitema et al. (2010), who used pre- and post-concept mapping to assess 
participants’ learning in a series of citizen juries. Their analysis focused more on 
changes in map structure, however, paying less attention to shifts in content.  
The basic logic of concept mapping as an assessment device is the same across most 
studies – participants are asked to complete a concept map prior to an intervention, 
and a second one afterwards. Yet as the use of concept maps has proliferated over 
the past decades, the format of the concept maps and the methods to analyse the 
observed changes have become increasingly varied. While some maps are built up 
hierarchically with the central concept on top, others are organised radially around a 
core. Connecting lines may be labelled (this is called a propositional mapping format), 
or not. Finally, map completion can be a more or less ‘directed’ process: participants 
may be asked to fill in ‘scaffold’ maps with given concepts and linking terms, or, more 
commonly, draw a map ‘from scratch’ on a blank sheet of paper (Ruiz-Primo & 
Shavelson, 1996). When it comes to map assessment, one group of methods, building 
on Novak and Gowin’s initial work, scores maps based on the number of components 
and their structure, distinguishing between valid and invalid propositions and 
crosslinks, either by counting only those deemed accurate or by rewarding them with 
a higher score (Pearsall et al., 1996). A second cluster of methods assesses 
participants’ maps based on their similarity to a ‘master map’, through manual or 
computerised comparison with the concepts and propositions, or the proximity of 
certain concepts, on the latter (Acton et al., 1994; Luckie et al., 2011). Yet others seek 
to combine both approaches and score components, but also use an expert map to 
weigh them (Rye & Rubba, 2002). Finally, some authors rely on a global assessment 
of the map by one or more experts, or evaluate maps based on certain general 
criteria (e.g. Lomask et al., 1992). 
5.2.2 Approach to concept map analysis in order to assess knowledge 
structuring 
In devising our approach to using concept mapping to assess cognitive learning, we 
had to account for the specific objectives and context of our research. The primary 
goal of our policy exercises was to advance knowledge on two specific aspects of 
European and international climate policy, burden-sharing and REDD financing. We 
sought to accomplish this through a flexibly structured format which emphasised 
interaction and exchange among the participants. The exercises were not an 
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instruction setting aimed at conveying pre-specified sets of information to 
participants, as concept maps have traditionally been used. This had implications 
both for how we presented the task to participants and how we went about analysing 
the resulting maps. A less directed ‘mapping from scratch’ process, which had 
participants create their own map on a blank sheet of paper, seemed more 
appropriate to the nature and objective of our intervention. In the same vein, to keep 
the exercise ‘light’ and as little ‘test-like’ as possible, we opted for a pure mapping 
rather than a propositional mapping format, which did not require participants to 
label the connecting lines on their maps. Since we were interested in what 
participants learned rather than ascertaining whether they learned ‘the right things’, 
we felt that scoring the maps based on a comparison with a ‘master map’ drawn up 
by the organising team would not be the right approach. Rather, we searched for an 
established methodology that would allow for an aggregated analysis of the content 
and structure of the maps, without judging the perceived accuracy of the connections 
made.  
These requirements led us to opt for a methodology that had initially been developed 
by Morine-Dershimer (1993) to trace conceptual change in teacher education, 
complementing it with some additional metrics on map structure. The method relies 
on a coding of the items on the sets of pre-and post- concepts maps and is based on 
two key principles, (1) centrality – the proximity of certain concepts to the core of the 
map, which can be taken as an indicator how salient they are in the perception of the 
author and (2) specificity – the proportional frequency with which these concepts 
occur on the map. A comparison of shifts in the centrality and specificity of concepts 
from the pre- to the post-measurements therefore allows tracing changes in the 
structuring of knowledge as well as newly perceived relevance of certain aspects. The 
latter is an important aspect of our definition of ‘new knowledge’, which is not 
limited to the appearance of entirely novel concepts on participants’ mental maps, 
but which can also manifest itself through increased awareness of the salience of 
particular aspects of the problem.  
Following Morine-Dershimer, we started out by coding all items on the concept maps 
into a number of categories which capture the content on the maps. The categories 
were developed inductively, by working iteratively and adjusting the categories and 
their definitions until all items had been accommodated in a consistent and coherent 
manner. Given the different topics of the two policy exercises, we devised two 
separate coding systems, both of which ended up having eleven categories. An 
explanation of the two coding systems, including sample responses for each category, 
can be found in Annex 2.A.  
Subsequently, for each category on every map, scores for centrality and degree of 
specificity were calculated. Centrality scores were calculated based on the level at 
which the category first appeared on the map, relative to the map core. For example, 
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if a concept was linked directly to the core, its centrality score was 1. If another 
concept first appeared in a reference connected to the first concept, its centrality 
score was 2, and so on. In order to enable comparison of scores across concept maps 
and participants, we needed a measure for each concept category from each 
participant, even if that category did not appear on a map. Therefore, again following 
Morine-Dershimer, concept categories that were absent on a map were counted as 
being two levels below the furthest level present on that map. For example, for a 
map that extended to five levels, a category that had no items noted received a 
centrality score of seven. Specificity scores were calculated based on the relative 
frequency of items associated with one category – the number of items falling under 
a specific category was divided by the total number of items on the map. For instance, 
for a map with a total of 30 items, six of which were coded as belonging to the 
category ‘international context’, the degree of specificity for this category on this 
map was .20 (twenty per cent of items on this map belonged to this category). Along 
the same lines, if a category did not appear at all on a map, it received a specificity 
score of .00.  
Participants were asked to draw one concept map before the policy exercise and a 
second one afterwards. During the workshop dinner on the eve of the workshop (at 
the morning of the policy exercise for the student groups), participants spent ten to 
fifteen minutes constructing a concept map on the topic of the policy exercise. They 
were handed a sheet of paper, the front side of which was empty except for a short 
explanation of concept mapping and a central node containing the topic of the policy 
exercise (‘Key aspects of EU burden-sharing’ and ‘Setting up a global REDD fund’, 
respectively), that was to form the point of departure for a radially arranged map. 
The back side of the sheets contained an example of a concept map unrelated to the 
topic of the exercise to help participants unfamiliar with concept mapping to get 
started. After the policy exercise, participants were asked to draw a second concept 
map, with the same instructions as at the beginning of the day. In the expert run of 
the burden-sharing exercise, three participants who had to leave to catch their trains 
or planes home did not draw the map on the spot, but sent scanned maps via email a 
few days after the exercise. Similarly, since the students in both exercises had 
completed their first map only in the morning, they were told they could draw their 
post-maps at home and submit them during the following week. Neither experts nor 
students had their first map available when drawing the second one.  
With sets of 60 and 69 paired pre- and post-concept maps for the EU Burden-sharing 
and the REDD policy exercise, respectively, the response rate was quite high for the 
student groups, as for them this was a compulsory part of the course they were 
following. For the expert groups, while the response rate for the ex ante maps was 
close to 100%, the rate afterwards was considerably lower, owing to the difficulty of 
motivating participants for yet another task after a long and strenuous workshop day. 
In the end, we obtained sets of comparable pre- and post-maps from five participants 
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for the EU burden-sharing exercise, and nine pre- and post-sets from participants for 
the REDD exercise. This constitutes a major limitation to the validity of our findings 
for these groups and we discuss the implications of this below. We will now turn to 
describe the results of the concept map analysis, first for the runs of the EU burden-
sharing exercise and then for the REDD exercise, before making some observations 
across all four groups.  
5.2.3 Cognitive change in the policy exercises on EU burden-sharing 
Run with experts 
As stated above, with only five available sets of pre- and post-concept maps, the 
response rate for the expert run of the EU burden-sharing exercise was very low. 
However, we obtained at least one set from each occupational group present at the 
policy exercise (policy-makers, academics, consultants, private sector), which 
enhances the representativeness of this small sample to some extent. Figure 5 
displays mean centrality and specificity scores at pre- and post-test for the available 
maps (n=5) (for a table including all scores, see Annex 2.B, Table 23). Mean centrality 
scores are depicted on the x-axis, with centrality decreasing from left to right. Mean 
specificity scores are indicated on the y-axis – the higher a category on the map, the 
more frequently it is referred to on average across the available maps. Thus, 
categories that moved left have become more central at post-test, while those that 
have moved right have become less so. Along the same lines, categories that moved 
up have increased their proportional frequency across maps, whereas those moving 
down appear less often on ex post maps. 
Looking at Figure 5 below, we can observe that a number of concept categories 
shifted from pre- to post-measurement for the expert group. Simultaneous shifts on 
both indicators, centrality and specificity, were most noticeable for the two 
categories relating to the design and implementation of burden-sharing 
arrangements and to the European emissions trading system (EU ETS).
 23
 Both 
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 The results presented here differ from the ones reported in Haug et al. (2011). For this paper, 
we had coded the map items and analysed the resulting dataset from the expert run only, 
before even collecting the data from the student run on the same subject. Yet when 
attempting later to apply this initial coding scheme to the student maps, we realised that it did 
not fully capture the content contained in the student maps. We thus adjusted and expanded 
the coding system in order to account for the diversity of items across the whole set of maps. 
In doings so, we inevitably lost some of the subtleties and nuances in the results for the expert 
group – thus arguably underreporting the cognitive change among this set of participants –, yet 
felt that the benefits of achieving comparability in the results from both groups outweighed 
this disadvantage. For the concept map data from the REDD exercise, we worked from the 
outset with maps from experts and students to develop common coding categories applicable 
to both participant groups.  
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became more central as well as specific on the ex post maps. This resonates with our 
observations during the policy exercise, where discussions circled extensively around 
the question how to design a burden-sharing agreement that is robust (containing 
sufficiently stringent enforcement mechanisms) yet flexible enough to accommodate 
for unforeseen developments (e.g. particularly cold winters or hot summers, which 
might result in emissions increases through increased heating/air-conditioning). 
Similarly, over the course of the workshop, participants became increasingly aware of 
the strong interrelation between burden-sharing and the functioning of the EU ETS, 
which again explains why these issues became more central and specific on the ex 
post maps. On the other hand, the specificity of the treatment of criteria for burden-
sharing, while still very high on the post-maps, decreased considerably. Items relating 
to this category made up more than thirty per cent of all concepts on experts’ ex ante 
concept maps. On the ex post maps, their (still sizeable) share decreased to slightly 
above 20 per cent. Looking at the maps in more (qualitative) detail, we find that pre-
maps were dominated by rather generic lists of possible criteria (cost-efficiency, cost-
effectiveness, equity…) on which future burden-sharing schemes could be based. 
These lists were replaced by a more diverse outlook on the topic in the post 
measurement, as is noticeable from the spread of concept categories in lower part of 
Figure 5. In section 5.2.5, we delve in more detail into the type of items contained in 
the maps (making a distinction between lists, labels, and explications) on the maps 
and discuss how shifts between types relate to the knowledge structuring property of 
cognitive learning.  
In line with the approach introduced by Morine-Dershimer (1993), we subsequently 
sought to statistically assess the shifts in centrality and specificity using analysis of 
variances (ANOVA), with time of mapping (pre or post) as the independent variable. 
The analysis reveals differences between pre- and post-measurement in the degree 
of specificity for the EU ETS and the policy design and implementation categories, 
which are significant at p <. 05 level for EU emissions trading and at p <. 10 for policy 
design and implementation (see Annex 2.B, Table 24). It is likely that the small 
number of available concept maps prevented other, smaller effects from becoming 
statistically significant.  
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Figure 5. Centrality and specifity scores at pre-test (above) and post-test (below), 
experts burden-sharing exercise. Conceptual shifts discussed in the text are bolded. 
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Run with students 
Turning to the concept maps drawn by the students who participated in the policy 
exercise on EU burden-sharing, we find somewhat different patterns (Figure 6; Table 
25 in Annex 2.B). The most visible change is probably the rise of the ‘politics and 
negotiations’ concept category, which is statistically significant at p <. 05 in terms of 
specificity and at p <. 10 in terms of centrality (see Annex 2.B, Table 26 for all ANOVA 
results of the student group). This emphasis on the aspects related to the dynamics 
of politics and negotiations resonates with our findings on students’ self-reported 
cognitive learning from the policy exercise, on which we report in more detail later in 
this chapter. The main similarity in concept mapping outcomes between the expert 
and the student group lies in the increased priority attached to aspects related to the 
EU emissions trading scheme. As for the experts, this aspect has become significantly 
more central and specific on the ex-post maps, reflecting the focus of much 
discussion on the interrelation between burden-sharing and the emissions trading 
system.  
Two further statistically significant changes relate to the decrease in a proportionally 
smaller number of items (i.e. decreased specificity) for the categories ‘actors’ and 
‘policy objectives’ on the ex post maps. When qualitatively examining the content of 
these categories, we note again a reduction in the ‘listing effect’ from pre- to most-
measurement. Many ex ante concept maps had included extensive lists of actors 
(‘industries’, ‘rich countries’, ‘poor countries’, ’NGOs’, ‘governments’, etc.) as well as 
a rather large number of highly generic references like ‘climate target EU’, ‘goal-
setting’, or ‘common aims’, which we subsumed under the category of policy 
objectives. These lists, which in some cases seemed to serve the purpose of ‘filling up’ 
a rather empty ex ante map, had become more condensed and reduced to the 
essential on the post maps. The conceptual picture at post-test thus captures a more 
nuanced, substantive understanding of the issue.  
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Figure 6. Centrality and specifity scores from pre- to post-test, students burden-sharing 
exercise. Conceptual shifts discussed in the text are bolded. 
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Having analysed the conceptual changes of expert and student group of the EU 
burden-sharing exercise separately, we were interested in comparing the patterns 
between the two groups. Independent-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), using 
group affiliation (expert/student) as the independent variable, revealed a number of 
differences (see Annex 2.B, Tables 27 and 28). First of all, the category ‘international 
context’ was significantly more prominent on the expert maps at both pre- and post-
test. We think that this is due to the richer contextual knowledge of this group that 
rightly attributed some importance to the global situation and policy developments, 
whereas the students tended to strongly focus on the task they were confronted with, 
namely the negotiation of an intra-EU agreement.
24
 Moreover, the high priority the 
students attached to the politics and negotiations dimension is reflected in 
significantly higher specificity (at both pre- and both-test) and centrality scores (only 
at post-test). A final statistically significant difference relates to the much greater 
specificity which which the ‘criteria’ of and ‘design and implementation’ for burden-
sharing agreements were elaborated on the expert pre-maps. This difference had all 
but disappeared in the post-measurement, however, testifying to a degree of 
convergence between expert and student knowledge following the exercise.  
5.2.4 Cognitive change in the policy exercises on REDD 
For the policy exercises on REDD, we followed the same approach to data collection 
as for the workshops on burden-sharing, both for the expert and the student runs. 
Since the topic of the exercise was different, the coding scheme for assessing the 
concept maps that we developed necessarily differed from the system for the 
burden-sharing exercise. An overview of the coding categories, including explanations 
and sample responses, can be found in Annex 2.A.  
Run with experts 
While still relatively low, the response rate, nine paired sets of pre- and post-maps, 
was somewhat better for the REDD policy exercise than for the one on burden-
sharing. Still, the limited sample size may have prevented us from detecting medium 
or small statistical effects. The only significant shifts relate to the category ‘actors’. 
The centrality of the concept decreased significantly from pre- to post map as did its 
specificity, although this was only at the p < .10 level. Again this is explained through 
a reduction of the ‘listing effect’ for this category; as participants learned in more 
depth about the topic over the course of the exercise, rather generic map items like 
                                                                
24
 The scenarios framing the policy exercises described the international policy context in 
which the exercise was set, and the journalist equally published news relating to international 
developments. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, these attempts to draw attention to the 
global dimension of the exercise seem to have had less impact on participants than we had 
anticipated. 
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‘industrialised countries’, ‘developing countries’, ‘companies’ and ‘local stakeholders’ 
diminished in number and centrality.  
Figure 7 displays aggregated centrality and specificity scores for concept categories at 
pre- and post-test (a complete set of mean centrality and specificity scores is included 
in Annex 2.B, Table 29). We see that while the ‘allocation and disbursement’ category 
– subsuming items related to the expenditure side of REDD financing – has remained 
the most central and specific category in both pre- and the post-measurement, the 
supply side of REDD finance (‘financing and sources’) has moved up to second place 
on the post-maps. ‘Governance of the mechanism’ – relating to the institutional 
arrangements for managing REDD finance – also increased markedly in centrality and 
specificity. In contrast, there is one category, ‘international context’, which clearly 
lost in importance from pre- to post-measurement; especially specificity scores went 
down in this case. Taken together, these changes render visible the imprint that the 
discussions over the course of the policy exercise left on participants. They reflect the 
rather focused theme of the workshop, how to design a global REDD fund. Key 
questions in this regard – where should the funds come from, who should receive 
them and how should this process be organised – emerge as the main themes from 
the ex post concept maps. Important contextual factors, such as the international 
context for REDD, have lost in importance. A final category that gained on both 
indicators is ‘policy objectives’. We are not sure how to interpret this, but the 
increase may be related to a theme in discussions throughout the workshop day on 
how to prioritise and make trade-offs the various objectives of REDD, from a focus on 
climate mitigation to a more integral vision that also accounts for biodiversity and 
livelihood goals. 
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Figure 7. Centrality and specifity scores from pre- to post-test, experts REDD exercise. 
Conceptual shifts discussed  are bolded. 
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Run with students 
Turning to the concept maps drawn by the students who took part in the policy 
exercise on REDD, the visible shifts in centrality and specificity on Figure 8 do not 
seem particularly remarkable at first glance (see Annex 2.B, Table 31 for all scores). 
The two most central and specific categories – ‘financing and sources’ and 
‘environmental performance of REDD’ – have by and large maintained their positions. 
However, analysis of variances pick up a rather large number of statistically 
significant changes in the dataset (n=69) (Annex 2.B, Table 32). 
Two statistically significant upward shifts (in terms of both centrality and specificity) 
from pre- to post-measurement concern the categories ‘governance of the 
mechanism’ and ‘co-benefits of REDD’. The increase in attention to these concept 
categories in the student group ties in with our findings on self-reported learning, 
which we will discuss later in this chapter. The increase in the perceived salience of 
the concept of co-benefits of REDD (relating to the question to what extent REDD 
mechanism design should reward the achievement of other social and environmental 
objectives beyond climate mitigation) also resonates with our findings on recorded 
normative learning (reported in the next chapter) and self-reported cognitive learning. 
By contrast, categories that decreased significantly on one or both measures include 
‘actors’, ‘REDD implementation’, and ‘policy objectives’.
 
Taken together, we can 
interpret these findings along the same lines as the ones for the expert group. They 
reflect a strong instrumental concern with global REDD mechanism design, which 
stood central in the discussions over the course of the day. Against this background, 
more contextual categories (‘actors’, ‘REDD implementation’ – referring to the 
realisation of REDD projects on the ground) lost in prominence on the post-maps.  
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Figure 8. Centrality and specificity scores from pre- to post-test, students REDD exercise. 
Conceptual shifts discussed in the text are bolded.  
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Again, we were also interested in comparing the patterns of reference of experts and 
students to different concept categories. Overall, there is a relatively large number of 
statistically significant differences between the two groups, both at pre- and at post-
test (see Annex 2.B, Tables 33 and 34). As for the burden-sharing exercise, the 
international context was significantly more prominent on expert maps, both for the 
pre- and the post-measurement (for the latter, only the difference in centrality was 
statistically significant). At pre-test, experts also included items related to ‘allocation 
and disbursement’ significantly more frequently on their maps than the students. 
This difference had diminished and was no longer statistically significant at post-test, 
however. By contrast, items that belong to the ´politics and negotiations´ category 
were significantly more central on students´ pre-maps, both before and after the 
exercise. The same applied for the categories ‘co-benefits of REDD’ and ‘actors’, but 
only at post-test. Overall, contrary to the burden-sharing exercise there is thus little 
indication of a convergence of experts’ and students’ mental maps as a consequence 
of the REDD exercise. One potential explanation for this relates to the nature of the 
two topics: a game on burden-sharing as the potentially more structured issue may 
hold more similar lessons for all participants, whereas with REDD financing, different 
aspects seem to have attracted the attention of experts and students, respectively.  
5.2.5 Additional evidence for cognitive learning from the concept maps 
As we have seen above, Morine-Dershimer’s measures of centrality and specificity 
provide a valuable avenue for tracing the occurrence of conceptual change and also 
allows for insights regarding their content and direction. What we cannot deduce 
from the results of this method, however, is the extent to which these changes 
constitute an objective ‘improvement’, i.e. a ‘better structuring of existing knowledge’ 
compared to the status ex ante. As we argued in Chapter 2, we refrain from using a 
normative yardstick on whether participants learned ‘the right things’, adopting an 
open attitude regarding the question of ‘what is learned’. Therefore, we decided 
against grading the quality of the concept maps or making use of a master map, 
which would have implied imposing the ‘correct’ content of a concept map or the 
‘right’ way of structuring it. Instead, we searched for other indicators that might 
provide evidence for cognitive learning.  
Number of items and levels per map 
We first turned to comparing the total number of items and the number of levels 
(distance of nodes from the central node) on pre- and post-concept maps. Both 
metrics are used in a number of concept map assessment methods (e.g. Jacobs-
Lawson & Hershey, 2002; Roehler et al., 1988). Although there is not a one-on-one 
relationship, we would posit that an increase in the number of levels speaks to an 
increased, and presumably improved, structuring of the drawer’s mental map of an 
issue, thus attesting to progressive differentiation in the terms of Ausubel’s learning 
theory (see Section 5.2.1 above). Similarly, more items on ex post concept maps may 
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be interpreted as evidence for a richer understanding of the topic at hand. This is not 
entirely unambiguous, however; as Huitema et al. (2010) rightly contend, cognitive 
learning may in some cases also be reflected in the elimination of false assumptions 
and irrelevant items.  
Figures 9 and 10 present the number of items and levels as averages per participant 
group at pre- and post-test. We can see that the average number of items and levels 
on the concept maps increased from pre- to post-measurement in all four groups – 
with the exception of the mean number of levels for the expert group on burden-
sharing, which remained constant (but at a higher level than for the other groups). 
For the two student groups, the increases from pre- to post-test (both in the number 
of levels and in the number of items) were statistically significant (see Annex 2.C, 
Table 35).  
 
Figure 9. Average number of items per concept map at pre- and post-test. 
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Figure 10. Average number of levels per concept map at pre- and post-test. 
Can we detect a difference between experts and students on these indicators? We 
find that at pre-test, experts noted on average more items than students (16.07 vs. 
12.57) and that their maps also had more levels (2.64 vs. 2.26), though both effects 
were only weakly significant at p < .10 (see Annex 2.C, Table 36). We cannot detect 
such effects at post-test any more, the gaps having narrowed both for the average 
number of items (19.07 for the experts vs. 17.33 for the students) and levels (2.79 vs. 
2.52). We would interpret this as evidence that, in line with our expectations noted 
above, the policy exercise had a greater cognitive learning effect on the students 
than on the experts; the number of levels and items on the concept maps at post-test 
show an extent of convergence between experts’ and students’ knowledge on the 
topic. 
Differentiating between different types of concept map items  
In an additional step, to add a more qualitative element to the assessment of map 
quality, we used a distinction between different types of responses items that 
Morine-Dershimer introduced in her 1993 paper. She differentiates between three 
kinds of items on participants’ maps: listings, labels and explications. Listings are 
extended enumerations under a superordinate item, which cite examples of this item, 
but hardly shed additional analytical light on it (e.g. ‘housing, agriculture, electricity’ 
under ‘sectors’ in the EU burden-sharing exercise). Labels in Morine-Dershimer’s 
definition are generic, one-word statements (in our context for instance ‘fairness’, 
‘developing countries’, ‘negotiations’), without additional context or information. 
Explications refer to items including more elaborate comments, or clusters of items 
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that describe a higher-order item in greater detail (e.g. ‘where to find the necessary 
funding?’ or ‘bargaining power, time pressure, rhetoric skills’ as subcategories of 
‘negotiations’). The implicit assumption in this typology is that a shift away from lists 
and labels to explications from pre- to post-measurement testifies to improved 
knowledge structuring. More explications on the ex post maps are interpreted as 
evidence that items are noted down more deliberately, less freely associative than at 
pre-test, leaving out items that have come to appear less relevant. We have already 
touched on this in the preceding sections, where we observed a reduction in listings 
for a number of categories from pre- test to post-test (most notably ‘criteria’ in the 
context of the burden-sharing exercise, and ‘actors’ and ‘policy objectives’ for both 
exercises) during the post-measurement. Since we also wanted to trace possible 
shifts in response types in a more systematic way, we coded every concept map 
according to the response type (label, explication, overly-detailed listing) that was 
dominant across the map. Figure 11 displays the share of concept maps for each 
response type at pre- and at post-test.  
 
Figure 11. Share of concept maps dominated by explications, labels or lists, respectively, per 
participant group. 
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With the exception of the expert group for the burden-sharing exercise, where all 
available maps consisted predominantly of explications already at pre-test, for the 
other three groups, the share of maps in this category increased markedly. At the 
same time, these groups saw a decline in the number of maps that were – across all 
eleven concept categories – dominated by labels. The same applies for the 
proportion of maps containing primarily listings, which had been low already at pre-
test (non-existent in the expert groups). At post-test, only a single student map (from 
the REDD exercise) primarily exhibited this feature. A Wilcox Signed-Rank test 
(treating the three response types as ordinal variables) shows that the shift from 
listings to labels to explications was indeed significant for the groups except the 
experts in the burden-sharing workshop (see Annex 2.C, Table 37).  
5.2.6 Interim conclusions 
In summary, analysis of the ex ante and ex post concept maps following Morine-
Dershimer’s method provides solid evidence that cognitive change occurred as a 
consequence of the policy exercise in all groups. Tracing the shifts of the concept 
categories from pre- to post-measurement provided valuable insights on the content 
and direction of this change. Across all four groups, key issues in policy design in the 
respective domains (interactions with the EU ETS/ design and implementation of 
burden-sharing schemes for the first game, and fund governance/ financing and 
allocation for the second) gained in salience from the pre- to the post-measurement: 
they were elaborated in more detail and moved closer to the centre of the map. Key 
themes in discussions over the course of the day thus left an imprint on participants’ 
minds, as reflected in the design of their concept maps. This strengthened focus on 
‘policy content’ pushed more contextual and partly more descriptive categories 
(‘actors’, ‘international context’, ‘policy objectives’ – with the exception of the latter 
on REDD experts’ maps, where it gained in importance) more to the margin of the 
maps. While the renewed focus on items related to policy design on the ex post maps 
was a common feature across all four groups, we observed one additional 
phenomenon for the students taking part in the burden-sharing exercise: in this 
group, issues related to the politics and negotiations involved in designing burden-
sharing schemes increased greatly in perceived salience, becoming the most central 
and second-most specific category on the ex post maps. By contrast, this category 
remained stable at low levels or lost in prominence in the other three groups. We will 
examine to what extent this trend is reflected in students’ self-reported cognitive 
learning in the second part of this chapter.  
Complementing the above analysis with metrics like the number of items and levels 
and especially changes in response types (lists, labels, explications) enabled a more 
complete assessment of the concept maps, not only in terms of shifts in the 
perceived salience of certain aspects, but also of evidence for improved knowledge 
structuring. The results point to mental maps that have become both more complex 
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(higher average number of items per map) and more structured (increase in the 
number of levels, with the exception of the experts taking part in the burden-sharing 
exercise, where the starting level was already very high in this respect) as a 
consequence of participating in the policy exercises. Comparison of the dominant 
type of responses from pre- to post-maps supports this conclusion. We find a 
reduction in the share of lists and labels in favour of more explications (again with the 
exception of the burden-sharing expert group, where this type dominated already at 
pre-test), supporting the impression of a more synthetic, evaluative outlook of the 
issue after the policy exercise. For both types of analysis (conceptual shifts and 
concept map metrics), however, the small number of available maps from the expert 
groups (and here especially for the EU burden-sharing policy exercise) constitutes a 
major limitation. Not only did it make detecting statistically significant effects harder, 
it also reduces the representativeness of the findings. Indeed, for the expert groups, 
the results from the concept map analysis are probably first and foremost proof that 
this method is a valid tool for tracing cognitive change also beyond an instructional or 
training context and that it deserves more widespread application also in other 
domains.  
5.3 Self-reported cognitive learning  
While the preceding assessment of participants’ pre- and post-concept maps shed 
light on some aspects of cognitive learning (recorded shifts in emphasis regarding the 
topics of the two exercises, structuring and complexity of participants’ mental maps), 
in the following, we aim to add a more qualitative dimension to the analysis. More 
specifically, in line with the expectations for cognitive learning that we outlined in the 
beginning of the chapter, we examine to what extent participants reported insights 
from the policy exercises in terms of policy substance (policy options and their 
feasibility in the domains of EU burden-sharing and REDD financing, respectively) and 
of the policy process and its dynamics. To this end, we draw on information from ex-
post interviews conducted with participants about two weeks after each run as well 
as the post-surveys completed immediately after the exercise (or, for the students 
within a week after the event). The surveys included a number of closed questions on 
cognitive learning as well as an open-ended question that inquired what three key 
insights the respondent was taking home from the policy exercise.  
5.3.1 Cognitive learning on policy content in the policy exercises on EU 
burden-sharing 
Run with experts 
The experts participating in the policy exercise on EU burden-sharing were overall 
moderately positive about the insights they gained from it in terms of policy content. 
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The survey responses to the question ‘to which extent has the policy exercise 
increased your understanding of current developments in European climate policy?’ 
reflect this (see Table 10): two respondents (14 per cent) responded ‘not really’, 
while 3 respondents (21 per cent) each chose the categories ‘very much’ and ‘to 
some extent’, with a further six persons (43 per cent) stating that it had enhanced 
their understanding ‘a bit’. Given the high   level of existing knowledge in the area of 
the policy exercise among participants, we would consider this a reasonable result, 
especially given the short timeframe of the exercise.  
 To which extent has participating in the policy exercise increased your understanding of 
current developments in European climate policy? 
  not at all not really a bit to some 
extent 
very much 
Count  2 6 3 3 
%  14% 43% 21% 21% 
Table 10. Self-reported learning on current policy. Experts burden-sharing exercise 
The aspect that was mentioned most often in the ex post interviews was one that 
had received little attention in the 2008 policy negotiations on the EU Climate and 
Energy Package, namely the crucial importance of the criteria on which burden-
sharing agreements are based. According to one interviewee, the workshop ‘made 
me think about ways to make it (the policies and arrangements, C.H.) more flexible 
and what criteria you have for sharing the burden, like per capita emissions and all 
other ways and what was important for the countries and how you put them 
together - this was something new.’ This theme also emerged from the open survey 
question: responses concerning the three key lessons learned from the event 
included statements like ‘how important the main criteria for effort-sharing are’, 
‘criteria for effort-sharing are paramount but divisive’, ‘criteria for effort sharing are 
very complex and yet crucial for success’, and ‘fairness is a social construct, 
interpretable in many ways.’ The issue of compliance – how to ensure that member 
states will meet their commitments under a future burden-sharing agreement – was 
also raised by several interviewees, including this respondent: ‘for instance 
compliance was new for me, as a policy-maker you have to think in a different way 
about the implications of your decisions.’ Finally, someone emphasised that the 
policy exercise had prompted a more holistic understanding of the issue at hand, 
commenting that ‘it was a very nice way to delve into the problem and see its 
different political dimensions.’ 
Participants were more sceptical, however, to what degree the policy exercise had 
succeeded in prompting a truly future-oriented dialogue – supposedly one of the key 
objectives of the policy exercise format. 8 respondents (57 per cent) responded that 
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the policy exercise had ‘not at all’ or ‘not really’ increased their understanding of 
future developments in European climate policy (see Table 11). 
 To which extent has participating in the policy exercise increased your understanding of 
future developments in European climate policy? 
  not at all not really a bit to some 
extent 
very much 
Count 2 6 5 1  
% 14%  43%  36%  7%  
Table 11. Self-reported learning on future policy. Experts burden-sharing exercise. 
This also came out of the interviews, with the majority expressing the view that the 
fact that the policy exercise was set in the future (2020) had not really had an impact 
on the deliberations. One interviewee maintained that moving the policy exercise 
into the future setting had been a good decision: ‘I thought this was a good choice 
after all. […] It helped me a bit to reflect how thinking about climate change needs to 
develop further.’ Another cited the ‘need to balance long-term opportunity with 
short-term cost’ as one of his/her three ‘key insights’ on the survey. Yet most other 
respondents were more negative. As somebody put it:  
‘You can get away a little bit from the everyday problems and discussions that 
are going on at the moment and the little things that influence the country’s 
behaviour. But it is hard to just imagine that all these little things are not there 
anymore in 2020. In the end, we found out that the outcome is the same as 
when we had been discussing the present and not the future. To get more away 
from the current situation you might need something more fleshed out about 
what the future looks like to get people away from the present.’ 
The need for more information and detail, for instance in the scenarios and role 
descriptions, in order to reinforce the futures dimension of the policy exercise, was 
also cited by other interviewees. Somebody argued that while the strategy of 
removing people from their current role and context by placing them into a future 
setting might be valuable for participants that are directly engaged in the actual 
negotiations as policy-makers or private sector lobbyists, it might not have been 
necessary for the group present at our policy exercise. He argued that, while very 
knowledgeable, our participants were – except for one participant –more removed 
from day-to-day decision-making: ‘These people could easily take the role of a 
present-day negotiator, there was no reason to move them ten years ahead in time. 
[…] then it is easier to stick with the present day situation because you have the facts 
more readily available.’  
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Run with students 
Students rated their self-reported cognitive learning about current policy content 
from the policy exercise similarly, though slightly more positive (mean of 3.69 vs. 
3.50), than the experts (see Table 12). 31 persons (63 per cent) stated the exercise 
had increased their understanding ‘to some extent’ or ‘very much’, whereas six 
individuals (twelve per cent) responding ‘not at all’ or ‘not really’. The difference in 
score between students and experts was not statistically significant.  
 To which extent has participating in the policy exercise increased your understanding of 
current developments in European climate policy? 
  not at all not really a bit to some 
extent 
very much 
Count 1 5 12 21 10 
% 2% 10% 24% 43% 20% 
Table 12. Self-reported learning on current policy. Students burden-sharing exercise. 
The insights that students reported regarding the substance of European climate 
policy touched on different aspects. Some coincided with issues raised in the expert 
group (‘the notion of fairness in burden/effort sharing’, ‘creating and agreeing on a 
baseline in the context of historical emissions was very difficult’). Other statements, 
like the realisation that ‘economic conditions in different countries need to be 
considered in policy formulation’ or that ‘national prosperity stays an important 
factor’ probably reflect the background of the students in environmental 
management, with the policy exercise confronting their personal beliefs that 
environmental concerns should constitute a priority in political decision-making. 
Overall, less than one fifth of all ‘key insights’ that the students noted in response to 
the open survey question were primarily related to policy content, illustrating that 
this did not constitute the core of their cognitive learning during the exercise.  
Contrary to the expert group, mean student scores on learning about the future of 
European climate policy were slightly higher than those about the present (3.88 vs. 
3.69). 19 respondents (39 per cent) replied ‘to some extent’ or ‘very much’ to this 
question (see Table 13). Yet despite the more positive assessment regarding the 
knowledge gained about future developments, the fact that the policy exercise itself 
was set in the future seems did not seem to have resonated strongly with the 
students we interviewed. One commented: ‘it was hard to imagine what was the 
same and what would be different by then. So I guess we played as if it was now.’ 
Another was even more agnostic to this aspect: ‘Now that you said it was in 2020, I 
wouldn't have remembered that actually. If you had asked me when it was set, I 
would have said this year […].’ Thus, the futures context apparently had only little 
influence on the way the students acted throughout the policy exercise. One might 
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argue however that this element of the exercise was less relevant for this group 
anyway. As both policy-making and negotiation processes as well as the specific 
subject matter were rather new to most students, there was less need to stimulate 
‘out of the box’ thinking in this manner.  
 To which extent has participating in the policy exercise increased your understanding of 
future developments in European climate policy? 
  not at all not really a bit to some 
extent 
very much 
Count  7 23 13 6 
%  14% 47% 27% 12% 
Table 13. Self-reported learning on future policy. Students burden-sharing exercise. 
5.3.2 Cognitive learning on policy content in the policy exercises on REDD 
financing 
Run with experts 
For the policy exercise on REDD financing, we were again interested what 
participants reported to have learned about current and future policy on REDD, 
especially its financing dimension. Seven experts (58 per cent of those who 
completed the survey) responded that they had learned from it ‘to some extent’, 
against three persons (25 per cent) who reported that this had ‘not really’ been the 
case (see Table 14). The mean score at 3.33 was marginally lower than for the experts 
of the burden-sharing group (the difference was not statistically significant, however), 
thus to some extent disproving our expectation that the policy exercise on REDD 
might provide greater potential for cognitive learning.  
 ’The REDD-ALERT policy exercise provided me with an update on current developments on 
REDD+ financing.’  
  not at all not really a bit to some 
extent 
very much 
Count  3 2 7  
%  25% 17% 58%  
Table 14. Self-reported learning on current policy. Experts REDD exercise. 
The issues raised most often in the open survey question regarding the ‘key insights’ 
gained were – not surprisingly – connected to the core of the exercise, REDD 
financing. Some participants just noted ‘various ways of short/medium/long term 
financing for REDD’ or ‘mechanism of financing’, and one person admitted that 
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‘raising sufficient funds will be more difficult than I thought.’ Another added that 
‘REDD faces exactly the same financing problems as every other forestry issue. So we 
should look at the financing options of other international problems, especially where 
it has worked.’ Somebody else elaborated in the ex-post interview:  
‘The discussions in policy circles and in the literature are often so devoid of flesh 
and blood and political context, it seems as if we just get the design [of a future 
REDD mechanism, C.H.] right, the rest will just fall into place and parties will live 
up to the commitments they made. The workshop made me realise the 
difficulties in raising the needed resources to an issue as uncertain and complex 
as REDD.’  
A similar observation was made with regard to the reality in developing countries, 
reflecting that what was ‘missing in this discussion (and maybe the real world) is the 
detail on what is done on the ground and how this reflects back on things like MRV 
[monitoring, reporting, and verification of achieved emission reductions, C.H.], 
administration, funding, etc..’ Other participants reported that they had understood 
better ‘how the [REDD, C.H.] fund could be operationalised’ or concluded, with 
regard to the planned phasing of REDD implementation, that ‘readiness and actual 
mitigation phase should be clearly separate.’ Finally, an important recurrent theme in 
both interviews and survey responses was increased scepticism regarding the 
political as well as the practical feasibility of REDD following the exercise: ‘the success 
of REDD is not guaranteed’, ‘few countries actually have an incentive for an 
operational REDD mechanism’; ‘principle is ok, but difficult to put into practice’.  
The response of the experts to the second closed survey question on cognitive 
learning, namely to what extent the policy exercise stimulated thinking about the 
medium and long-term future of REDD financing, was decidedly more positive than 
for the burden-sharing exercise. All respondents replied that this had been ‘to some 
extent’ or ‘very much’ the case (see Table 15), resulting in a mean score of 4.25 out of 
5. This was the highest of all self-reported learning questions in the survey across the 
different groups, and significantly higher than for the same survey question to the 
burden-sharing experts (F(1,20.48) = 11.78, p < . 05)
 25
. The REDD policy exercise thus 
seems to have achieved the objective of getting participants to thoroughly reflect 
about future policy developments, as illustrated by this quote of one participant: 
‘God knows I have been to many workshops, but this one really stands out. The long-
term big picture of REDD and the related challenges and what we might do about 
them have become a lot more tangible.’ Another added that the exercise ‘did raise a 
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 The F-value is a ratio of the variability between groups compared to the variability within the 
groups. If this ratio is large then the p-value is small producing a statistically significant result 
(i.e. rejection of the null hypothesis). Df refers to the degrees of freedom. The Welch-test 
reported as the assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated for the ANOVA test.  
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lot of questions that are easily lost when one thinks only about the next steps to 
make REDD a reality.’ 
 ’The REDD-ALERT policy exercise made me think about the medium- and long-term future of 
REDD+ financing.’ 
  not at all not really a bit to some 
extent 
very much 
Count    9 3 
%    75% 25% 
Table 15. Self-reported learning on future policy. Experts REDD exercise. 
The scenario of the REDD policy exercise moved the simulation ahead five years into 
the future (from 2010 to 2015). This future setting itself, however, seems again to 
have left only little impression with the participants. ‘Placing yourself in 2015 is not 
so easy to do in a short time’ was one reaction of an interviewee. But it did help to 
‘sharpen some of the conflicts we will have to expect’, according to another. Overall, 
however, we would tend to conclude that this design element had only a very limited 
effect in the context of our policy exercises.  
Run with students 
This brings us to the cognitive learning effects from the student exercise on REDD. 
Unfortunately, we cannot rely on data from the closed survey questions for this 
group as the relevant section was omitted from the post-questionnaire due to an 
oversight. Nonetheless, the available qualitative data allows for relatively robust 
insights into the students’ learning in this domain, even though it limits the extent to 
which direct comparisons can be drawn.  
Compared to the student exercise on burden-sharing, lessons learned on policy 
content, which touched on various aspects related to the design and potential 
effectiveness and equity implications of a future REDD mechanism, figured much 
more centrally among the three ‘key insights’ that students involved in the REDD 
exercise wrote down in their post-surveys. About half of the items noted could be 
grouped under this category, as opposed to roughly twenty per cent for the students 
of the burden-sharing exercise (like for the other groups, the remaining items related 
either to the policy process and its dynamics, which we will cover in the next section, 
or insights into actors and attitudes, which are covered in chapter 7 on relational 
learning). In general, the responses covered a broad range of issues, revealing a 
rather sophisticated understanding of REDD and the associated political and technical 
challenges. Similarly to the insights reported by the experts, a large number of items 
dealt with aspects of REDD financing, the central theme of the policy exercise. 
Examples include the realisation that ‘funding is difficult to find and agree upon’, that 
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raising ‘enough and stable funding for REDD+ is not a logical result of the negotiation 
process’, that ‘eligibility criteria for funds and fund management are important issues 
to agree upon and require stakeholder participation’ or that ‘funding is the most 
difficult part of all negotiations in general and REDD+ in particular.’ A further theme, 
which was also reflected on the concept maps and in the outcomes on normative 
learning examined in the next chapter, was the importance of safeguards and co-
benefits, i.e. attention to the wider social and environmental dimensions, in REDD 
design. Respondents stated that ‘co-benefits are one of the most important 
outcome[s, C.H.] for developing countries for contributing to REDD+’, that 
‘accounting for co-benefits are [is, C.H.] important to value the rights of local 
communities […]’ and that ‘[s]takeholder participation is not an automatic first 
thought that comes to mind, but is essential for legitimacy.’ A number of respondents 
also reflected on the institutional aspects of REDD: the exercise ‘shows how much we 
are stuck with the current institutions like World Bank and GEF’; ‘[i]nstitutional 
aspects and governance of REDD fund will be a major challenging aspect of the 
scheme.’ Last but not least, the open survey question prompted more general 
reflections on the prospects and possible impacts of REDD, with respondents 
reaching different conclusions in this regard. While some concluded that 
‘nevertheless it [REDD, C.H.] seems the best forward we have’ and that ‘although 
[despite, C.H.] the difficulties, REDD is a cheaper and more practical solution than 
most alternatives and therefore has the potential to be of great impact’; others 
warned that ‘executing an agreement with such complexities and on such scale could 
be considered highly unrealistic’ or emphasised ‘the problem that if you pay the 
loggers not to log, how many loggers will there be.’  
Compared to the other groups, the interviews that we conducted with students 
following the exercise on REDD financing seemed to indicate a more positive view of 
the decision to move the policy exercise into the future. As one interviewee 
commented,  
‘[i]t made a difference, because there is simply less time available to deal with 
the problems and there is more pressure to get to an agreement. If things are 
set in the future and nothing much has changed so far, then the issue becomes 
much larger, which is a very good thing for such exercise. And it is also good to 
realise that this is actually happening. Five or ten years from now we really are 
in that situation and it will be a shame that we haven’t done more about it in 
the previous years.’ 
Another concurred: ‘I think it did [matter that the exercise was set in 2015, red]. It 
gave people more freedom to be creative in their thinking, since placing the situation 
into the future makes it an imaginary setting that is however very closely connected 
to reality.’ Unfortunately, we are again lacking data from the relevant closed survey 
question to back up this observation on a wider basis and to more reliably ascertain 
broader cognitive learning effects about future policy for this group. 
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5.3.3 Broader contribution of the policy exercises - insights that are ‘new to 
the world’? 
Having concluded this discussion on individual learning about policy brings us to the 
broader question to what extent the two policy exercises generated insights and 
policy options that might not only be novel to the participants, but actually ‘new to 
the world.’ While this may be ‘an excessively high standard against which to measure 
any study technique’ (Jones, 1964, 42), it is a claim that is made in the more 
optimistic writings on the possible effects of simulation-games and thus warrants 
some examination here. Our analysis here limits itself to the expert runs, as it was 
mainly for these that such insights could credibly be expected.  
Policy exercise on EU burden-sharing  
When asked whether they reckoned that the policy exercise had generated truly 
innovative, novel insights or policy options, our interviewees were in the first 
instance somewhat sceptical. Though all but one respondent could name specific 
aspects of EU burden-sharing in the interview that they had not been familiar with 
beforehand and that thus constituted cognitive learning for them as individuals, they 
expressed doubts whether these really constituted ‘new knowledge’ at a broader 
level. ‘No, I don’t think so. I am so close to the process and follow the negotiations’ 
was the reply of one person, supported by another, who concluded that: ‘[s]omebody 
that has been following the discussion on burden-sharing for the last ten years would 
not get very many new things out of it.’ Having examined the minutes and outcomes 
of the runs and cross-checked them with our recorded observations, we would tend 
to agree with this assessment. Nevertheless, upon closer analysis, there were also a 
number of elements emerging from the negotiations and the debriefing that in our 
view do constitute modest advances to the general discussion on EU burden-sharing 
and add some sophistication to it, although it is of course very difficult to judge their 
innovativeness at a broader level.  
The most interesting aspects in this regard probably related to the criteria or 
methodology for determining the emission reduction commitments of individual 
member states, which also featured prominently in the responses to the open survey 
question on ‘key insights’ in both the expert and the student groups. The question of 
criteria for burden-sharing had been hardly contested in the policy negotiations of 
the 2008 effort-sharing decision in the context of the EU Climate and Energy Package, 
which were taking place around the same time as our expert workshop. However, it 
turned out to be the by far most controversial topic in the policy exercise runs with 
both experts and students.
26
 The discussions during the policy exercise illustrated 
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 The fact that the topic received limited attention in the real negotiations for the period 
2012-2020 may be attributed to the Commission´s framing of its legislative proposals relating 
to the EU ETS, effort-sharing and renewable as a ´package´: whereas the EU ETS emphasised 
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that, when looking ahead to the medium-term, as was the intention with this method, 
the question of criteria seems set to become significantly more intractable. Since the 
´low-hanging fruits´ – the relatively easily exploitable mitigation potentials in the 
transport and residential sectors – will have been largely used up by then in the more 
developed member states, a wealth-based allocation of reduction commitment 
appears less politically palatable than today. At the same time, mitigation in the non-
trading sectors will have become costlier in the newer member states, further 
curbing their enthusiasm to shoulder a larger brunt of the abatement burden. One 
expert group sought to address this dilemma by resorting to a combined indicator 
that factored in marginal abatement costs, but also took account of equity 
considerations, both in terms of emissions and income. Assuming that member states 
were to accept the calculations of marginal abatement costs computed by the 
Commission for the whole of the Community as a basis for allocating targets , this 
might indeed be a feasible and innovative way forward.  
A different issue that came up in the discussions was the interrelation between the 
EU ETS and the effort-sharing domain. As the EU ETS is expanded to include 
additional sectors, this inevitably reduces the mitigation options remaining in the 
non-trading sectors. Ensuring sufficient flexibility inside the effort-sharing domain 
thus becomes ever more relevant. This could be achieved either by allowing for the 
trading of achieved reductions among member states (with the strong performers 
selling on their excess emission cuts) or by relying on purchases of carbon credits 
from outside the Community. The latter option carries a greater risk of compromising 
the environmental integrity of the scheme, prompting expert group B as well as the 
student groups to focus on maximal internal flexibility, which, as they argued, would 
also increase the overall cost-efficiency of the mitigation effort. Alternatively, as was 
propagated by some of the new member states during the 2008/2009 negotiations, 
the ‘firewall’ separating the EU ETS from the effort-sharing domain could be softened 
to some extent. This would however impact the ‘cap’ – the centrally established 
emissions ceiling – under the EU ETS, with detrimental consequences for the 
installations covered by the trading scheme in terms of transparency and investment 
certainty. Both expert groups realised this risk in their discussions and as a 
consequence focused primarily on the first two options.  
Expert deliberations in the context of our exercise further established a link that has 
not featured in policy discussions to date, namely the connection between burden-
sharing in mitigation and in adaptation. Both Spanish teams in the two expert sub-
groups argued that the relatively more severe climate impacts and related adaptation 
costs that their country was facing should in some way be reflected in the agreement 
on mitigation burden-sharing. While other teams opposed this, cautioning that such a 
                                                                                                                                                          
cost-effectiveness considerations, the Effort Sharing Decision squarely addressed member 
states’ equity concerns (Haug & Jordan, 2010). 
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link would risk overburdening the mechanism, the policy exercise may have 
foreshadowed future discussions on this point. Eventually, neither group in the 
exercise endorsed a direct link by factoring adaptation burdens (however these might 
be calculated) into the determination of emission reduction commitments.  
Policy exercise on REDD financing 
The judgment of the expert participants that we interviewed in the aftermath of the 
REDD policy exercise was quite similar to the one by the participants in the burden-
sharing group. Though all interviewees were positive about the insights they had 
gained individually about future developments and challenges related to a global 
REDD mechanism, they were cautious to what extent any ideas had emerged that 
could possibly qualify as ‘new to the world’. According to one interviewee, ‘it was 
rewarding intellectually to reflect about issues that are still two steps away from 
what is being discussed now in policy, but besides my broader impressions, I have a 
hard time coming up with a single concrete idea that emerged from it [the policy 
exercise, C.H.] that I would call innovative and useful.’ 
Our own assessment, based on minutes of the workshop and the debriefing as well as 
our own observations, comes to a similar conclusion. One aspect of the outcomes of 
the exercise that we reckoned may have pushed the boundaries of broader 
mainstream thinking on REDD concerned how achieved emission reductions under 
REDD in a country might be verified. Our expert group and also most of the student 
groups agreed that, following the example of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), this task should be carried out by accredited 
independent entities, thus according a key supervisory role for a largely public 
mechanism to private bodies. This choice diverged from established conceptions on 
this issue, which mostly consider it as a function of an independent international 
institution or body (Angelsen et al., 2009; Streck et al., 2009). While involving the 
private sector in this way may have the benefit of fully harnessing the experience 
with verification and certification gained under the CDM, it may also raise 
sovereignty concerns and risks increasing transaction costs.  
Otherwise, while not producing novel ideas or policy options per se, the REDD policy 
exercise did provide a useful ‘test drive’ for two policy options related to the 
disbursement of payments from a global REDD fund. These had been suggested in 
the scientific literature and were included as options on the policy element cards in 
the exercise, but – as far as we can judge - had not yet reached the political 
discussions. The first was the suggestion to organise disbursement from a global 
REDD fund through an auction-based format. In such a set-up, developing countries 
would sell their verified REDD units to the global fund, which would first purchase the 
units offered at the lowest price, then those at the second-lowest, and so forth, until 
the provided budget is exhausted or the desired quantity of REDD units reached. In 
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the academic literature on the topic, Obersteiner et al. (2009) emphasise the 
versatility of REDD auctions, which could be designed to account for social and 
environmental co-benefits, or target specific groups of countries by organising 
auctions in separate tranches, using different qualifier criteria. However, developing 
country teams in both the expert and the student runs of the policy exercise 
fundamentally opposed the efficiency-based logic of such a system, arguing that 
dedicated windows under the fund catering to different purposes or priorities were 
both more equitable and transparent. These equity-based concerns do not bode well 
for the political feasibility of an auctioning approach, which is yet to enter the 
international climate negotiations, where the focus is currently still on the more 
fundamental questions surrounding REDD.  
More positively received was the notion of a longer-term integration of REDD with 
the global carbon market. Country teams agreed that for REDD to be viable over the 
long run an interface of some sort with the carbon market would have to be 
established. Among the different options that were discussed for engineering the 
transition from a fund to a market-based approach, the idea of an International 
Investment Reserve received the greatest support in the policy exercise. An 
International Investment Reserve would act like an investment bank for REDD, 
purchasing yet-to-be created REDD units from host countries and, once verified, 
reselling these into the carbon markets to create returns for investors and to 
replenish the IIR fund (Obersteiner et al., 2009). This set-up would provide for an 
influx of REDD credits into the carbon markets, controlled by the reselling decisions 
of the Investment Reserve’s governing board. The concept met with opposition from 
the United States team, however, who argued that the fund administration should be 
not be able to exert influence on the autonomous functioning of the market.  
5.3.4 Insights into policy dynamics in the policy exercises on EU burden-
sharing 
Another aspect that we were interested in the domain of cognitive learning was the 
extent to which participants reported insights on the process dimension of policy-
making in EU and international climate policy, respectively. Given the set-up of the 
policy exercises as simulated negotiations, we expected especially the students in 
both exercises, who we assumed to be generally less familiar with such processes, to 
experience cognitive learning in this domain.  
Run with experts 
When examining the results of the expert run of the burden-sharing exercise, 
however, we were surprised at the substantial level of attention to the process 
dimension in participants’ evaluations. After all, while only a minority was directly 
involved in policy-making in their daily work, all had for the past years been working 
on climate policy issues, albeit from different perspectives. A majority of eight 
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participants (57 per cent) stated that the exercise had increased their understanding 
of the dynamics of EU climate policy-making ‘to some extent’ or ‘very much’, against 
two (14 per cent) and four persons (29 per cent), respectively, who opted for the 
categories ‘not really’ and ‘a bit’ (see Table 16). With an average score of 3.57 out of 
5, this outcome was marginally higher than for the questions inquiring about other 
aspects of self-reported cognitive learning in this group.  
‘To which extent has participating in the policy exercise increased your understanding of the 
dynamics of EU climate policy-making?’ 
  not at all not really a bit to some 
extent 
very much 
Count  2 4 6 2 
%  14% 29% 43% 14% 
Table 16. Self-reported learning on policy dynamics. Experts burden-sharing exercise. 
The extent to which issues related to policy and negotiation dynamics had left an 
imprint with participants came out even more clearly in the responses to the open 
survey question and the ex post interviews. More than one third of experts´ reported 
‘key insights’ fall in this group. Participants for instance highlighted the ‘[i]mportance 
of negotiation process as there will always be need to be compromise’ and noted 
that ‘it is easy to get carried away in a negotiation setting and accept text that differs 
from your position.’ They also noted lessons that they had learned from the exercise 
in terms of negotiation strategies, such as the ‘[i]mportance of unbundling then 
rebundling as a way of clarifying real priorities and circumventing petty objections’ or 
that ‘the negotiating matrix needs to be very simple. There need to be a limited 
amount of negotiation topics that are well thought through.’ Finally, reference was 
made to the specific policy context that the burden-sharing exercise sought to 
simulate: one respondent highlighted the ‘limitations of EU decision-making structure’ 
as a key insight. Yet this aspect was not necessarily novel to others; according to one 
interviewee, the exercise ‘strengthened and reaffirmed my view of how countries 
operate in a negotiating setting in the EU.’ Others were more sanguine, as for 
instance this person: ‘I think it was quite a useful exercise because, especially for me 
with my background, it gave me some insight in the way these things work.’  
Run with students 
In line with our expectations, student scores on learning about policy dynamics 
surpassed those of the experts. 27 students (55 per cent) reported having learned 
‘very much’ in this regard, with the average amounting to 4.35 (see Table 17). Not 
only was the difference in results between student and the expert group statistically 
significant (F(1,61) = 8.97, p < .01), the mean for learning about policy dynamics was 
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also much higher than for the questions inquiring about other aspects of cognitive 
learning in this group.  
‘To which extent has participating in the policy exercise increased your understanding of the 
dynamics of EU climate policy-making?’ 
  not at all not really a bit to some 
extent 
very much 
Count  1 8 13 27 
%  2% 16% 27% 55% 
Table 17. Self-reported learning on policy dynamics. Students burden-sharing exercise. 
This emphasis was echoed in the responses to the open survey question, with half of 
all answers to the question regarding the ‘key insights’ from the policy exercise 
focusing on the process dimension. While the aspects mentioned are rather diverse, 
some key themes emerge, such as possible ‘success factors’ for negotiations: ‘[t]he 
success of negotiations depends greatly on the ability of the representative to convey 
their ideas in a convincing way’, whereas ‘[t]houghtful, thorough reasoning and 
argumentation and underpinning is of secondary importance, considering the time 
pressures.’ Similarly, students noted that ‘negotiations in small focus groups benefits 
the process’ and that a ‘strong stance on one issue can be used as leverage against 
another.’ Another strand of responses expressed frustration with the constraints of 
policy-making: ‘Negotiation outcomes have no relation to objective science’, ‘politics 
is about power and dirty’ and ‘[t]here is a discrepancy between reaching a good 
agreement and reaching an agreement that will actually be implemented.’ Some also 
referred specifically to the EU context, reflecting for instance that the ‘[v]oting 
system is important obstacle to very ambitious targets.’ In the ex post interviews, 
students also emphasised this dimension when asked what they were taking away 
from the exercise, as illustrated by the following quote: ‘I definitely learned a lot 
more that day than probably in the couple of weeks of the course, really. It was fine 
to hear about it [how policy-making works, C.H.], but then to actually do it in practice 
is quite different.’  
5.3.5 Insights into policy dynamics in the policy exercises on REDD 
financing 
Run with experts 
Unlike to the EU decision-making process, which provided the frame of the burden-
sharing policy exercise, the exercise on REDD financing was embedded into the 
context of global climate negotiations. More specifically, the scenario of the exercise 
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stipulated that the setting of the simulation was a pre-meeting preceding the start of 
the actual negotiations.
27
  
The REDD experts varied in their response to the question to which extent the policy 
exercise had enhanced their understanding of the dynamics of international decision-
making, with an equal split between the four answer categories ‘not really’ to ‘very 
much’ (see Table 18). The mean score (3.50) was very close to that of the burden-
sharing group (3.57).  
‘The REDD-ALERT policy exercise provided me with a better understanding of the dynamics 
of international decision-making on REDD+.’ 
  not at all not really a bit to some 
extent 
very much 
Count  3 3 3 3 
%  25% 25% 25% 25% 
Table 18. Self-reported learning on policy dynamics. Experts REDD exercise. 
Process aspects also appeared among the self-reported ‘key insights’ in the survey, 
though less dominant and elaborate than for the burden-sharing expert group. One 
participant highlighted the ‘negotiation limitations/procedures’, another simply 
noted to the ‘negotiation process’, and yet another mentioned insights into ‘[h]ow to 
phrase comments so that other delegates will react/internalise.’ In the interviews, 
the process dimension was also brought up. According to one participant, the 
exercise made her  
‘[…] wonder about the value of reasoned argument versus manipulation and 
power in international negotiations. The exercise showed how important 
framing and finding the right allies is in getting an idea accepted. And how 
easily an objectively good option can be discarded if it is not well presented.’  
Two other interviewees, however, pointed to the fact that while the policy exercise 
did bear some semblance to reality in its procedures, it was unable to capture the 
dynamics of international climate negotiations, due to its limitation to just five 
countries. Based on our own observations, we would tend to concur with this 
assessment. Yet we maintain that, given the number of participants, the decision to 
play with a smaller number of teams favoured a more in-depth engagement with the 
                                                                
27
 The reason was the objective to maintain symmetry in design with the first policy exercise, 
where five parties had been represented in the simulation. For the REDD exercise, we opted 
for a pre-meeting to the international climate negotiations (which involve more than 180 
parties) as the most credible way to justify a similar limitation in the number of participating 
countries.  
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subject matter as the teams could jointly explore the advantages, drawbacks and 
implications of certain options before entering into negotiations with their 
counterparts.  
Run with students 
In the open survey question as well as the follow-up interviews, the students that 
participated in the REDD policy exercise reported a number of key insights and 
learning effects concerning the process dimension of policy-making. As one student 
commented, ‘I enjoyed it quite a lot, so I was quite excited about it. It made me more 
interested in that kind of topics, especially the push-pull theories of policy-making. It 
made also very obvious why nothing is ever binding.’ Another summarised her 
impressions as follows: ‘[f]or me, it seems like the whole policy process is like a big 
dark hole of bargaining, agreeing […].’ 
Recurrent themes in the reported ‘key insights’ relating to policy process were the 
challenges involved in reaching consensus (‘achieving consensus in international 
negotiations needs good understanding of different needs, ability to negotiate 
between parties and strong leadership as well’), the compromise nature of the 
resulting outcome (‘the higher the level of consensus, the more empty words’, 
‘[c]ompromise often leads to a diluted result’) and the importance of communicating 
clearly (‘[m]iscommunication slips in easily’, ‘[t] he importance of skilled diplomacy 
and effective speaking’). Yet on the whole, the policy process dimension of cognitive 
learning seems to have been less dominant for the students who participated in the 
REDD than for those taking part in the burden-sharing exercise. About a quarter of all 
noted ‘key insights’ falls in this domain (as opposed to roughly half for the burden-
sharing group), and also in the interviews this aspect was mentioned rather as one 
among others or else discarded entirely, as for instance by this student:  
 ‘I didn’t learn new things about negotiations and policy making since I have 
done things like that before. […] I learned quite a lot about REDD. I think it was 
interesting to see the variety of stakeholders involved in REDD. I didn’t realise 
that so many countries have interest in REDD and would actually be willing to 
put money into it.’  
Substantial learning about REDD and learning about policy dynamics thus seems to 
have happened in more equal measure in this group.  
Before drawing together the findings of this chapter, we want to probe a little deeper 
into the extent to which some other factors apart from the topic of the exercise and 
the distinction between experts and students may have influenced the extent of 
cognitive learning among the participants in our policy exercises.  
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5.4 Factors influencing cognitive learning 
5.4.1 Participants’ proximity to policy-making and prior expertise 
The first question we were interested in was whether we could find a relation 
between participants’ backgrounds and the extent of their self-reported cognitive 
learning on current and future policy as well as policy dynamics. Thus, we sought to 
ascertain for the expert groups whether their professional affiliation mattered for 
their survey scores on cognitive learning. We distinguished between four different 
groups: participants working in the public sector, in the private sector, in research or 
in non-governmental organisations (NGOs). However, since group sizes were unequal 
and especially since only two NGO representatives had completed the post-survey, 
we combined those four into just two groups: firstly public sector/NGOs, whom we 
assumed to be closer to day-to-day policy-making; and secondly research/private 
sector, whom we hypothesised might be further removed from these processes (see 
Annex 2.D, Table 38). Analysis of variances revealed a statistically significant 
difference only for cognitive learning about current policy. The fact that the 
participants we considered as having more distance from day-to-day policy-making 
reported more learning about current developments is an outcome that matches 
with our expectations (F (1,24) = 6.59, p < .05).  
Concerning the students, we were interested if we could find differences between 
students of different academic backgrounds in terms of cognitive learning. The 
master course in Environment and Resource Management, which all students were 
following at the time of the exercise, draws in students from a broad range of 
disciplines, from engineering to anthropology and philosophy. We divided the 
student participants into three different groups based on their bachelor degree 
(natural science/humanities, social sciences and environmental studies, and finally 
political science/international relations), aiming to reflect the extent to which they 
might be familiar with the contents of the policy exercise. Unfortunately, we had 
again only data from the burden-sharing group at our disposal for the relevant survey 
questions. The descriptive statistics are reported in Annex 2.D, Table 39. ANOVA did 
not return any significant differences between those three categories for either 
aspect of cognitive learning.  
In a next step, we were curious about a possible relationship between the impact of 
participants’ existing knowledge on the topic of the exercise and their self-reported 
cognitive learning. The pre-questionnaires for both exercises included several 
questions asking participants to evaluate their expertise on a number of themes 
related to the content of the two policy exercises. Correlation analysis between these 
scores and self-reported cognitive learning effects yielded only one significant 
outcome each for the burden-sharing and the REDD expert group. For the former, 
self-reported prior knowledge on EU policy processes was negatively correlated with 
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learning about policy dynamics (r = -.634, p < .05). While this was in line with our 
expectations about learning outcomes presented in Chapter 4 – more learning on 
behalf of those that claimed they knew less about the topic beforehand –, the same 
did not apply for the results of the REDD expert group. Here, background knowledge 
of international climate policy – constituting the broader political context of the 
REDD exercise – was positively correlated with learning about current policy (r = .690, 
p < .05), indicating that higher baseline expertise may even have favoured cognitive 
learning in this regard. One possible explanation for this difference lies in the less 
structured nature and lesser maturity of the topic of REDD financing, where greater 
contextual knowledge at the outset may have helped.  
5.4.2 Reasons to participate 
We were also looking for potential connections between participants’ reasons to sign 
up for the policy exercise and its normative learning effect. Evidently, this was only 
relevant for the expert groups since the exercise was part of the regular curriculum 
for the students.  
In the pre-questionnaire, expert participants had been asked to evaluate the 
importance of a number of goals for their decision to register for the workshop in the 
pre-questionnaire, from primarily cognitive motivations (‘I want to get an update on 
the latest developments in EU climate policy/ on REDD financing’), to more relational 
(‘I want to better understand the perspectives of other actors/stakeholders’) and 
social ones (‘opportunity to network’). With one exception, there was no indication 
that those experts with a stronger motivation for cognitive learning also reported 
stronger learning effects in this domain (see Annex 2.D, Table 40). Instead, there 
were a number of correlations between ‘softer motivations’ (such as a desire to build 
up new relationships, interest in the research project sponsoring the policy exercise, 
the opportunity to network, and curiosity about the policy exercise format) on the 
one hand, and cognitive learning about current policy developments and policy 
dynamics, on the other. Hence, one might hypothesise that a more open orientation 
towards the aims of the day may have facilitated cognitive learning, or at least the 
extent to which it was self-reported by participants.  
5.4.3 Impact of different roles 
In a last step, we examined whether we could detect any effect of the roles that 
participants were playing in the exercise on the extent of their cognitive learning. For 
the EU burden-sharing exercise, we distinguished between three clusters of roles: 
wealthier EU member states (represented in the exercise by Sweden and Germany), 
less wealthy member states (represented by Spain and Poland), and the European 
Commission. Analysis of variance did not return significant differences between the 
three groups for either aspect of cognitive learning. We were unable to replicate the 
analysis for the REDD policy exercise runs, because, due to the absence of data on 
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self-reported cognitive learning for the student group and incomplete survey 
responses from the expert group, group sizes for the different roles had become too 
small for meaningful statistical testing.  
5.5 Summary 
While the first part of this chapter sought to trace recorded conceptual change by 
comparing pre- and post-concept maps (see Section 5.2.6 for a summary of the main 
findings), in the second part, we focused on cognitive learning as self-reported by 
participants. To this end, we combined data from survey questions (both closed and 
open-ended) and from post-interviews with participants. The data presented shows 
that some extent of cognitive learning occurred in all participant groups, but to 
varying degrees and with varying emphasis on different aspects. Table 19 provides a 
comparative summary of the main outcomes across the four groups.  
Finally, in terms of measurements, the combination of different types of data – 
concept maps, surveys, and interviews – has proven valuable for shedding light on 
different aspects of cognitive learning. Analysis of the pre- and post-concept maps 
yielded insights on knowledge structuring as well as aggregated conceptual change 
from pre- to post-measurement. Interviews and surveys served to test our 
assumptions for some key areas where we expected cognitive learning to occur, such 
as policy developments in the domains covered by the two exercises, as well as policy 
dynamics. Recorded data from the concept maps and self-reported data from surveys 
and interviews thus provided largely complementary information; yet in some cases 
it also allowed for cross-checking insights, for instance where self-reported learning 
outcomes coincided with upward shifts of concept categories on the concept maps. 
We should however note again the limitations in terms of data availability and quality 
in particular for the expert groups. These have implications for the validity of the 
respective findings. Given the small number of observations, especially the analysis of 
the expert concept maps may be considered first and foremost a proof of concept, 
indicating that this method is suitable for generating relevant outcomes also outside 
of a training context, the only field where it has so far been applied. 
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 Policy exercise on EU burden-
sharing 
Policy exercise on REDD financing 
 Experts Students Experts Students 
Self-reported 
cognitive 
learning 
about policy 
substance 
(0/+) 
Survey scores 
‘increased 
understanding of 
current policy 
developments’  
3.50 out of 5; 
‘enhanced 
understanding of 
future 
developments’  
2.36 out of 5. 
 
Insights into 
criteria for 
burden-sharing, 
compliance 
issues; Learning 
about future 
policy impeded 
by lack of detail; 
tied to present-
day 
considerations, 
impact of 
exercise design?  
 
(+) 
Survey scores 
‘increased 
understanding of 
current policy 
developments’  
3.69 out of 5; 
‘enhanced 
understanding of 
future 
developments’  
3.88 out of 5. 
 
  
Insights e.g. into 
importance of 
criteria and 
baselines for 
burden-sharing 
arrangements, 
conflict between 
climate and 
economic policy 
goals). Noted 
difficulty of 
projecting oneself 
into the future.  
 
(+) 
Survey scores 
‘provided update 
on current 
developments’ 
3.33 out of 5; 
‘made me think 
about future 
developments’ 
4.25 out of 5. 
 
Insights e.g. into 
REDD financing 
options and 
constraints, fund 
operationalisatio
n, general 
feasibility of 
REDD (by 
definition future-
oriented issues, 
as REDD is only 
emerging/current
ly being 
negotiated). 
Mixed 
assessment of 
future setting 
(‘hardly any 
impact’ vs. 
‘useful’).  
(++ *) 
*no survey 
data 
available 
 
Insights into 
REDD 
financing 
options and 
constraints, 
importance 
and 
challenges 
linked to co-
benefits from 
REDD, 
institutional 
challenges 
(the latter 
reflected by 
upward shifts 
from pre- to 
post-concept 
maps).  
Insights that 
are ‘new to the 
world’?  
(0/+) 
None according to interviewees; our 
own analysis finds some innovative 
aspects in the discussions/outcomes 
(combined indicator for burden-
sharing, implications of interrelation 
burden-sharing/EU ETS, attention to 
adaptation burden-sharing.   
(0) 
None according to interviewees; 
based on our own analysis, choice 
of private verification bodies 
deviates from mainstream 
thinking. Test-drive for 
disbursement options not yet 
discussed in policy negotiations.  
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Self-reported 
cognitive 
learning 
about policy 
process 
(+) 
Survey score 
‘increased 
understanding of 
dynamics of 
decision-
making’3.57 out 
of 5.  
 
Qualitative data 
quite positive on 
this dimension, 
insights on 
negotiation 
strategies and 
dynamics, role of 
information, etc.  
 
 
(++) 
Survey score 
‘increased 
understanding of 
dynamics of 
decision-
making’4.35 out 
of 5.  
 
Constituted a key 
area of learning 
for this group (cf. 
reported ‘key’ 
insights and rise 
of politics and 
negotiations 
category on post-
concept maps): 
e.g. negotiation 
strategies, 
smallest-
common-
denominator 
character of 
many consensual 
decisions, etc.  
 
(0/+) 
Survey score 
‘better 
understanding of 
international 
decision-making’ 
3.50 out of 5.  
 
 
 
Some insights 
into nature and 
constraints of 
consensual 
decisions; but 
limited number 
of countries 
perceived as 
constraint to 
better 
understanding of 
dynamics.  
 
 
(+) 
[no survey 
data 
available]  
 
Based on 
interview 
data: Insights 
into 
constraints of 
consensual 
decision-
making, 
importance 
of 
negotiation 
skills, etc. 
Less 
dominant in 
self-reported 
‘key insights’ 
than for 
burden-
sharing 
student 
group.  
 
Table 19. Self-reported cognitive learning, summary of main outcomes. 
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6. Normative learning 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the extent of normative learning among experts and students 
as a consequence of participating in the policy exercise. In Chapter 2, we defined 
normative learning as shifts in the views, values or paradigms that guide the decision-
making processes of individuals and collectives. In our view, normative learning does 
not exclusively entail large scale, paradigmatic shifts, but may range from more 
limited alterations in viewpoint on specific issues to changes on broader, more 
abstract norms and value judgments.  
The literature on policy games highlights the potential of policy exercises to bring 
about normative learning among participants (see also Section 2.3). According to 
Parson and Ward (1998, 133), ‘simulation exercises can change the way participants 
think about the problem, shake up preconceptions […].’ The presumed ability of 
policy games and policy exercises to stimulate normative learning is attributed to the 
communicative negotiation process at its heart, which allows participants to expose, 
clarify, and confront their viewpoints: ‘[d]uring the joint experimental action in the 
game, value debates become focused, sharpened and placed into operation in such a 
way that value tradeoffs can be negotiated’ (Duke & Geurts, 2004, 312). One could 
say that the role-playing inherent in policy games creates a sort of two-level situation: 
first, participants bring to bear their personal values and opinions on the role that 
they are playing. The second level refers the constellation where they impersonate 
that role vis-à-vis the other teams. Thus, normative learning in a policy game stems is 
based both on having to negotiate one’s own viewpoint with the role that one is 
assigned, and on the process of reconsidering one’s own stance in light of the 
interactions between the different roles during the simulation.  
The notion that policy games may be conducive to building consensus reflects a 
further line of thinking about normative learning which, while not as pervasive as in 
the literature on public participation, is nonetheless present also in the context of 
policy games. Duke (2011, 348) argues that ‘[o]ne of the most potent aspects of 
policy exercises is their ability to find common ground among competing 
stakeholders.’ Bots and van Dalen (2007) likewise refer to ‘mediation’ as one 
potential function of policy games. They describe the opportunity to use policy games 
as a ‘virtual negotiation table’ (Bots & van Daalen, 2007, 519), which allows 
stakeholders to come together outside of their day-to-day environment, identify 
shared interests and points of convergence, and work on consensus-building. Often, 
role reversal – i.e. participants playing roles in the simulation that are different from 
their own in reality – is mentioned as a useful technique to foster such convergence 
(Deutsch, 1973; Lewicki et al., 1997).  
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Mostly, however, writings on policy games tend to recognise that consensus-building 
may not always be the most appropriate goal in an appraisal process, and treat the 
notion with caution. In general, the focus rather lies on the value of policy games in 
clarifying participants’ values and perspectives; Bots and van Dalen (2007, 521) 
describe this as ‘games as a parliament’. The structured negotiation process involving 
multiple roles helps participants uncovering previously unfamiliar perspectives of 
other stakeholders or better understanding the rationale behind familiar ones (which 
we subsume under relational learning). The assumption is that this may subsequently 
have a bearing on one’s own normative stance, and improve the potential for 
cooperation.  
What does this mean for our own expectations with regard to participants’ normative 
learning in the policy exercises that we organised and ran? As we have argued in 
earlier chapters, given the dearth of literature on this topic, our research on the 
learning effects of policy exercises is necessarily exploratory. While we therefore 
refrain from hypotheses-testing, we did have some assumptions and expectations 
which we examine in more detail in the sections below. Given the focus of the two 
exercises, apart from more general questions on participants’ normative learning in 
the pre- and post-survey, we mainly tested for changes in their perception of the 
feasibility or desirability of certain policy options and design features. We also 
examined to what extent normative convergence on these issues occurred among 
participants. The latter is perhaps not a key objective of the type of policy exercises 
pioneered by Toth and Parson. Yet given the emphasis on consensus building in other 
parts of the literature on participatory appraisal, we felt it was appropriate to 
investigate this dimension as well and see whether we could find evidence to that 
effect.  
As for the measurements on cognitive learning, we also investigated the impact of 
the different topics of the two policy exercises as well as the differing level of 
participants’ background knowledge on normative learning effects. Comparing the 
data from the different cohorts, we examined the impact of different levels of 
expertise on normative learning by experts and students, and also sought to draw 
conclusions about the relation between the different topics of the two exercises (EU 
burden-sharing and REDD) and their respective normative learning effect. Drawing on 
insights from social psychology reported in Chapter 2, which pointed to an inverted 
U-curve depicting the relation between existing background knowledge and 
propensity for normative learning, we expected to find more normative learning 
among the students than among the expert group. More specifically, we reckoned 
that the student group would, given their moderate level of background knowledge, 
locate itself somewhere near the top of the U-curve, whereas the experts’ views and 
convictions might often be too engrained to be able to change significantly over the 
course of a single day.  
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Experts of the policy exercise method emphasise the value of the method specifically 
for complex, novel issues on which knowledge is still evolving and value judgments 
are still in flux (Parson, 1997; Wenzler, 1993). REDD financing has only recently made 
it on the international climate policy agenda and discussions surrounding it are still at 
an early stage. By contrast, EU burden-sharing has been on policy-makers’ minds for 
almost two decades. While there is clearly a need for policy innovation to develop 
effective burden-sharing mechanisms to implement the kinds of ambitious mitigation 
targets which will be needed in the short- to medium term to slow down or halt 
climate change, one cannot speak of it as an unstructured issue. Consequently, there 
may be reason to expect more normative learning from the REDD exercise – at least 
for the experts, as for the students, both topics were equally unfamiliar.   
The data we are using in this chapter mainly consists of information from the pre- 
and post-questionnaires that all groups completed prior to and after the policy 
exercise, complemented by information from the collective debriefing and ex-post 
interviews with participants. As in the chapter on cognitive learning, the present 
chapter makes a distinction between recorded and self-reported data. While the 
recorded, ‘objective’ measure is based on the shifts in response patterns on a series 
of propositions from pre- to post-questionnaires, the self-reported measure makes 
use of participants’ own judgment on the extent of their normative learning in the ex 
post questionnaire.  
This distinction also forms the basis for the structure of this chapter. We start out by 
describing the results of our efforts to trace normative change from pre- to post-
survey based on the survey statements. We then turn to participants’ self-reported 
normative learning, and subsequently move on to investigate the differences 
between the four groups, as well as the interrelation between the ‘objective’ 
(recorded) and ‘subjective’ (self-reported) proxy. Finally, we investigate some of the 
factors that may have hindered or helped normative learning among the participants 
of the policy exercises, based on the survey data.  
6.2 Tracing normative change from pre- to post-measurement 
across the four exercises 
As outlined above, one part of our measurements of normative learning relied on a 
pre- and post- comparison of participants’ views on a list of items and propositions 
covering different aspects of the subject matter of the policy exercises, EU burden-
sharing and REDD respectively. Participants completed an online pre-questionnaire 
one week prior to the workshop and a second one on paper, containing the same set 
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of items, right after the workshop.
28
 Below we first describe the results of the expert 
and student runs on EU burden-sharing, before turning to the outcomes for the 
policy exercise on REDD financing.  
6.2.1 Normative change in the policy exercises on EU burden-sharing 
For the policy exercise on EU burden-sharing, expert and student groups alike were 
asked to provide their opinion on twenty items related to the politics of burden-
/effort-sharing in the EU (see Annex 2.E). This part of the survey comprised three 
blocks: the first two blocks inquired into participants’ views on the relative 
importance of various aspects for successfully concluding and implementing burden-
sharing agreements in the EU, using a 5-point Likert scale (1 - ‘irrelevant’ to 5 -’very 
important’). Examples of factors that participants were asked to evaluate include 
‘compensation or ‘side payments’ in other policy domains’, ‘temporal flexibility, 
including options for the banking and borrowing of emission reductions’ in a future 
burden-sharing scheme, and ‘evidence of significant emission reductions globally’. 
The third block focused on participants’ perceptions on various actors in the context 
of EU burden-sharing, again relying on a five-point scale (1 - ‘totally disagree’ to 5 -
’totally agree’).
29
  
Run with experts 
For the expert group, we found statistically significant shifts in group means in two 
out of twenty survey propositions (see Annex 2.E, Table 41 and 42). At first glance, 
this seems quite limited because with a significance threshold of p = 0.05, one would 
expect at least one significant effect purely by chance. However, given the very small 
sample size, there is a considerable risk of concluding an absence of effects, whereas 
these may simply not be possible to measure for such small groups. Therefore, 
especially for the expert groups where the small-size sample problem is more acute, 
we focus not only on effects that are statistically significant, but also on the directions 
of others which fall below this threshold.  
                                                                
28
 For logistical reasons, this order was reversed for the student runs, where participants filled 
in the pre-questionnaires on paper right before the policy exercise, and completed an online 
survey in the week following the event. The average time lag between pre- and post-
measurement remained the same between expert and student groups, however.  
29
 We treated all resulting pre- and post-data as interval for the purposes of the analysis 
(Bryman & Cramer, 1990). From a statistics perspective, it might have been preferable to 
assess shifts in viewpoints by aggregating individual items. However, attempts to do so by 
forming a scale, either by using Cronbach’s Alpha or principal component analysis, did not yield 
reliable results; we therefore resorted to investigating the changes for each statement 
separately. 
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The first significant shift related to aspects important for successfully implementing 
EU burden-sharing. On average, experts judged ‘evidence of significant emission 
reductions globally’ less relevant for the conclusion of EU-internal burden-sharing 
arrangements after the exercise than before. This finding, which implies that the 
perceived importance of international developments for EU climate policy decreased 
over the course of the exercise, may be explained in part by the dynamics inherent in 
the simulation: while the scenario sketched out a challenging future global context 
for the exercise, the exercise itself simulated EU-internal negotiations. The vividness 
of this simulation experience may have contributed to this decrease of global-level 
focus on the part of participants. This interpretation is supported by another 
comparatively large change in group means, which however does not reach the level 
of statistical significance: on average, participants considered ‘pressure for the EU to 
lead internationally’ a less important factor for reaching agreements on burden-
sharing after the exercise than before. The other shift that reached the level of 
statistical significance touches upon notions of fairness and equity in the EU: 
agreement with the statement ‘the EC protects the interests of the less developed 
countries too much’ increased significantly from the pre- to the post-measurement. 
This, given how close it is to the core of the issue of burden-sharing in the EU, in our 
eyes represents a particularly interesting instance of normative learning.  
Apart from changes in group means, we were also interested in exploring whether 
the pre- and post-survey statements provided evidence for normative convergence 
among participants over the course of the exercise. To test for such convergence, we 
compared the standard deviations for each item in the pre- and post-survey. Where 
the standard deviation decreased from pre- to post-test, we took this as a sign of 
normative convergence, whereas an increase of the standard deviation was 
interpreted as normative divergence.
30
 For the expert run, we noted decreases in 
standard deviation (i.e. normative convergence) from pre- to post-measurement for 
only eight out of the twenty survey statements, while it increased in ten cases, and 
remained stable in the remaining two (see Annex 2.E, Table 42). These findings do 
not lend support to the hypothesis that our policy exercise induced normative 
convergence among the group of participants. However, it is noticeable that the 
order of magnitude for the increases in standard deviation (indicating normative 
divergence) is very small in all cases (with a maximal value of ΔSD = .18 for a scale 
ranging from 1 to 5) and may thus not be particularly meaningful. By contrast, the 
largest instance of normative convergence amounts to ΔSD = .47 (for a total scale of 
5), respectively, providing a slightly firmer indication that group opinion converged 
on the need for a ‘strong role of the Commission as an impartial facilitator.’ The 
                                                                
30
 Since a normal distribution cannot be assumed for the data set of pre- and post-standard 
deviations and since there is no non-parametric test for paired samples, our analysis relies on 
assessing the visible changes in standard deviations between the pre- and the post-
questionnaire.  
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following section analyses normative change for the student runs of the burden-
sharing policy exercise, based on the same set of pre- and post-survey statements. 
Student runs 
As with the expert group, we were interested in detecting shifts in group means as 
well as indications of normative convergence or divergence among the students 
taking part in the policy exercise on burden-sharing.  
Overall, the picture emanating from the student questionnaires resembles the 
findings from the expert run (see Annex 2.E, Table 43 and 44). At a p < .05 level of 
statistical significance, we find significant shifts in group means for two out of twenty 
statements, with two further shifts significant at p < 0.1. Interestingly, these changes 
concern different statements than in the case of the expert exercise. For instance, 
students rated the importance of ‘arrangements which take account of historic 
emission reductions’ significantly higher after the exercise than before. This reflected 
the controversy surrounding the setting of the base year (the year from which 
emission reductions are calculated) in the simulation run, and also resonated with 
some of students self-reported ‘key insights’ in the post-survey (see Chapter 5). The 
expert group had probably been more aware of the difficulties this issue had 
provoked at earlier policy negotiations and had thus rated it higher on average 
already at pre-test (M1 = 3.19). The second significant shift concerns the role of the 
poorer EU member states in concluding burden-sharing agreements, whose 
‘willingness […] to make climate change a political priority, even if this comes at a 
certain economic cost’ students considered on average more important after the 
exercise than before. The two statements that showed shifts in means significant at 
the p < 0.1 level related to the importance of a ‘strong role of the Commission as an 
impartial facilitator’ and to the need for ‘temporal flexibility, including options for the 
banking and borrowing of emission reductions’. The former is one of the statements 
where we found relatively strong normative convergence in the expert group, 
indicating that at least some of the dynamics in pre- and post-surveys revolved 
around the same themes in both groups.  
Turning to the question of normative convergence in the student exercise, we note 
that on the whole, changes in standard deviations are quite small for this group, 
amounting to a maximum score of ΔSD = .20 (by comparison, the largest change in 
the expert group was ΔSD = .47). There are as many (slight) instances of normative 
convergence as there are of normative divergence. Overall, the data does not provide 
any firm evidence whether the group’s viewpoints moved closer together as a 
consequence of the exercise or whether the opposite was the case.  
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6.2.2 Normative change in the policy exercises on REDD 
Expert run  
Replicating the design for the burden-sharing questionnaire, pre- and post-
questionnaires prompted participants in the REDD policy exercise to evaluate a 
number of statements relating to the potential and prospects for a global REDD fund 
on a 5-point likert scale (1-totally disagree to 5-totally agree). The eight statements 
aimed to gauge participants’ viewpoints on a global fund as an interim financing 
vehicle for REDD, its ability to generate sufficient funding for REDD, the question of 
geographical balance in REDD and the issue of environmental and social co-benefits 
in REDD accounting, among others. The survey also contained an additional section 
which asked participants to rank seven items based on the level of controversy they 
thought these might generate in future negotiations on a global fund for REDD. Each 
rank could only be assigned once, thus forcing participants to establish an ordinal 
ranking between the items.  
Probably also related to the small sample size (n=8) for the expert run (see the 
discussion on this above), t-tests per statement/item did not reveal any significant 
shifts in group means from pre- to post-test neither for the first part (see Annex 2.E, 
Table 45 and 46), nor for the second part of the questionnaire (see Annex 2.E, Table 
47 and 48). The only case approaching statistical significance at p < 0.1 was a 
statement prompting a more general evaluation of the prospects for REDD 
(‘establishing a REDD+ mechanism that will effectively reduce tropical deforestation 
is almost impossible’). On average, agreement with this proposition, while still low 
after the exercise, was clearly higher than before. This is an interesting finding since it 
provides some – albeit weak – evidence that the policy exercise led some participants 
to re-evaluate their views on the chances of success for REDD – a clear, though 
limited, instance of normative learning. 
Looking more closely at other – not statistically significant – shifts in means for the 
ranking exercise, we note that the issue of fund capitalisation and replenishment, as 
well as disbursement criteria, monitoring requirements and accounting for the co-
benefits of REDD were on average judged more controversial ex post than ex ante. 
Deciding on the modalities for verifying developing countries’ REDD performance, by 
contrast, was on average considered less controversial after the exercise than before. 
This probably resonates with participants’ experience during the policy exercise: the 
difficult negotiations on REDD funding during the simulation underscored the 
intractability of this issue, whereas verification of performance was one of the few 
areas where participants were able to reach a relatively concrete outcome at the end 
of the day (see Chapter 4). 
Turning to the question of normative convergence, we again do not find much 
evidence for consensus-building in the group as a consequence of the exercise. In fact, 
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the trends in standard deviations differ between the two relevant parts of the 
questionnaire. Participants’ scores did converge to some extent in the ranking task, 
with standard deviations decreasing for five out of seven items. However, for the 
second part of the questionnaire – eight propositions on prospects and design for a 
global REDD fund – we find increases in standard deviations (indicating normative 
divergence) for six out of eight cases. Looking at the largest shifts within this set, we 
note that while participants’ views seemed to converge to some extent on the value 
of a REDD fund as an interim step before linking REDD to the global carbon market, 
the spread of opinions increased considerably on the question to what extent co-
benefits should be made a key criterion for disbursing funds. Coincidentally, 
discussions on co-benefits in REDD were quite heated during the policy exercise and 
may have made some participants more aware of the trade-offs involved in enforcing 
higher environmental and/or social standards for REDD activities.  
How to interpret these outcomes? The occurrence of some degree of normative 
convergence for the ranking part of the survey can be explained through the common 
experience of day-long negotiations, which impacted impact participants’ views of 
the perceived saliency of the various issues. There is also a methodological conclusion 
to be drawn from this. Such a ranking exercise may be useful for gauging to what 
extent views on the importance of the various issues converged. However, tracing 
pre- to post-shifts in rating the propositions, as we did in another part of the survey, 
may in hindsight be the stronger indicator for genuine normative learning. Therefore 
we would tend to attribute more weight to the results regarding the propositions 
which seek to gauge participants’ more fundamental convictions about the goals and 
perceived effects of REDD as a policy instrument. Results for this section point to 
diverging rather than converging viewpoints among the expert group and thus run 
counter the often-held assumption that policy games and policy exercises are 
generally conducive to consensus-building. This was also our impression at the 
debriefing, where opinions continued to be far apart on a number of fundamental 
points, including the ultimate objectives of REDD (should it focus on carbon alone or 
seek to embrace the problem of deforestation in all its complexity?) and realistic 
sources for financing.  
Student run 
The students participating in the REDD policy exercise completed the same 
questionnaires as the experts. Unfortunately, confusion among some of the students 
regarding the ranking exercise in the paper-based pre-questionnaire made some 
recoding for this part of the survey necessary.
31
 Looking at the pre- and post-results 
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 Rather than assigning each rank only once among the items listed, about a third of the 
respondents assigned several ranks multiple times, e.g. by according the first rank (‘most 
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of the ranking, we find that, based on the recoded data (see Annex 2.E, Table 49 and 
50), there is a significant change group in means from pre- to post-test for two out of 
seven items, namely ‘disbursement criteria’ and ‘institutional arrangements’.
32
 The 
heightened attention for the importance of institutional arrangements after the 
policy exercise corresponds with our observations during the runs. Over the course of 
the exercise students became increasingly aware of the deeply political character of 
any decision on institutional issues as well as its implications, leading to drawn-out 
negotiations on this issue in most sub-groups.  
T-tests for the second part of the survey, the propositions on REDD, returned just one 
significant result (see Annex 2.E,  
 
Table 51 and 52). Students’ assessment of the statement that co-benefits should 
become a key criterion for disbursing REDD funds, were on average significantly less 
positive after the policy exercise than before. Again, this resonates with our 
observations: going through the exercise, students developed a better understanding 
of the difficulties that stringent standards for co-benefits of REDD might present in 
particular to the participation of least developed countries in a REDD mechanism. 
This may have caused them to view this option more sceptically than at the outset. 
Interestingly, the co-benefits aspect is also one where cognitive and normative 
learning effects intersected for this group as this theme gained in salience on 
participants’ concept maps and was also frequently cited as a self-reported key 
insight (see Sections 5.2.4 and 5.3.2). A second shift significant at a p < 0.1 level 
occurred for a statement cautioning of a potential ‘institutional lock-in’ that a global 
REDD fund might entail and that might delay or prevent the transition to integrating 
REDD into the global carbon market. On average, students found this proposition 
more pertinent after the exercise than before. This may have to do with greater 
realism about potential funding constraints and other shortcomings of a fund-based 
instrument following the exercise.  
Finally, to what extent do we find evidence that the exercise gave rise to normative 
convergence, or, on the contrary, normative divergence among the students? On the 
whole, evidence for alignment of viewpoints in this group was even weaker than in 
the expert run. Contrary to the expert group, where a degree of normative 
convergence had been noticeable for this part of the survey, for the student group, 
we note four instances of normative convergence and three of divergence across the 
                                                                                                                                                          
controversial’) to two policy issues at once. In order to avoid losing the information in the 
‘faulty’ responses, we recoded them, based on the logic laid out in Annex 2.F.  
32
 The effect for the  item ‘institutional arrangements’ was also significant in the original data 
set, excluding the ‘faulty’ response sets, thus lending additional support to its robustness. 
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set of seven items (see Annex 2.E, Table 52). In addition, the changes are for the most 
part quite small. As for the propositions on REDD, there is not a single one where the 
standard deviation decreased from the pre- to the post measurement. The changes 
are again minor in nature. However, they do lead us to tentatively conclude that – as 
for the expert run – the REDD policy exercise seems to have prompted students’ 
individual viewpoints on REDD to diverge rather than converge.  
6.2.3 Summary 
Having thus described the outcomes on recorded normative learning from all four 
policy exercise runs, what do we make of the results? On the whole, the patterns are 
quite consistent across the four runs. Dependent-sample t-tests picked up only a few 
shifts in group means for the statements included in pre- and post-questionnaires. 
We did find slightly more significant shifts in means for the student exercises, which 
might be interpreted as an indication for more – though by no means strong – 
normative learning on their part. Regarding the question of normative convergence 
within the groups over the course of the exercise, there is hardly any evidence that 
this did indeed occur. On the contrary, for the REDD simulation, we even have some 
indications that views diverged more afterwards than beforehand.  
Turning to the differences between experts and students discussed above, 
statistically significant shifts in means and noticeable changes in standard deviations 
sometimes concerned the same items for both groups, sometimes different ones. 
This is not entirely surprising: after all, both groups underwent the same intervention, 
shared similar experiences and drew to some extent similar conclusions from it. Yet 
at the same time, given the differing starting points in terms of background 
knowledge between expert and student groups, some ‘eye-openers’ for students, 
which gave rise to normative changes in this group, were probably well-established 
facts for the experts already before the exercise. This impression was also confirmed 
during ex-post interviews with both groups.  
In sum, the recorded data provides no evidence for strong normative learning 
through the policy exercise. One should keep in mind, however, that, especially for 
the expert groups, we may not have been able to detect medium-sized or small 
effects due to the limited sample sizes. Another explanation may be the limitations 
that such tests present for detecting normative change in the first place. There is a 
risk that respondents may not genuinely reconsider the content of the propositions in 
the ex post questionnaires, especially if the time interval between pre- and post-test 
is short. Deyle and Schively Slotterback (2009) emphasise an additional difficulty in 
this regard, based on their own experience with such measurements: in their view, 
especially for open forms of interventions like participatory processes, it is very 
difficult to precisely pinpoint in advance the areas where normative change might 
occur, and to formulate the propositions accordingly. This may be easier in more 
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structured contexts, for instance where the goal is to evaluate the impact of a 
training session providing a specific set of information to respondents. And yet in our 
view this does not imply that researchers should not pursue such ventures, but rather 
that there is a strong case for triangulating quantitative and qualitative, recorded and 
self-reported data in order to increase the robustness of the results (see also Chapter 
8). In the following, we compare findings from the recorded data discussed above 
with those self-reported by participants based on an explicit survey question to this 
effect.  
6.3 Self-reported normative learning and its relation with 
recorded normative change 
6.3.1 Self-reported learning and between-group differences 
Post-questionnaires for both policy exercises included a prompt asking participants to 
evaluate to what extent the policy exercise had changed their viewpoints on EU 
burden-sharing and REDD financing, respectively. Table 20 summarises the outcomes 
for all four groups.  
To what extent did the policy exercise change your viewpoint on EU burden-sharing/REDD 
financing?  
 not 
at all 
not 
really 
a bit to some 
extent 
very 
much 
margin  
total 
Experts EU 
Burden-
sharing 
Count   6 4 4 1 15 
  %    40% 27% 27% 7% 100% 
  REDD Count   1 7 3 1 12 
  %    8% 58% 25% 8% 100% 
Students EU 
Burden-
sharing 
Count   9 16 19 5 49 
%   18% 33% 39% 10% 100% 
REDD Count 1 6 23 34 13 77 
%  1% 8% 30% 44% 17% 100% 
Table 20. Survey responses to post-questionnaire question on normative learning. 
We find that, among the four groups, participants in the expert group on EU burden-
sharing generally reported the lowest levels of normative learning. Six individuals, 40 
per cent of the respondents, indicated that the policy exercise had ‘not really’ 
changed their viewpoint on the topic at hand, whereas the rest said it had changed it 
‘a bit’ (4 respondents or 27 per cent), ‘to some extent’ (4 respondents or 27 per cent) 
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or ‘very much’ (1 respondent). The scores were slightly higher for the expert group 
taking part in the REDD exercise, with only one respondent indicating he had ‘not 
really’ learned in normative terms, while all others were more positive in their 
evaluation. As expected, the picture is more positive for the student groups. 44 per 
cent and 17 per cent of the students taking part in the REDD exercise indicated that 
their views had changed ‘to some extent’ and ‘very much’ as a consequence of their 
participation. For the burden-sharing exercise, the student survey results are only 
slightly lower, with 39 per cent and ten per cent choosing the two highest categories.  
We sought to explore statistically the variations in self-reported learning between the 
four participant groups. More specifically, we were interested as to whether 
participants’ backgrounds or the topic of the exercise made a difference for the 
reported learning effects. To this end, we used analysis of variances, with group 
affiliation (experts vs. students) and topic of the exercise (EU burden-sharing vs. 
REDD) as independent variables.
33
 Figure 12 below shows the unweighted means of 
the four groups for this model (for a scale of 1 – ‘not at all’ to 5 – ‘very much’).
34
  
 
Figure 12. Self-reported normative learning on ex-post questionnaires, estimated marginal means 
for the four participant groups (based on a 1 – ‘not at all’ to 5 – ‘very much’ interval scale). The 
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 Within the REDD student group, we excluded one outlier, who – as the only individual in our 
dataset – had reported that he had ‘not at all’ changed his viewpoints over the course of the 
exercise (yet whose responses to the survey statements tracing normative change had shifted 
more than the group average). 
34
 Unweighted means (also referred to as ‘estimated marginal means’) are appropriate here 
because the four samples sizes are unequal. In such cases, using unweighted means eliminates 
the possibility of confounding the effects of different variables.  
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four data points represent the estimated marginal means for the four groups of participants – the 
groups on EU burden-sharing on the left, the groups on REDD on the right. The lower blue dots 
represent the expert groups, and the green dots higher up the student groups. The lines serve to 
compare between-group means at pre- and post-test. 
As Figure 12 indicates, these mean scores are higher for the REDD exercise than for 
the burden-sharing one, both in the expert and the student group. At the same time, 
there is a notable difference between the levels of normative learning by students 
and by experts – they are much higher for the former than for the latter. Looking at 
the outcomes of the ANOVA, we see that the model as a whole is significant (F(3) = 
2.81, p < .05), which means that the two factors (group affiliation and topic of the 
exercise) help explain the difference in the reported learning effects between the 
groups. One of the two main effects, group affiliation, is significant at the p < .05 level. 
There was thus a significant difference between self-reported normative learning 
among the two groups, experts and among students (F(1,148) = 4.36, p < .05). The 
second main effect, the topic of the exercise, reached statistical significance at the p 
< .10 level (F(1,148) = 2.90).  
Testing separately for the differences in normative learning between experts and 
students on the one hand, and EU burden-sharing and REDD on the other, both 
effects proved significant. The topic of the exercise thus had a significant impact on 
its learning effect (F(1,151) = 4.53, p < .05), as had participants’ group affiliation 
(F(1,151) = 4.84, p < .05). These differences correspond to the expectations laid out in 
the introduction to this chapter. We have indeed found more self-reported 
normative learning among students, whose more limited background knowledge may 
have made it easier for them to revise their views over the course of a daylong 
intervention. And the relatively novel issue of REDD financing seems to have sparked 
more normative learning in both groups than the topic of EU burden-sharing.  
6.3.2 The interrelation between the ‘subjective’ and the ‘objective’ measure 
of learning 
Having examined the results for both recorded and self-reported normative learning, 
we were interested in the degree of congruence between the two measures. Given 
the call for using different types and source of data to enhance the robustness of an 
evaluation (see Chapter 3), this comparison seemed a natural extension of the 
approach. In order to compare them, we first had to develop an aggregated measure 
of recorded change based on the pre- and post-survey statements, which we had 
only analysed individually in the previous sections. In order to combine all these 
items into a single measure, we calculated the average change per participant across 
all survey statements from pre- to post-measurement, thus devising an overall score 
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of recorded normative change for each individual.
35
 Table 21 below shows the means 
and standard deviations for these aggregated measures.  
  Mean shift in score 
per participant from 
pre- to post-survey 
Standard deviation 
Experts EU Burden-sharing              .55 .17 
  REDD              .81 .40 
Students EU Burden-sharing              .65 .23 
 REDD              .82
36
 .28 
Table 21. Recorded normative change, means and standard deviations.  
We see that, as with self-reported normative learning, average shifts per participant 
from pre- to post-questionnaire are bigger for the policy exercise on REDD than the 
one on burden-sharing. They are also greater, although only marginally so, in the case 
of the REDD exercise, for students than for experts. As with the self-reported learning 
data, we used factorial two-way ANOVA (with group affiliation and topic of the 
exercise as independent variables) to explore these differences in greater detail. 
Figure 13 below depicts the estimated marginal means for recorded normative 
change in this model.  
Again, the model as a whole proved statistically significant (F(1,132) = 10.68, p < .05), 
indicating that the two factors (participants’ background and the topic of the exercise) 
help explain the variation in mean scores for recorded normative learning. Yet the 
homogeneity of variances, an important assumption when conducting ANOVAs, was 
violated for this test, and attempts at data transformation did not remedy this.
37
 
Given the fact that ANOVA is generally quite resilient to violations of this assumption 
(Hill & Lewicki, 2006), however, this finding may still be meaningful. Since the topic of 
the exercise seemed to be driving most of the variance in our sample, we ran an 
additional t-test, which provides an option that does not assume equal variances 
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 We used only the propositions on REDD, and not the REDD ranking exercise, to calculate 
these shifts for the REDD exercise. This was due firstly to the fact that the scale for the REDD 
rankings spanned 1-7, whereas it was 1-5 for the other parts of the survey. While we could 
have adjusted for this, we felt that this part of the survey was also somewhat different in 
nature and thus perhaps not directly comparable to the other sections.  
36
 The mean shift per item for the outlier, who reported that he had ‘not at all’ changed his 
viewpoint, was 1.07, above average even for this group, which had the highest values for the 
‘recorded change’ proxy.  
37
 Homogeneity of variances refers to the expectation that the variances of the groups that are 
measured are equal.  If the variances are unequal, this can affect the Type I error rate, i.e. lead 
to an incorrect rejection of a true null hypothesis, thus yielding a false positive.  
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between groups, to further investigate the difference in means between both 
exercises. The t-test showed that the recorded normative shift from pre- to post-
questionnaire was significantly different at p < .0001 for the policy exercise on EU 
burden-sharing (M = 0.63, SE = 0.03) and the one on REDD financing (M = 0.81, SE = 
0.03, t(128) = -4.30, p < .0001), thus supporting the finding that participants in the 
REDD exercises learned more than those participating in the burden-sharing events.  
 
Figure 13. Recorded normative learning (mean shift per survey item from pre- to post-test), 
estimated marginal means for the four participant groups. The lower blue dots represent the 
expert groups, and the green dots higher up the student groups. The lines serve to compare 
between-group means at pre- and post-test. 
Coming back to the interrelation between the self-reported and the recorded 
measure of normative change across the four policy groups, Figure 14 provides some 
initial insights. We see that on average, the proxy for recorded change remained 
fairly stable no matter whether an individual responded that his or her viewpoint had 
changed ‘not really’, ‘a bit’ or ‘to some extent’ as a consequence of the exercise (the 
data point on the left represents the outlier from the REDD student exercise). Only 
those who reported that they had learned ‘very much’ in normative terms also had 
significantly higher proxies of recorded change (i.e. their responses to the statements 
in pre- and post-questionnaires had changed more than the average). This is reflected 
in the correlation coefficient for the two measures: they are positively, although by 
no means strongly, correlated (r = .209, p (one-tailed) < .01) for the complete set of 
participants. There is thus some kind of relationship between the two measures, yet 
it is not linear.  
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Before we turn to drawing together the findings of this chapter, we want to probe a 
little deeper into the extent to which some other factors apart from the topic of the 
exercise and the distinction between experts and students may have influenced the 
extent of normative learning among the participants in our policy exercises.  
 
Figure 14. Interrelation between recorded and self-reported normative change. The x-axis refers 
to the Likert scale used in the self-reported question as to how much each participant changed 
their views on the topic of the exercise (1 = ‘not at all’ to 5 = ‘very much’). The y-axis shows the 
mean and standard deviation of the proxy for recorded normative change. The latter is calculated 
as the mean change across all statements per participant.   
6.4 Factors influencing normative learning 
In our examination of possible factors that may have influenced participants’ 
normative learning, we followed the approach used in the chapter on cognitive 
learning (see Section 5.4). We first investigated the possible impact of participants’ 
background and expertise, before moving on to their reasons for participation and 
the roles they had assumed during the policy exercise.  
6.4.1 Participants’ backgrounds and prior expertise 
In a first step, for the expert groups, we were interested whether participants’ 
professional affiliation might help explain their scores on self-reported or recorded 
normative learning. However, statistical tests did not pick up any differences 
between the four professional groups (public sector, the private sector, research or 
NGOs), neither in terms of their self-reported normative learning nor for recorded 
normative change. The same applied when distinguishing between only two groups 
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who we assumed might be closer or more removed from day-to-day policy-making in 
their daily occupation, respectively (see Section 5.4.1). Professional affiliation thus 
does not seem to have had a strong impact on experts’ normative learning. It is 
possible however, that the small sample sizes and the unequal size of the groups 
(with a larger share of participants coming from research and academia) prevented 
us from detecting smaller effects.  
For the student groups, we were interested if the different academic backgrounds of 
the participants in the Master’s course in Environment and Resource Management 
mattered for self-reported and recorded normative learning effects. Like for cognitive 
learning, we distinguished between Bachelor’s degrees in natural 
science/humanities/others, social sciences and environmental studies, and finally 
political science/international relations, seeking to reflect the extent to which they 
might be familiar with the contents of the policy exercise. Interestingly, analysis of 
variance did not reveal any significant differences between those three categories, 
neither for self-reported learning nor for the normative change proxy.  
If these general differences in participants’ backgrounds did not significantly 
influence normative learning, how about the impact of participants’ existing 
knowledge on the topic of the exercise? The basis for the latter was their self-
assessment in the pre-questionnaire, where they had been asked to evaluate their 
expertise on a number of themes more or less closely related to the content of the 
two policy exercises. Not surprisingly, we found that for the first policy exercise, self-
reported normative learning was negatively correlated with (self-reported) 
background knowledge on burden-sharing issues, the focus of the simulation (r = -
.332, p < .05). Similarly, there was a negative correlation between expertise on 
climate and energy law and the proxy for recorded normative change for the first 
policy exercise (r = -.316, p < .05). This again lends support to the assumption of an 
inverted U-curve depicting the relationship between pre-existing expertise and 
normative change. According to the U-curve proposition, while an intermediate level 
of expertise facilitates normative learning, possessing expert knowledge in a domain 
actually reduces the chances for normative change. The data from the REDD 
exercises supports this: self-reported normative learning was negatively correlated 
with self-reported expertise on international climate policy (r = -.255, p < .05) and on 
development finance (r = -.301, p < .01), respectively.  
6.4.2 Reasons to participate  
In a next step, we were looking for possible connections between participants’ 
reasons to sign up for the policy exercise and its normative learning effect. In the pre-
questionnaire, expert participants had been asked to evaluate the importance of a 
number of goals for their decision to register for the workshop in the pre-
questionnaire, from primarily cognitive motivations (‘I want to get an update on the 
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latest developments on REDD financing’), to more relational (‘I want to better 
understand the perspectives of other actors/stakeholders’) and social ones 
(‘opportunity to network’).  
We found for both policy exercises that there were rather strong correlations 
between the latter, ‘softer’ motivations to participate in the exercise and self-
reported normative learning. Thus, for the burden-sharing group, self-reported 
normative learning was positively correlated with interest in the project (r = .609, p 
< .05), opportunity to network (r = .624, p < .05), and the format of the workshop (r 
= .625, p < .05). For the REDD exercise, the same applied for interest in the project (r 
= .740, p < .05), and the desire to ‘get a better grasp on who is involved in this issue 
and to build up relationships’ (r = .674, p < .05). The only significant correlation 
between cognitive motivations to join the policy exercise and normative learning 
concerned the aggregated measure for recorded change. For the burden-sharing 
group, this was significantly correlated with the desire to learn about current 
developments in European climate policy (r = .751, p < .05) and the wish to better 
understand the dynamics of EU climate policy-making (r = .726, p  < .05).  
We can conclude from the above that those who attended the workshop for 
primarily social or relational purposes were also more likely to report having learned 
from it in normative terms. Recorded change on the other hand was connected – at 
least for the burden-sharing group – to cognitive motivations. Obviously, these 
findings are very tentative given the small sample sizes and exploratory nature of this 
research, but may nonetheless provide material for hypothesis-building in future 
work, an issue which we will discuss in more depth in Chapter 8.  
6.4.3 Roles in the policy exercise 
Finally, could we find any connection between the roles that participants assumed 
during the policy exercise and the degree of their normative learning? Again, we 
replicated the approach we used in Chapter 5 on cognitive learning, differentiating 
between three clusters of roles for the burden-sharing policy exercise: wealthier EU 
member states (represented in the exercise by Sweden and Germany), less wealthy 
member states (represented by Spain and Poland), and the European Commission. 
Analysis of variance did not return significant differences between the three groups, 
however, neither for self-reported nor for recorded normative learning.  
In the case of the REDD exercise, we made a distinction between those representing 
developing and those representing developed countries. In this case, recorded 
normative change was significantly higher for the participants that played developing 
rather than developed countries during the exercise (F(79,1) = 5.50, p < .05). It thus 
seems that, given the predominance of Northern participants in our exercise, those 
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who represented a country further removed from their own realm of experience also 
learned more in normative terms.  
6.5 Summary 
This chapter sought to ascertain the extent of participants’ normative learning over 
the course of the policy exercise runs. Given the subject matter of the exercises, we 
focused primarily on the feasibility or desirability of certain policy options and policy 
design features in the context of EU burden-sharing and REDD, respectively. As for 
the analysis of cognitive learning effects (see Chapter 5), we relied on both recorded 
and self-reported measurements. Pre- and post-questionnaires constituted the 
primary source of data for this purpose.  
We first sought to trace normative change by measuring to what extent participants’ 
assessment of a series of closed survey items shifted from pre- to post-test. On the 
whole, we found only few statistically significant changes in group means across all 
four groups of participants. The items on which group means shifted significantly 
varied from group to group, indicating that normative change, where it occurred, 
does not necessarily seem to have revolved around the same issues between expert 
and student groups. Since some writings on policy games point to consensus-building 
as one potential function of policy games, we also looked for indications of normative 
convergence within groups, measured as reductions in the standard deviation from 
pre- to post-test. We found hardly any evidence to this effect, but should also note 
that it is not a key goal of the type of game we organised. 
The picture emanating from participants’ self-evaluation of their normative learning, 
based on a survey prompt to that effect, was slightly more positive. Analysing the 
differences between the different groups of participants, our expectations in this 
regard were for the most part confirmed: based on the self-evaluations, REDD as the 
more unstructured, novel topic seems to have given rise to more normative learning 
than the exercise on EU burden-sharing. Likewise, students reported higher 
normative learning effects than experts, in line with the ‘inverted U-curve’ theory 
which assumes that a moderate level of background knowledge facilitates the 
revision of pre-existing viewpoints. The difference between the ‘REDD group’ and the 
‘EU burden-sharing group’ was significant also for the recorded measurements for 
which we had constructed a measure of aggregate normative shifts. Determining into 
the impact of other factors (participants’ background, existing knowledge, roles) 
turned out more to be more difficult.  
 140 
 
7. Relational Learning 
7.1 Introduction 
Better understanding of others’ positions, mind sets, and preferences, greater trust 
and an enhanced ability to cooperate make up the key elements of the notion of 
relational learning as defined in Chapter 2. While all these aspects can be relevant in 
different types of appraisals, a review of the literature on simulation-gaming for 
policy development yields a more limited set of relational learning effects potentially 
relevant for this group of approaches. After all, policy games are mostly shorter 
interventions, which last for only a day or two. By contrast, other types of policy 
appraisal such as public participation processes often involve a series of meetings 
over a longer timeframe, and thus provide greater opportunity to build new or 
improve existing relationships. Likewise, many appraisals draw on an established, 
cohesive network of participants. In many policy games, by contrast, including the 
expert runs of our own policy exercises, participants do not know each other 
beforehand, come from different places (in our cases, also different countries), and, 
while working on the same issues, will not necessarily cross paths again in the near 
future. This contributes to diversity in terms of the backgrounds and perspectives 
represented in the group, which is often cited as a key condition for cognitive and 
normative learning. Yet at the same time, it inevitably limits the possibilities for 
detecting changes in the relationships within the group.  
After this initial disclaimer, what are the relational learning benefits evoked in the 
literature on policy games and policy exercises? The contribution that these methods 
can make towards improving participants’ understanding of others’ mind sets is the 
aspect that is mentioned most often in this regard. Authors agree that policy games 
can help clarify and sensitise participants to others’ values and world views 
(Underwood & Duke, 1987; Van der Meer & Geurts, 1995), also due the fact that 
‘when playing a role, positions and opinions can be magnified and identified more 
easily’ (Bots & van Daalen, 2007, 521). By having to argue in favour of or against 
certain policy options and seeking to convince opponents of one’s own point of view, 
‘the underlying objectives of parties crystalize, surface and become more explicit … 
The potential of a game for assisting individuals in viewing the situation from other 
perspectives through playing other roles is a major benefit of this approach’ 
(Underwood & Duke, 1987). This last point made by Underwood and Duke draws 
attention to the dual nature of relational learning in policy games: they provide 
participants with the opportunity to learn not only about each other’s mind sets, but 
also about the values and interests underlying the roles that they or others are 
playing during the policy game or exercise. Naturally, the gap between these two 
dimensions increases or decreases depending on how close the roles are to 
participants’ own background and position in real life (a dynamic which also applies 
Relational Learning 
 
141 
 
for normative learning, see Chapter 6). Yet the fact that ‘games aid the strategic 
understanding of the actor-network configuration’ (Mayer, 2009, 849) remains an 
undisputed benefit of this method. Some authors (Duke & Geurts, 2004; Klabbers et 
al., 1995) also report improved communication in the group of participants as an 
outcome of running a policy game, ‘which, over the longer term, could lead to a more 
solid foundation for action’ (Klabbers et al., 1995, 131). However, they neither go into 
further detail nor present supporting evidence for this claim.  
Looking specifically at policy exercises, it seems that, given the strong cognitive 
motivations underlying this method, which emphasise putting the right conditions in 
place for enabling learning about the policy problem and developing and appraising 
policy options, relational learning objectives may be even less prominent in this 
context than for other types of policy games. Indeed, they are hardly mentioned in 
writings on policy exercises. Better understanding of other’s values and arguments 
features not as an important objective per se, but only as an intermediate step 
towards resolving substantial disagreements (cf. Brewer, 1986). And while Duinker et 
al. (1993, 3) cite ‘foster[ing] communication and mutual understanding’ as one of the 
three principal goals of their policy exercise on European forest policy, they do not 
follow up on this aspect in their extensive account of the exercise runs.  
So what about our expectations concerning relational learning in the policy exercises 
that we designed and ran? Our interventions were quite short and expert participants 
did not come from one cohesive group. Therefore, we did not expect that we be 
would able to find evidence of changes in the relationships among participants, at 
least among the experts. Rather, we hypothesised that stakeholder perspectives and 
insights into the roles participants were playing would constitute the core of 
participants’ relational learning. Learning about the key interests and motivations 
driving the countries represented in the policy exercise was also the aspect that we 
focused on primarily in our assessment. We expected this to be relevant especially 
for the student groups, given their lack of prior exposure to the topic of the policy 
exercise and its context, but anticipated – albeit lower – learning effects also for the 
experts, few of whom were policy-makers in real life. Finally, we did not see any 
grounds for assuming that the topic of the exercise – EU burden-sharing vs. REDD – 
would have an impact on the degree of relational learning. Therefore, in the 
following analysis, unlike in the previous two chapters on cognitive and normative 
learning, we mostly contrast the results for experts and student groups as a whole, 
without further distinguishing between participants in the burden-sharing and the 
REDD exercise. In terms of measurements, we relied on self-reported data in ex post 
surveys and interviews, given the difficulties of devising a reliable recorded measure 
of relational change. Regarding the structure of this chapter, the next two sections 
examine our findings regarding participants’ learning about other’s perspectives and 
mind sets, focusing in particular on insights into the roles that they or others played 
during the exercise. This is followed by a brief discussion of other aspects which came 
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forward in the evaluation of the four runs and which, while they may not qualify as 
relational learning as such, nonetheless relate to the interactive, social dimension of 
the policy exercise method.  
7.2 Learning about perspectives across the four runs 
7.2.1 Learning about perspectives in the expert groups 
The experts taking part in the policy exercises acknowledged the relational learning 
potential offered by the role-playing aspect of this appraisal method. As one 
participant in the burden-sharing exercise reflected based on his own experience,  
‘when people are forced to play roles and are faced with the practicalities from 
a point of view of different countries or different individuals or different 
institutions this is a very powerful way of conveying information in a way that 
allows people to understand some of the difficulties that different countries 
might have.’  
Figure 15 summarises the results for the question on this dimension of relational 
learning (increased understanding of other stakeholders/actors as a consequence of 
the exercise) across three participant groups.
38
  
 
Figure 15. Self-reported relational learning (improved understanding of perspectives of other 
stakeholders). 
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 Unfortunately, there is no data available for the REDD student group as the block of self-
reported learning questions was mistakenly omitted from their ex-post questionnaire. 
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Looking at the survey results, among the experts taking part in the burden-sharing 
exercise, opinions varied, with four participants reporting that their understanding 
had ‘not really’ increased, against ten who responded ‘a bit’ or ‘to some extent’ 
(mean 3.0). Contrary to our own expectations, the picture was quite different for the 
experts in the REDD exercise, where ten persons stated that their understanding had 
increased ‘to some extent or ‘very much’, against only two who answered ‘not really’ 
(mean 3.73). Overall, we can thus conclude that the policy exercises did lead to some 
extent of relational learning in both expert groups. Testing for between-group 
differences using analysis of variances (ANOVA) revealed that the difference between 
the burden-sharing and the REDD expert group was statistically significant (F (1,23) = 
4.63, p < .05). The higher level of self-reported relational learning on perspectives in 
the REDD expert group may be due to the fact that REDD is a relatively new addition 
to the agenda of the global climate negotiations. REDD financing is currently still 
being discussed in rather general terms, with the implication that REDD experts may 
not be as aware of countries’ interests and priorities on specific issues, even where 
these have formed already, thus providing higher potential for relational learning 
through the exercise. On the whole, however, the difference in appreciation of the 
roles/perspectives dimension between the two groups was not reflected neither in 
the individual ex-post interviews nor in the ‘three key insights’ from the policy 
exercise that participants were asked to report in response to an open question in 
the post-survey.  
Turning to data from the ex-post interviews, a first recurrent theme was the sense of 
having experienced ‘first-hand’ the complexity and challenges in navigating 
multilateral negotiations (especially when, as in the international climate 
negotiations that provided the context for the REDD exercise, decisions need to be 
taken by consensus) and in arriving at an outcome that is acceptable for all involved. 
In particular, the exercises appear to have made participants more aware of the 
(domestic) constraints and strong interests underpinning countries’ positions even on 
seemingly technical aspects of a policy, which complicate reaching agreement. 
Somebody summarised: 
 ‘For the participant you get a real sense of how difficult these negotiations are 
and how you have to guess what kind of vested interest the other countries 
have. In my daily work I focus on environmental benefits and you don’t try to 
understand so much why countries are against something but you just think the 
countries is [sic] not doing their job. It makes you realise what the agenda is of 
these countries and how these interests play together.’  
In a way, it seems surprising that these considerations should be novel to experts 
working on this issue area for a long time, albeit from different professional 
perspectives. Yet playing a role seems to have driven home these points more 
forcefully than may be possible in other contexts, as illustrated by the following 
quote:  
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‘It [the policy exercise] has certainly helped me to understand some of the 
dynamics that we saw developing between those countries that were largely 
acquiescent to our request and those that weren’t, which is very useful for the 
work that I’m doing at the moment.’  
These reflections were also echoed in general terms in some of the answers in both 
expert groups to the ‘key insights’ survey question, such as ‘roles of different players’, 
‘strategies of players’, or ‘players don’t behave in a rational way.’ Also in the 
debriefing to the REDD policy exercise, the insights gained from playing a role were 
the first aspect mentioned by participants in response to the question how it felt to 
take part in such an exercise.  
The expert participants referred to the role dimension of relational learning not only 
in general terms, as described above, but also in terms of their specific experiences 
with or insights into certain roles. Most often, these observations related to the role 
that they themselves had assumed, but in some cases also concerned other roles 
represented in the exercise. For the EU burden-sharing exercise, it was the position 
and relative power of the European Commission that drew most attention. Asked 
whether playing the Commission role had furthered his insight in the way that actor 
operates in reality, one participant replied:  
‘Yes of course, I found this one of the most surprising things. When counter 
proposals were made in the negotiations, as a researcher, I might have raised 
all kinds of arguments against them. But since I was playing the Commission, I 
did not mention those points since I very much wanted an agreement to be 
reached. This happened very fast, by the way.’  
Another concurred that ‘as the Commission, in the end, you can bring in very little, 
and you want most of all that an outcome is reached.’ This view contrasts to some 
extent with one of the ‘key insights’ reported by someone else in the post-survey, 
who report having realised that the ‘EU Commission has great framing power’. 
Ultimately, these two viewpoints may not necessarily need to be at odds, however. 
Recent analyses of European climate policy tend to agree that the Commission has 
substantially expanded its influence in climate policy over time (e.g. Jordan et al., 
2010; Oberthür, 2011), with the swift adoption of the EU climate and energy package 
(which was still being negotiated at the time of the policy exercise) as a high-water 
mark. The Commission’s successful framing of the set of individual policy proposals as 
a tightly integrated package that would ensure EU leadership in the international 
negotiations on the future of the climate regime was undoubtedly a key element to 
this success. Aside from the Commission’s role, one participant also emphasised that 
the exercise ‘made [him] realise what it means to have the presidency’ in the 
European Union context.  
In the REDD expert group, relational learning about specific roles seems to have been 
linked somewhat more to country groups than to individual countries. A first, 
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somewhat sobering insight was reported by a participant in the post-survey, namely 
that ‘few countries actually have an incentive for an operational REDD mechanism’. If 
indeed applicable, this assessment would not bode well for the prospects of such a 
global mechanism ever coming about. As somebody elaborated in a follow-up 
interview:  
‘Already the technical complexity of REDD is mind-boggling, but the workshop 
made me realise that this is only part of the picture. In fact, politically speaking, 
only very few of the interests that the different countries have in REDD match 
and align, and in many cases they are outright contradictory. Especially the 
United States can keep pushing for highly cost-efficient and environmentally 
sound REDD in the negotiations, since what do they lose if it never gets 
adopted?’  
This reflection highlights the close link between the fate of a global REDD mechanism 
and progress in the international climate negotiations as a whole. While the initial 
idea of REDD held appeal for both developing and developed countries – promising 
additional funds to the former and supposedly quick and cheap emission abatement 
potential for the latter –, REDD in itself will not be a ‘deal-maker’ in the quest of 
reaching agreement on a future climate regime.  
Another participant, who had represented a developing country during the policy 
exercise, reflected on the attitude of developed countries, the donors under a future 
REDD scheme:  
‘I got the feeling that donors are too demanding on delivery [of REDD credits]. I 
mean, at least in the beginning – and that may last for a long time – REDD will 
most of all be a learning process, and that in itself is beneficial. But if that 
understanding is not there [among donors], then very quickly REDD may 
become an elite activity for only some, very advanced REDD countries.’  
This line of thinking, expressing a differentiated view into the interests and mind set 
of REDD donor countries, echoes one of the ‘key insights’ reported on the ex post 
survey, namely that the ‘first steps [need] to come from rich countries’ in setting up 
an operational REDD mechanism. Finally, in two follow-up interviews, participants 
pondered the weight of Brazil in the international REDD debate. One interviewee felt 
that the exercise had illustrated to him that ‘in essence, Brazil’s motivation to tackle 
deforestation is domestic and what happens at the international level, [is] by 
definition less important’ for the country. Another emphasised her key role as a 
‘bridge-builder between donors and developing nations’ and as an ‘example that with 
decent governance, you can stem deforestation pressures’. 
Summarising, the qualitative data from post-interviews and -surveys provides 
evidence for some degree of relational learning among participants in terms of 
insights into the (constellations of) actors represented in the two policy exercises and 
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their motivations and interests. However, especially when comparing to the cognitive 
learning effects that we examined in the previous chapter, relational learning 
probably represents more of a side line of participants’ reflections about the 
workshop. Some ‘key insights’ noted in the ex post surveys concerned this dimension, 
yet thoughts about actors and actor constellations were only offered upon specific 
prompts in the interviews, with a number of participants not having much reflection 
on this issue at all. In line with our expectations, we would thus argue that, at least 
for the expert exercises, relational learning, where it happened, was more of an 
ancillary rather than a main effect of the policy exercise.  
7.2.2 Learning about perspectives in the student groups 
A look back at Figure 15 which reports on the survey results for the question on self-
reported relational learning (understanding of perspectives of stakeholders) reveals a 
rather high degree of relational learning among the students that participated in the 
burden-sharing policy exercise. 21 students replied that the exercise had increased 
their understanding of stakeholders’ perspectives ‘very much’ and 14 ‘to some 
extent’, with only three students responding ‘not really’ (see Figure 15). Analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) indicates that the mean score for this group is significantly higher 
than for the experts taking part in either the burden-sharing or the REDD exercise (F 
(1,72) = 10.96, p < .05). Our expectation to find a higher extent of relational learning 
among students than among experts is thus confirmed at least for the burden-sharing 
group.  
On the basis of the qualitative data on students’ relational learning about actor 
perspectives and roles, we find that while overall there may have been a higher 
degree of relational learning for this group, the patterns of what was learned are very 
similar to what we found among the expert groups.  
As in the expert groups, a first relevant line of thought that emerged from the open 
question on ‘key insights’ in the post-surveys related not to insights into specific roles, 
but to the realisation of different national conditions and the complexity of 
interacting interests in international negotiations. As one person noted following the 
burden-sharing policy exercise: ‘Amongst European countries there are different 
interests due to different economic development paths. This complicates the 
achievement of an agreement.’ Others expressed similar feelings, emphasising the 
‘complexity of burden-sharing with countries in different stages of development 
(which also attribute different levels of importance to environmental policy in 
general)’, that ‘there's [are] so many different goals for all the different countries’, 
that burden-sharing is ‘a complex problem to manage as it includes a lot of actors and 
interests.’ Reflecting on the correspondence between the simulation context in the 
policy exercise and the reality of policy-making in the EU, someone concluded that 
‘[r]eaching an agreement between 6 countries [the number of countries that had 
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been represented in the policy exercise] is hard, 27 should be a nightmare!’ Similar 
reflections (‘all parties have different priorities’, ‘the different views and stakes 
countries have referring to REDD’, ‘[t]here are different points of views and interests 
among developed and developing countries; and even among themselves.’) were 
made, though somewhat less frequently, in interviews and surveys following the 
REDD policy exercise. One student put a particularly strong emphasis on this point:  
‘The most important thing I learned is that it is really hard for countries to come 
to an agreement. This is because countries are bound by their constituencies, 
their geo-political circumstances, by their history. And once you … play that role, 
you start to understand why there are so many arguments for and against and 
why there is conflict.’ 
Another stressed the importance of the relational dimension for the quality of the 
agreement reached, noting that the ‘outcome of negotiations also strongly hinges on 
mutual understanding.’ In both groups, there was also some reflection on the 
relationship between individual and collective interest in negotiations: ‘When it 
comes to negotiations on internal burden-sharing decisions, countries do not think a 
lot about the achievement of the aggregated EU target’; and in the context of REDD, 
‘[t]he stakes of developing and developed countries are too different and they rarely 
seem to consider [the] general interest of the planet.’ Some students in the REDD 
exercise also commented on the actor constellation with regard to specific issues, like 
this student who pondered the question of co-benefits, i.e. ensuring that the 
implementation of REDD does not focus exclusively on the carbon integrity of the 
project at hand, but also aims at wider social and environmental sustainability: 
‘Every country has a different stake when it comes to loss of biodiversity or 
indigenous rights. All these co-benefits mean different things for each country. 
So the more you include co-benefits the more difficult it becomes to reach an 
agreement.’ 
Besides these more general relational considerations regarding the constellation of 
actors and their respective interests in the two policy exercises, a second set of 
relational aspects emerging from the post-interviews and -surveys again concerned 
students’ perceptions and insights regarding specific actors that were represented in 
the policy exercise. Turning first to the exercise on EU burden-sharing, as for the 
expert run, it was the Commission’s role that was singled out most often in this 
regard. One student, when asked what was the first thing that came to his mind 
about the policy exercise about two weeks after the run, responded the following:  
‘How frustrating it was to be the Commission. You think you are setting the 
agenda, work hard to consult all the member states and present a proposal that 
is a good, ambitious compromise. And then you are simply pushed aside at the 
decision stage.’  
Relational Learning 
 
148 
 
This theme was picked up in a large number of responses to the open survey 
question. While some students mentioned it in general terms (‘Role of the 
Commission’; ‘[t]he impact of EU Commission’s [sic] attitude on policy-making’, etc.), 
most of the answers provided a negative judgment of the Commission’s influence in 
line with the interview quote above. Answers emphasised the ‘[w]eak power of the 
Commission in determining the crucial issues’ and ‘[t]he difficult role of the 
Commission, in between the interests of all member states’. Apparently based on his 
or her own experience during the exercise, someone concluded that the ‘role played 
by the European Commission is marginal. The CoM [Council of Ministers] changed 
dramatically the European Commission proposal’ and another stated that the 
‘Commission really only presents its proposal, but in the end it’s the member states 
who have the final word and their interests are very important.’  
As in the expert group, however, there were also dissenting voices. One student 
observed that ‘[s]ometimes you cannot go for your own objective because it does not 
follow the Commission who finally has a lot of power in decisions making.’ Another, 
while abstaining from evaluating its impact, highlighted the ‘[i]mportance of a strong 
role of Commission. They need to lauch [sic] the debate with a well prepared 
proposal.’ Besides the interest in the Commission’s role in policy-making, the only 
other actor that was mentioned explicitly was the rotating EU presidency, with one 
student underscoring ‘the importance of the … EU presidential nation.’ Another 
reflected on the Council of Ministers as a collective, noting that for this body, ‘it is 
difficult to adopt a long term view. The Country’ interest [sic] prevails when choosing 
targets and measures.’  
Relational aspects covered by the students that participated in the REDD exercise 
were more diverse in outlook and theme. While some students we interviewed after 
the exercise stated that insights into roles and actors had not been at the core of 
their learning experience, others, like this student, were more positive: ‘When you 
read articles, you learn mostly about policies. The exercise gave the whole idea and 
the details of how REDD works, what are the different positions on REDD … This was 
interesting to see.’ Another concurred, adding that  
‘…it was interesting to see the variety of stakeholders involved in REDD. I didn’t 
realise that so many countries have interest in REDD and would actually be 
willing to put money into it. I also learned a lot about the positions of the EU 
and the US in particular.’  
On the subject of the United States, as in the expert exercise, somebody expressed a 
pessimistic view of the country’s commitment to REDD: ‘I find it hard to believe that 
the US will participate meaningfully in the near future. The United States has no 
interest in taking part in REDD,’ whereas Brazil was thought to have a ‘crucial position 
in REDD’. Other comments in the post-surveys emphasised the divide between 
potential REDD donors and host countries on the one hand (‘North-South 
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differences’), or, within the Southern group, the ‘large differences between the LDCs 
[least developing countries] and the developing [emerging] economies, such as Brazil’. 
These considerations led one student to reflect on the perceived inequality in 
bargaining power in international negotiations: ‘Interests of developing countries will 
always get less priority. It was striking how even with an exercise in which no party 
has real power, developing nations still end up with a bad deal for them.’ Concerned 
with the same issue, another called on the rich countries to ‘see also the benefit in … 
[the] long run in this issue, this would balance the negotiations.’  
In summary, whereas references to learning about actor perspectives were on the 
whole somewhat more frequent and emphatic among students compared to the 
experts – an impression which was confirmed at least for the burden-sharing group 
by a significantly higher score on self-reported learning on this matter than the other 
groups –, what was learned in this regard seems to have been largely similar across 
runs. In all groups, relational learning about actor perspectives revolved around two 
main dimensions. Firstly, the exercise seems to have highlighted to participants the 
extent to which interests and positions in the policy arena, be it for REDD or for 
burden-sharing, are diverging, and what challenges this poses for reaching agreement. 
Secondly, there was relational learning about the interests and stakes of specific 
actors, which in the case of the burden-sharing simulations, focused largely on the 
Commission, but was somewhat diverse for the REDD exercise.  
7.3 Other relational aspects 
As set out at the beginning of this chapter, we largely concentrated on the dimension 
of actor perspectives and roles for our measurements in the relational domain. Since 
most expert participants did not know each other before the policy exercise and since 
the event lasted for only one day, other dimensions of relational learning (improved 
personal relationships, enhanced trust and better ability to cooperate) seemed less 
relevant for the specific context of our policy exercise. And while the students taking 
part in the policy exercise, who were studying in the same, rather large, MSc 
programme, were more familiar with each other beforehand, also here, we 
considered notions of trust and ability to cooperate as largely ancillary to the main 
learning goals of the exercise, which were more cognitive and normative in nature. 
What we briefly discuss in the following, however, are some aspects that, while not 
directly representing relational learning per se, do touch upon the social and 
communicative dimension of policy exercises as an appraisal and workshop format.  
7.3.1 Expert runs 
A key advantage that several experts emphasised when we asked them about their 
views on the strengths and weaknesses of the policy exercise method was its 
interactive character. As somebody commented, ‘it was very involving, much more 
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than other workshops. Normally you at least have a chance to stay out of the 
discussions or give very little input but this really relied on everybody to give a lot of 
input.’ Another participant agreed: ‘everybody is stimulated to work together and to 
act, and this makes it a particularly active workshop form.’ One participant pointed to 
the role-playing element of the exercise as a catalyst for communication among 
participants:  
‘It [the role-playing element] had a huge impact. Just the idea that everybody 
represents a country and not himself anymore and that you’re supposed to 
behave like you’re in real negotiations makes it really easy to talk to other 
people because you immediately have a topic to talk about, for example about 
what you think about some burden-sharing idea – I think it has created a spirit 
that was really full of respect and fun.’  
It thus seems as if the emphasis on interaction, negotiation, and exchange of 
arguments among participants had both substantial (‘everybody is forced to share 
their expertise’ in the words of yet another interviewee) and relational benefits. 
Somebody reflected after the REDD policy exercise:  
‘The post-workshop drinks are always a good indicator of how a workshop 
went. In this case, everybody stayed around and for a long time, which indicates 
how well we’ve connected and that people are interested in taking the 
networking further outside of the game context.’  
For the expert run of the REDD exercise, we had also included a specific question on 
the relational dimension to the ex-post survey. Participants’ reaction to the 
statement ‘the REDD-ALERT policy exercise helped to get a better grasp of who is 
involved in this issue and to build up relationship’ was moderately positive. Only two 
participants (17 per cent) ticked the box ‘not really’, whereas all others were more 
sanguine about it, with two persons responding ‘very much’ and four each (34 per 
cent) ‘a bit’ and ‘to some extent’. General satisfaction with the policy exercise was 
echoed in the unprompted reactions we received after the workshop. Emails from 
different participants thanked for the ‘really enjoyable workshop’ and the ‘excellent 
meeting of yesterday’. The fact that one participant noted ‘friends’ as one of his ‘key 
insights’ on the ex post survey also seems to indicate that the expert exercises 
succeeded in social terms.  
7.3.2 Student runs 
The echo from students on the relational or social benefits of the policy exercise was 
also relatively positive. The majority of the students we interviewed following the 
runs stated that the policy exercise had somewhat increased their familiarity with 
their class mates. In most cases, this seemed to relate primarily to other members in 
their country team rather than the wider group of participants, as evident from the 
following quotes from three different post-interviews: ‘I did get to know my study 
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mates. Some people in my group I didn’t know before and afterwards I did. The 
exercise was also nice in that sense.’ ‘One of my team mates I didn’t know before and 
now we talk to each other frequently.’ ‘I was in a group with three other people, who 
I didn’t talk to before. The game helped me a lot with making some new contacts. It’s 
a good game for that.’ This view was not universally shared, however. On the 
question whether the exercise had helped her build new relationships with some of 
her class mates, one student replied: ‘[n]ot really. There was one girl in my group that 
I got to know a bit better … I wouldn’t say that it was really suitable for getting to 
know someone.’ Another student also declined that this had happened, arguing that 
‘[w]e knew each other pretty well beforehand.’ 
In the ex-post survey, the students were asked how the policy exercise as a teaching 
method compared to other classes that they had attended during their studies, in 
Amsterdam and elsewhere. There was overwhelming agreement that it had been 
‘more interactive’ in nature; 94 out of the 127 students (74 per cent) who completed 
the survey after either the burden-sharing or the REDD policy exercise agreed ‘very 
much’ with this statement, with only five students (four per cent) responding ‘not at 
all’ or ‘not really’. Almost half (57 out of 123 respondents, or 46 per cent) also ‘very 
much’ agreed that the exercises had been ‘more fun’ than regular classes, a notion 
that only six students (five per cent) opposed. While aspects like of interactiveness 
and ‘fun’ clearly do not equate relational learning as we have defined it in Chapter 2, 
they do emphasise the ‘soft’ benefits of policy exercise as an occasional teaching tool 
in higher education. We will return to this issue in the following, final chapter.  
7.4 Summary 
Given the mostly short duration of the interventions and their focus on advancing 
knowledge, relational learning objectives are generally not at the core of the policy 
exercise method. One aspect of relational learning that did prove relevant in this 
context is their potential to improve understanding of other’s mind sets and 
perspectives, in particular with regard to the roles represented in the exercise. Both 
experts and students reported insights related to the complexity of the international 
actor configuration at large, but also on the interests and constraints faced by specific 
actors in the policy context that was being simulated. While we had not expected the 
topic of the exercise to matter for participants’ relational learning, it seems that for 
the expert group, the REDD exercise had greater effects in that regard than the one 
on EU burden-sharing. One possible explanation here again relates to the relative 
novelty of the topic which may have caught participants’ less aware of the specific 
interests and agendas of the different countries concerning REDD financing. Finally, 
expert participants emphasised the value of the highly interactive character of the 
exercise, which seems to have facilitated communication and networking among the 
participants – a finding which while it does not equate relational learning as such, 
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nonetheless underscores the value of the policy exercise method also in the social 
domain.  
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8. Conclusions 
Policy exercises have been proposed in the late 1980s as a way to make sense of 
complex environmental problems and learn about potential ways of addressing them. 
Since then, a number of these interventions have been implemented around the 
world, some of which have focused on climate-change related topics. Yet despite the 
significant investment needed in terms of time and resources to prepare such 
interventions, to date their potential – and their limitations – for stimulating learning 
benefits have been hardly evaluated in a systematic fashion. This is the gap that the 
present thesis seeks to address. The thesis demonstrates that policy exercises can 
produce substantial learning effects that can be empirically measured and 
documented. It developed and applied an innovative conceptualisation of learning 
effects that differentiates between cognitive, normative and relational learning. The 
results obtained illustrate the value of a typology that – rather than privileging one 
learning type over others – treats them on an equal footing. A tailor-made evaluation 
framework drew on a variety of instruments to measure each type of learning, 
allowing for capturing different aspects of each of them. The use of pre- and post-
concept maps probably constituted the most important methodological innovation in 
this regard.  
This concluding chapter first draws together the learning effects that we found across 
our policy exercises and discusses the implications of these findings for the policy 
exercise method (Sections 8.1 and 8.2). It then turns back to reflect on the learning 
typology and measurements and outlines a research agenda for both fields (8.3 and 
8.4). The chapter ends with a research agenda (8.5) and some considerations on the 
recent changes in the landscape of international and European climate policy (8.6).  
8.1 Learning effects from the policy exercises  
The three preceding chapters analysed participants’ cognitive, normative and 
relational learning from the policy exercises that we designed and ran. We found 
systematic empirical evidence of learning as measured by several mutually 
independent methods of observation. The evidence was stronger for individuals’ 
cognitive than their normative or relational learning (Section 8.1.1). As expected, 
learning effects among students surpassed those among experts, and learning effects 
from the exercise on the more immature policy topic, REDD financing, were higher 
than those from the exercise on EU burden-sharing exercise, a more mature policy 
issue, in many regards (Section 8.1.2). Determining firm correlations of other, 
contextual factors with the degree of learning achieved proved more difficult (Section 
8.1.3). Lessons for the organising team on how to design future interventions point to 
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trade-offs regarding their duration, the degree of structure and the amount of 
background information provided to participants (Section 8.1.4).  
8.1.1 Cognitive, normative and relational learning effects across the four 
runs 
Comparing the three types of learning over the different exercise runs, the evidence 
was strongest for participants’ cognitive learning, which we had defined as 
encompassing the acquisition of new and the improved structuring of existing 
knowledge. Results from post-surveys and interviews indicate that participants 
gained insights both with regard to current policy developments and future policy 
options. More than anticipated given experts’ experience in policy-making, policy 
consultancy or applied research, they also learned about the dynamics of policy-
making and negotiations. This underscores the value of hands-on, experiential 
learning for developing a deep understanding of process dynamics – whether in 
climate policy or in a different field. Still in the realm of cognitive learning, analysis of 
pre- and post-concept maps testified to changes in the emphasis of key concepts 
associated with the topic of the policy exercises and to improved knowledge 
structuring. This was evident from an increase in the average number of map levels 
and items (the experts taking part in the burden-sharing exercise formed an 
exception here, but had started from a comparatively higher baseline, see Chapter 5).  
The extent of normative learning – changes in participants’ viewpoints, norms, or 
paradigms – that we could ascertain was by comparison more limited. When it came 
to objectively ‘recorded’ normative change, as measured through shifts in means in 
the assessment of a series of normative statements from pre- to post-measurement, 
we found only little evidence. There was moreover hardly any indication of normative 
convergence within the group, as expressed in decreases in the standard deviation of 
a group’s survey responses from pre- to post-test. Participants self-evaluated the 
extent of their normative learning somewhat more positively, although rather in 
terms of revised viewpoints on specific issues than larger-scale normative shifts (see 
Chapter 6). The fact that participants (who primarily came from the global North) 
playing developing countries in the REDD exercise reported significantly more 
normative learning than those playing industrialised countries lends support to the 
hypothesis that role switches can support and facilitate normative learning, a finding 
which resonates with some views expressed in the literature (see Chapter 4 and 
Parson & Ward, 1998).  
Finally, relational learning benefits from the exercises related primarily to a better 
understanding of others’ mind sets, positions and preferences. More specifically, 
participants reported insights into the interests of countries represented in the policy 
exercises and their underlying interests and motivations, as well as the wider actor 
configuration (see Chapter 7).  
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8.1.2 Between-group differences in learning effects 
We collected data on learning effects from two different policy exercises. The first 
focused on distributing emission reduction commitments in EU climate policy, a 
process commonly referred to as burden-sharing. The second examined options for 
designing a global fund for REDD, a mechanism under the global climate regime 
which aims at compensating developing countries for their efforts in reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. We kept the design of the two 
exercises as similar as possible, in order to limit the ‘noise’ from additional factors 
that might lead to differences in the resulting learning benefits. For both topics, a 
first run was organised with a group of international experts and policy-makers, 
followed by runs with master students in Environment and Resource Management at 
the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. We used the student groups to collect additional 
measurements to gain further insights into the types of learning that an intervention 
like a policy exercise might trigger for this slightly different group of participants. This 
research design allowed for a two-way comparison, firstly between the impact of the 
two topics at the heart of the exercises that, as we argued in Chapter 3, differed in 
their maturity and their relative position in the policy cycle, and secondly between 
experts and students. Given the scarcity of previous research in this domain, we 
could only formulate tentative expectations regarding the impact of these differences 
on cognitive, normative, and relational learning. Still, it seemed plausible to expect 
that both the level of expertise and the maturity of the subject under investigation 
would impact on what participants might learn. Table 22 below summarises the 
expectations formulated in Chapter 3 together with the respective findings. The table 
zooms in on key results along the main axes for comparing learning effects set out in 
Chapter 3. Additional insights reported in the previous chapters, including on relevant 
conditioning factors and possible cross-correlations, are summarised in Section 8.1.3.  
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 Expected learning 
foci within the 
three learning 
types 
Expected 
differences 
between expert 
and student 
groups 
Expected 
differences 
between the 
more mature 
policy issue (EU 
burden-sharing) 
and the less 
mature one 
(REDD 
financing) 
Expected relevance 
of contextual 
factors 
Cognitive 
learning 
Understanding/m
awareness of 
policy options and 
their feasibility; 
both for current 
and future policy  
– CONFIRMED 
 
Policy dynamics 
(especially for 
students) 
- STRONGER 
THAN EXPECTED 
ALSO FOR 
EXPERTS 
Higher for 
students than 
for experts        
– CONFIRMED 
Higher for REDD 
financing (only 
for expert 
groups)               
–  CONFIRMED 
FOR FUTURE 
POLICY 
Higher for 
participants with 
lower baseline 
knowledge; for 
experts further 
removed from 
policy-making and 
students with less 
related academic 
backgrounds             
– CONFIRMED 
ONLY  FOR EXPERTS 
FURTHER 
REMOVED FROM 
POLICY-MAKING  
Normative 
learning 
Changes in the 
perception of the 
desirability and 
feasibility of 
policy options and 
design features    
– CONFIRMED, 
THOUGH  
LIMITED OVERALL 
Higher for 
students than 
for experts          
–  CONFIRMED 
Higher for REDD 
financing (only 
for expert 
groups)              
– CONFIRMED 
Higher for 
participants with 
lower baseline 
knowledge; higher 
for roles further 
removed from 
reality                        
– NO EFFECTS 
FOUND 
Relational 
learning 
Perspectives and 
interests of the 
countries 
represented in 
the policy 
exercise                  
– CONFIRMED 
Higher for 
students than 
for experts        
– CONFIRMED  
No differences 
anticipated         
– REJECTED,  
HIGHER FOR 
REDD THAN 
FOR BURDEN-
SHARING 
No specific 
expectations             
– NO EFFECTS 
FOUND 
Table 22. Learning effects – summary of expectations and findings. 
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The first general conclusion we are able to draw is that the effects for the student 
groups have been greater than those for the experts, at least where our 
measurements lent themselves for between-group comparisons. This emerges from 
the self-reported data (post-surveys and interviews) for all three learning types. It 
moreover shows in the recorded measures (concept map metrics) for cognitive 
learning. The higher learning effects we measured for the student groups were likely 
a function of their much less developed background knowledge on the policy context 
and the specific topic of the policy exercises. This lower knowledge base facilitated 
the assimilation of new knowledge and facts (cognitive learning), made the revision 
of pre-existing viewpoints (normative learning) more likely, and enabled novel 
insights into actor positions (relational learning). Yet whereas the learning effects 
were greater for students, we also found significant evidence of learning in the expert 
group. This is remarkable given the short duration of the policy exercise and the high 
baseline from which the experts started out, a point we will come back to in section 
8.2.  
What can we say about the impact of the exercise topic on learning effects? The 
comparison here is imperfect as we did not have the same experts participating in 
both groups (which, given the requirement of specific expertise and experience on 
the subject matter of the workshop, would have been impossible in any case). But we 
did use the same approach for identifying and inviting potential participants and are 
confident that the resulting mix of attendees and their level of expertise were largely 
similar in both cases. On the whole, our expectation that the greater ‘novelty’ of the 
issue of REDD financing compared to EU burden-sharing might enable higher 
cognitive and normative learning effects among experts (for students, both topics 
were equally unfamiliar) was confirmed. Drawing on interview and survey data, REDD 
experts self-reported significantly more normative learning, significantly more 
cognitive learning about future policy options, as well as more relational learning 
about actor interests and positions. There is thus considerable evidence that a more 
unstructured, less mature topic implies a higher potential for reaching specific 
learning objectives. Yet since the policy exercise drew on only two cases and a limited 
number of observations, this is only a tentative conclusion which merits further 
investigation.  
8.1.3 Enabling and impeding factors for participants’ learning 
In addition to the comparing the learning affects along the main axes (level of 
expertise, topic of the exercises) discussed above and summarised in Table 22, we 
also probed into possible connections between certain characteristics of participants 
and their cognitive, normative and relational learning from the exercise runs. In 
general, we found only few robust links between factors like participants’ 
backgrounds, their self-reported expertise and assigned roles during the policy 
exercise and their respective learning. A notable exception is the significant 
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correlation between ‘softer’ motivations to participate in the exercise - such as 
interest in the policy exercise method, in networking or in the project hosting the 
policy exercise (as opposed to noted interest in the topic of the two exercises) - and 
levels of self-reported cognitive and normative learning. We might thus hypothesise 
that an open orientation towards the method and its benefits seems to facilitate 
learning. This interesting correlation seems to call for selecting participants on their 
motivations if maximising individual cognitive and normative learning effects is the 
objective. Simultaneously, it also highlights the relatively greater challenge of 
stimulating learning in those stakeholders that are a priori less interested in engaging 
in policy games. Their learning may however be crucial to progress in the policy arena: 
our experience with preparing the policy exercises suggests that it is harder to 
convince (senior) policy-makers as opposed to other experts to participate. Be that as 
it may, our findings suggest that this subject deserves more comprehensive and 
systematic research into the relationship between exercise participants’ motivations 
and learning results.  
We were also interested in some broader aspects that participants perceived as 
conducive to or constraining of their individual learning experience and inquired 
about those in the debriefing sessions, post-surveys and interviews. Responding to 
questions in the post-survey prompting participants to evaluate a number of 
elements of the policy exercise (the exercise scenario, the role descriptions, 
facilitation, the debriefing session, etc.), all participant groups considered discussions 
with members of their own team as most useful to their individual learning 
experience. This assessment corresponds to our own observations during the 
morning sessions of the exercises (country-internal deliberations), where we 
witnessed participants quickly engaging in lively discussion with their team mates to 
assess the various policy options and their implications for the country they were 
representing. In our view, the way in which especially the experts used this setting to 
intuitively draw on and share their own expertise and experience underscores the 
communicative and deliberative value of policy exercises as ‘boundary objects’ 
between stakeholders coming from a range of different backgrounds (see next 
section). It also retroactively validates a number of decisions we took in designing the 
policy exercise, building on earlier experiences by Parson (1995) and Wenzler (1993). 
For one, in terms of steps of play, it seems to have paid off to start the day in a more 
cooperative, deliberative set-up (country teams developing their own strategy) 
instead of immediately moving into a more confrontational and rhetoric-driven 
negotiation mode. Equally, our decision to form country teams instead of assigning 
individual roles to participants (which would have had the benefit of being able to 
represent a wider range of countries) helped to stimulate in-depth discussion of 
policy content and to avoid an exclusive focus on antagonistic back and forth -
between countries.  
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The element that participants on average considered least useful for their learning 
experience were the exercise scenarios (except for the students taking part in the 
REDD exercise, who awarded slightly higher scores). This feedback relates to a point 
that especially the experts brought up in the debriefing sessions and ex-post 
interviews, namely the appropriate level of background information about the ‘state 
of the world’ and their own country in the fictional future scenario and the role 
descriptions (see next section). The ex-post surveys also included a range of 
statements about aspects that may have impeded respondents’ learning, such as an 
ill-chosen topic, a too short duration of the exercise, constraining scenarios or roles, 
over-structuring of discussions through the policy element cards, lack of knowledge 
or diversity among participants. The resulting mean scores per group were in general 
quite low (mostly in the range 1.5-2.5 on a 5-point Likert scale).This indicates that 
most participants apparently did not perceive these aspects to have been serious 
impediments. Among the experts, the short duration of the exercise (one day) 
received the on-average highest level of agreement (3.13 for the burden-sharing 
group, 2. 67 for the REDD financing group). The over-structuring of the exercise 
through the policy element cards also scored comparatively high among the burden-
sharing participants (mean 2.97), but less so for the REDD experts. We will come back 
to these issues in the following section. In the two student groups, lack of knowledge 
among the participants received the highest mean score (2.59 and 3.17 for burden-
sharing and REDD, respectively). This was not surprising, given that the rather 
complex subject matter of the exercise had been designed primarily with the expert 
audiences in mind.  
8.1.4 Lessons learnt by the organising team 
In our measurements and in the foregoing analysis, we have largely focused on what 
our participants learned from the policy exercises. But what lessons do we as the 
organising team take away in terms of how to design this kind of interventions? In 
preparing the exercises, we took great care to build on previous experiences (Duinker 
et al., 1993; Geurts et al., 2007; Parson, 1995; Toth, 1988b; Wenzler, 1993) and 
wherever possible sought to heed the advice provided in the respective accounts. 
Nonetheless, our experience again shows that designing such interventions involves 
trade-offs; we will briefly discuss the most important of them below.  
The first trade-off concerns the ideal length of a policy exercise. Previous events of 
this kind have lasted from a couple of hours to up to three days. We opted for the 
middle ground by limiting the actual proceedings to one full working day. However, 
we started with a workshop dinner on the eve of the exercise to facilitate participants 
getting to know each other, and to shorten the preliminaries on the workshop day. In 
retrospect, we probably made the right choice in this regard, although several expert 
participants criticised the short duration of the exercise and expressed the view that 
the final agreements reached had been somewhat ‘rushed’. Adding another half or 
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full day to the workshop would have allowed for more in-depth deliberations and 
exploration of some key issues. Yet it would have risked deterring some experts from 
taking part at all (as was expressed by interviewees during the ex-post interviews). In 
our view, a longer duration is likely worthwhile if the organiser of the event has 
sufficient convening power and/or influence over participants’ agendas (i.e. if the 
exercise is commissioned by a higher level of hierarchy within an organisation, as is 
often the case in a corporate environment). However, this needs to be weighed 
carefully against the objective of ensuring sufficient quality and diversity among 
participants: in our case, academics would probably have found it easier than 
bureaucrats to allocate several days to our exercise. This issue might be circumvented, 
however, if a policy exercise was convened by an institution charged with policy-
making, in which case its employees would be expected to attend rather than having 
to justify the absence from their desks. 
Related to the first trade-off, more time for the exercise would also allow for working 
with two (or even more) consecutive scenarios as frames for the proceedings. In the 
burden-sharing exercise, two groups went through the same steps of play in parallel, 
but under different scenarios. This attempt did not prove very successful, however, 
and we therefore refrained from repeating the two-scenario set-up for the REDD 
exercise (see Chapter 4). It is possible that the scenarios were not sufficiently 
different or simply not forceful enough to leave a real imprint on the proceedings, or 
that the debriefing did not dedicate sufficient attention to this aspect. We would 
imagine that consecutively going through two different scenarios might prove more 
fruitful, but this would require a longer timeframe for the workshop. 
Finally, there are two broader aspects that future organisers should carefully consider 
when preparing their own interventions of this kind, relating to the degree of 
structure and background information in a policy exercise. We had opted for a 
relatively structured format but only a limited amount of information through the 
scenario and role descriptions; in retrospect, we would probably revisit the former 
decision, but not the latter. We pre-structured the policy options at the core of the 
exercise by means of ‘policy element cards’ which country teams had at their disposal. 
These outlined alternatives for various policy design aspects of the policy decision 
that participants were confronted with. We had aimed to thereby facilitate 
participants’ start into the exercise and to provide them with initial ‘food for thought’. 
Looking back, specifying the different parts of the policy proposal to be negotiated 
definitely helped organise and focus the deliberations. Yet the amount of cards to be 
considered and the requirement to take a decision on each of the design features 
may have prevented an even more in-depth, creative discussion of the core aspects. 
As one of the experts who took part in the burden-sharing exercise reflected 
afterwards, 
‘[t]his was meant to try to replicate the real life negotiations on burden-sharing 
in 2020. This is only useful if more freedom is given to the actors to come up 
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with ideas of what can be important in burden-sharing … I think this maybe 
didn’t allow for a possibility to think out of the box.’ 
Based on survey responses and ex-post interviews, the policy element cards were 
received more positively in the REDD exercise. This may also be due to the less 
mature nature of the topic of REDD financing, where a certain degree of pre-
structuring of the discussion through the cards drawn up by the organising team may 
have been perceived as more useful and necessary. Yet also in this case, a focus on 
fewer core elements of the required decision and a smaller set of alternative options 
for each element might in retrospect have been advisable.  
A second question relates to the appropriate level of background information for the 
exercise through scenarios and role descriptions. During the debriefing, expert 
participants of the burden-sharing exercise discussed at length the pros and cons of 
providing more data or real-time modelling support. Possibly, more specific 
assumptions on countries’ emission trajectories, abatement costs and potentials, as 
well as model results that would have provided information on the consequences of 
key policy options being considered might have improved the quality of deliberations 
and the outcomes of the exercise. Participants remained divided on this point. 
Whereas according to one person in the ex-post interview, ‘simple evaluation tools 
would have added even more bite to the discussions’, others disagreed:  
‘My first thought during the day was that we did not have enough information, 
but on reflection I thought that more information might not give you a better 
understanding of the issues that are faced by people, because political decision 
making is so non-linear; it is not illogical as such, but it doesn’t follow a logical 
linear format. Therefore simply giving more information may well make things 
more difficult instead of enlightening anyone.’  
The last point made in the quote above is indeed the crux of the matter. Arguably, 
more (quantitative) background information might give participants a better base for 
decision-making. This in turn could enhance the realism of the exercise and 
potentially improve the relevance of its outcomes. At the same time, such an 
approach carries a number of risks. First, the production of such data necessarily 
involves a large set of assumptions. What these are based on and to what extent they 
seem credible to participants could become a serious subject of contention and thus 
risk side-tracking deliberations from the overall objectives of the policy exercise. 
Second, real-time modelling support would mean adding a level of complexity that 
would likely overwhelm participants of a short intervention or at least detract their 
attention from its primary goals. Such a workshop design would then rather serve the 
goal of field-testing the model and not the development and testing of options for 
future policy. Third, the question remains how the information gained from the 
model outputs would be used in the deliberations. Parson (1995), whose policy 
exercise offered participants access to an integrated assessment model, reports that 
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while country teams initially did not make use of the model at all, they later did so 
primarily with partisan intent (finding additional arguments for the positions they had 
already developed) rather than a genuine desire to assess the implications of certain 
options. In conclusion, there are good reasons to consider building in a stronger 
quantitative element into a policy exercise. Yet we would argue that it may be 
primarily worthwhile for a larger-scale intervention, where sufficient capacity is 
available to develop or adjust an existing model to the specific needs and goals of an 
intervention and where participants are involved over a longer timeframe, and ideally 
already during the preparation stage of the exercise.  
Having thus summarised the proximate learning effects from our policy exercises we 
will now turn to the broader question what our findings imply for the value of policy 
exercises in climate policy appraisal.  
8.2 The value of policy exercises for climate policy appraisal 
Overall, the learning effects that we found for our participants resonate with the 
emphasis on cognitive learning benefits voiced in the theoretical literature on policy 
exercises. Policy exercises are, generally speaking, part of the rationalist appraisal 
tradition. Their primarily cognitive motivation is visible in the assumption that 
simulating policy interactions in a ‘simplified model of reality’ can yield insights into 
potentially promising and feasible policy options or ways in which institutions or 
decision-making processes might be reformed (see Section 2.2.3). In this sense, the 
predominance of cognitive as opposed to normative or relational learning effects that 
we have found for our own policy exercises is not an unexpected result. The extent of 
this learning was quite significant even for the expert groups, given the background 
knowledge that the experts already had as well as the short duration of our 
intervention. There was evidence for improved knowledge integration and 
structuring, and participants self-reported insights into the advantages and 
drawbacks of various policy options. A broader, more holistic view of the problem 
also transpired from some post-exercise survey responses and interviews, but this is 
not a finding we can generalise for the wider group of participants.  
Indications of an enhanced long-term orientation and a serious reflection of the risks 
and contingencies involved in future policy-making were more ambiguous. While 
participants mostly refuted the notion that the exercises had succeeded in projecting 
them into the future scenario and stated that they had taken many of their decisions 
in the exercise by reasoning from the present-day situation, some of the evaluation 
data and the exercise outcomes do highlight risks and contingencies specific to future 
policy-making. Achieving a stronger ‘futures orientation’ may also be a question of 
exercise design (for instance, working with several consecutive scenarios may 
reinforce this goal, see above). Yet achieving this objective is known to be notoriously 
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difficult also when using other interactive appraisal methods, such as backcasting 
(van de Kerkhof, 2004). We unfortunately cannot claim that the policy exercise 
method, at least in the way we applied it, fared much better in that regard.  
Overall, participants reported – and this corresponded with our own observations – 
that the exercises had succeeded in creating a very interactive atmosphere that had 
stimulated them to share their knowledge and engage in a lively dialogue over the 
proposed policy options and their broader impacts and associated challenges. Initially, 
this happened primarily inside, but later also across the different country teams. The 
‘decision pressure’ created through the policy exercise format, with country teams 
having to formulate their position on different aspects of the policy problem at the 
heart of the exercises under time pressure, played an important role in fostering such 
an effective exchange of information across disciplinary and professional boundaries. 
It was striking to see how participants brought to bear their realms of expertise on 
the questions they were confronted with and made an effort to communicate this 
knowledge to others from different backgrounds. Therefore, like others (Parson, 
1996b; Toth & Hizsnyik, 2008), we believe that there is significant promise in using 
policy exercises as a tool to stimulate cognitive and relational learning at the 
interface of science and policy-making. Our exercises exposed experts from academia 
and think tanks to the realities and dynamics of policy-making and negotiations (see 
Chapter 5) and helped them identify knowledge gaps and potential needs for future 
research. Government officials in turn learned about recent scientific findings 
relevant to policy questions that they may have had little time to consider in more 
depth in their day-to-day work. 
Aside from individual learning benefits, to what extent could we observe that the 
policy exercises generated insights that could be considered novel and relevant at a 
broader scale, constituting a genuine gain in knowledge? As discussed in Chapter 5, 
the policy innovation we observed was fairly limited. The EU burden-sharing exercise 
went beyond current political discussions on how to distribute future emission 
reduction commitments on two counts: by developing a composite criterion on which 
future burden-sharing could be based, and with its suggestion to factor future 
adaptation needs into arrangements for mitigation burden-sharing. The REDD policy 
exercise on its part provided a ‘test drive’ for specific options that had been 
suggested in the academic and grey literature, but that had not yet entered policy 
discussions. The latter may point to a valuable function of the policy exercise method 
more generally: the reasons for which priori ‘value-neutral’ policy options like an 
auctioning design for a global REDD fund might be unpalatable to developing 
countries may most easily be understood in an interactive, future-oriented setting 
like a policy exercise. Parson (1995, 18) also comments that while his exercise had 
hardly yielded new policy options per se, a ‘more interesting service of the exercise 
was to clarify and focus arguments for and against particular policy proposals.’ Given 
that a large part of assessment and evaluation activities in environmental policy 
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focuses on technical learning on the programmatic aspects of policy (Huitema et al., 
2011), this makes for a rather important niche for simulation-gaming approaches 
such as policy exercises.  
In terms of generating new policy options, however, our results fall short of the 
claims made in the theoretical literature (Geurts et al., 2007; Parson, 1996b; 
Underwood & Duke, 1987). At the same time, they resonate with other accounts of 
previous policy exercise efforts. For instance, Duinker et al. (1993, 19) write:  
‘We had hoped that our policy-exercise workshop trials … would launch us well 
along the road to discovering some incisive policy insights in relation to the 
problems posed by continued forest decline in Europe. After all, one of the 
highest objectives of the policy exercise in theory is to learn policy lessons that 
would probably not be learned through conventional means [...] However, our 
initial reactions to the substantive outcomes of the workshops were that there 
was ‘nothing new under the sun’, that we had seen before all the policy 
messages and perspectives tabled at the workshops.’ 
Parson (1995, p. 18) reports a similar experience: ‘Although one objective of the 
exercise was to support the generation of novel policy ideas, few of significant 
novelty were brought forward.’ And Joldersma (2000, 83) notes in an ex post 
evaluation of an intervention on health care in the Netherlands that ‘no new policy 
alternatives were created’.  
Producing ´new´ knowledge is a rather demanding yardstick for any one-off 
interactive appraisal. In fact, the very nature of policy games might potentially 
constrain thinking ‘out of the box’ and developing truly innovative policy options. In 
view of the structured character of these interventions, one should moreover not 
underestimate the role that the mental models of the game designers may play in 
shaping their outcomes as well as what participants take away from them. And 
whereas policy exercises are generally less structured than other types of policy 
games (as they do not involve a predetermined reward or pay-off structure for 
participants’ actions, see Chapter 2), the scenario, role descriptions and other 
background materials (as in our case the policy element cards) nonetheless frame 
and bound the ‘possibility space’ for decision-making. In general, participants are 
invited to contest and critique the assumptions made, which in itself implies 
considerable potential for learning both among participants and organisers. Yet the 
basic approach still involves a significant ‘pre-structuring’ of the topic being simulated 
by the organisers. We found traces of this when analysing the concept maps that 
participants drew up prior to and following the exercise runs (see Chapter 5). On the 
one hand, it is only natural and desirable that aspects that stood central in the 
deliberations during the exercise gained prominence on the post-maps. On the other 
hand, the extent to which this happened does make us wonder whether there is not 
a tension between this kind of set-up and the proclaimed goal of creativity and 
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innovativeness. Ultimately, it may do more justice to the potential of the method if 
one were to view the outputs from policy games and exercises less as an end in 
themselves than as one step in a longer appraisal process (discussed in the literature 
as 'design in the small' - i.e. the individual game - vs. 'design in the large' - i.e. the 
overall learning or change process, cf. Klabbers, 2009). This is also what Duinker et al. 
(1993, 19) conclude:  
‘ […] perhaps such workshops are not to be expected to generate the policy 
lessons themselves, but rather are to provide the raw materials […] upon which 
a more firm policy analysis can be based. We see this as being more realistic in 
terms of expectations of what can be accomplished in meetings of this kind [...]’  
After these somewhat sobering conclusions, what factors might increase the learning 
potential of policy exercises for policy development? A couple of aspects come to 
mind here. First, as mentioned above, a longer duration of the exercises may allow 
for more in-depth reflection and for iterative experimentation with different policy 
options and framing conditions. Connected to this, there is much to be said for a 
collaborative game design process that involves key stakeholders from the beginning. 
Such an approach strengthens their commitment to the project and helps ensure that 
the game design is adequately approximates reality. Moreover, the design phase 
itself can serve as a powerful learning experience. Mendler de Suarez et al. (2012, 38) 
refer to it as ‘co-design as a bridging process’, where stakeholders learn about each 
other’s mental models as they collaboratively identify game elements and 
mechanisms that approximate the key dynamics of the real-world system they are 
operating in. Last but not least, and at the risk of stating the obvious, the right set of 
participants is key to generating both plausible and innovative outcomes from the 
exercise (see Chapter 3; cf. Cuppen, 2009). It has been our experience that it is 
possible to convince senior, well-connected experts from the research and think tank 
worlds to take part in such a workshop. Yet we, like others, have found it much more 
difficult to persuade policy-makers to make space for travel and a full-day event in 
their busy agendas, especially if its direct usefulness for their day-to-day tasks is not 
immediately obvious (see Chapter 4; Zhou, 2014; Bachofen et al., 2013). Ultimately, 
all three suggestions above require a high level of convening power and sufficient 
resources from the organisers of such events. This further raises the threshold for 
using an already relatively time- and resource-intensive method. If these conditions 
are met, however, the attendant learning effects may well justify the effort.  
Finally, some words on the value of the policy exercises for our second participant 
group, the Master’s students in Environment and Resource Management. Our 
measurements yielded substantial amounts of cognitive, self-reported normative, 
and relational learning for this group, thus underscoring the benefits of policy games 
as a particularly active form of student learning. Our own observations equally 
confirmed their potential in an educational context that is frequently emphasised in 
the literature (e.g. Harteveld, 2012). The exercises stimulated a high degree of 
Conclusions 
 
166 
 
involvement among the students, all the while leaving them in control and letting 
them experience the consequences of their actions first-hand. Knowledge about 
complex subjects was assimilated quickly (cognitive learning), yet there was sufficient 
room for the exercises to reveal student misconceptions, thus giving rise to 
normative learning. Perhaps most significant, however, were the insights students 
gained about the dynamics of the policy process, an eye-opener for those who had 
not been confronted with policy-making before.  
8.3 Cognitive, normative and relational learning revisited  
Apart from examining the potential of policy games and exercises for climate policy 
appraisal, a second key goal of this thesis was to make much-needed headway in 
measuring learning in an appraisal context, both in theoretical and in methodological 
terms. In Chapter 2, we explored various facets of learning processes and outcomes 
as they are described in the policy sciences and environmental studies literature. We 
derived three types of learning – cognitive, normative and relational –, which in our 
view capture key dimensions of learning in an appraisal context and which lend 
themselves to systematically assessing learning across different cases and social units 
of analysis. The first two types – cognitive and normative learning – feature 
prominently in the policy learning literature. The last one, relational learning, reflects 
the emphasis on interpersonal, social aspects of learning which transpires from 
research on learning in natural resource management, with its focus on small groups 
of actors that become familiar with one another and that (begin to) collaborate. Our 
reasons for diverging from dominant conceptualisations of learning in an 
environmental governance context were twofold. First, we wanted to steer clear of a 
‘levelled’ understanding of learning, preferring to treat the different types of learning 
side-by-side in a non-hierarchical manner. The often visible preference for learning 
that involves ‘deeper’, normative change in the existing literature seemed 
questionable to us. Therefore, we thought it both more appropriate and more 
systematic from an empirical viewpoint to analyse learning effects in terms of their 
nature (cognitive, normative, or relational) rather than their perceived value. 
Secondly, by separating out relational learning, we aimed at emphasising an aspect 
that in our view is key in the context of interactive appraisals, yet that is often treated 
only implicitly in other typologies.  
Having applied this conceptualisation for measuring learning across the four policy 
exercise runs, we have found it to be very workable. It was well suited to 
operationalisation through the set of instruments that we introduced in Chapter 3 
and that we will briefly return to below. The typology lends itself to cross-case 
comparison, also when involving different evaluation teams. Distinguishing 
phenomena along the cognitive-normative-relational axis is intuitive. Moreover, the 
lack of a hierarchy between different levels of learning may reduce evaluator bias as 
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there is no pressure to detect ‘higher order’ effects, which may not be forthcoming, 
especially if the appraisal process is rather short. This typology has by now been 
applied several times already. Huitema et al. (2010) used it to analyse learning effects 
from a set of citizens’ juries on water management in the Dutch part of the Rhine 
basin. Based on pre- and post-surveys, concept maps and interviews, they found 
substantial effects for all three types of learning among the members of the citizens’ 
juries, but much less for the policy-makers who had commissioned them. Munaretto 
and Huitema (2012) applied the typology to examine water and environmental 
governance processes in the Venice lagoon. Relying on interviews, participatory 
observation and archive data, they reported that learning among stakeholders in the 
Venice lagoon was largely limited to cognitive learning within the established 
management practices, with normative and relational learning being an exception 
rather than the rule. Finally, Baird et al. (2014) investigated stakeholder learning from 
an adaptive co-management process on climate change adaptation in Ontario, 
Canada. Using concept maps, social network analysis and self-reported measures, 
they found robust evidence for cognitive and relational learning as a result of the 
process, with normative learning outcomes being more ambiguous. These rather 
diverse applications of our conceptualisation illustrate its usefulness across a range of 
contexts. Moreover, their results largely dovetail with the findings reported in this 
thesis insofar as the evidence for learning was stronger when it came to cognitive 
learning effects as opposed to relational and especially normative learning effects, 
and that this evidence was stronger for less expert participants.  
As with other classifications and typologies, there is the inevitable question of the 
interdependence between the different dimensions or categories. The three types of 
learning that we identify are certainly interrelated. Yet they nonetheless display 
specific, distinct characteristics which can and should be assessed separately if one is 
to come to a more sophisticated understanding of the benefits of interactive policy 
appraisals. For instance, whereas a higher degree of normative learning may indeed 
stimulate a greater desire and/or ability for cognitive learning or vice versa, neither is 
a necessary precondition for the other. In other words, it is possible to absorb new 
facts without changing one's view on the subject at hand. At the same time, 
deliberation and persuasion may lead a participant to re-evaluate known arguments 
and thus change his or her viewpoint without having increased his or her knowledge 
base. While it seems intuitive to assume that cognitive, normative and relational 
learning can in principle reinforce one another, trade-offs between the different 
types seem equally imaginable. Levy (1994), for instance, posits that a high degree of 
cognitive complexity may in some cases impede normative learning. This is because 
more complex, and consequently less falsifiable cognitive structures may ‘make it 
easier for actors to assimilate inconsistent information into their existing belief 
structures as exceptions and special cases’ instead of revising their viewpoint (ibid, 
295).  
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Our evaluation framework had not been designed so as to tease out the 
interrelationship between the three basic types of learning that we identified. Instead, 
we had been primarily interested in assessing the occurrence or otherwise of the 
different types of learning under varying circumstances. This was primarily due to the 
state of the literature, where systematic assessments across learning types had thus 
far been lacking. When examining the learning effects found in this thesis from the 
angle of interactions between the different learning types, the results are 
inconclusive. On the one hand, the fact that normative learning was more limited 
among the expert groups seems to support Levy’s intuition reported above that 
‘increases in cognitive complexity may be a way of avoiding belief change rather than 
facilitating it’ (ibid). The same is true for the finding that normative learning was 
more pronounced for the less mature policy field. On the other hand, the general 
correlation between the different types of learning, especially among the student 
groups, seems to indicate that the different types of learning do indeed reinforce one 
another. As a consequence, we may speculate that the relationship is non-linear, 
decreasing with the degree of expertise. There is consequently an interesting 
research agenda in seeking to tease out this relationship, e.g. by conducting 
consecutive exercise runs with students and studying how increasing expertise 
impacts on degrees of normative learning. In order to assess the relationship across 
the entire range of expertise however, similar consecutive exercises would have to be 
conducted with experts as well because there may be one or more points of 
inflection.  
8.4 Measuring learning in appraisals – pitfalls and promises 
After these considerations on our theoretical framework, we now move to our 
measurements on learning and the instruments we used to that effect. In order to 
adequately capture the effects from the policy exercises, we designed a 
comprehensive evaluation framework that relied on a range of mutually independent 
measures of observation. It combined recorded and self-reported, qualitative and 
quantitative data sources, and measurements were taken at multiple points in time. 
We are aware of few evaluation efforts of deliberative appraisals reported in the 
literature that use a similarly broad array of instruments, especially including pre- and 
post-comparisons (for exceptions, see e.g. Baird et al., 2014; Huitema et al., 2010). 
We hoped that this approach would allow us to capture different aspects of 
participants’ learning and to compare certain findings across data sources. Reflecting 
on our experience, we conclude that the framework we used has met these 
expectations, despite some challenges that we encountered and that we will discuss 
in more detail below. A more recent effort by Baird et al. (2014) builds on its 
elements, expanding the toolbox with social network analysis, yet placing less 
emphasis on qualitative data.  
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The use of concept maps for assessing conceptual change as well as changes in 
knowledge structure arguably represents the most important innovation in our 
evaluation framework. Pre- and post-concept maps and the associated analytical 
methods for dissecting them, while well known in education research, prove a 
promising new addition to the evaluative apparatus in interactive appraisal contexts. 
Tracing how the positioning of concept categories on participants´ maps shifted from 
pre- to post-measurement enabled valuable insights into the changes in knowledge 
structure as a consequence of participating in the policy exercise. This usefully 
complemented the self-reported data on key insights gained from the workshops. 
Pre-post comparison of other metrics, like the number of items and levels per map 
and especially changes in response types (lists, labels, explications) shed additional 
light on the question whether the observed shifts were also accompanied by an 
actual improvement of participants’ mental maps of the issue area as reflected in the 
concept maps.  
Although our measuring framework advances on the state of the literature, there are 
at least two avenues by which future research could further improve it. First, coding 
and subsequent data preparation for analysis are both time-consuming and 
potentially error-prone. Therefore, future efforts using this kind of data might focus 
on ways to computerise and/or digitalise parts of the process (see e.g. Cline et al., 
2010), although manual coding will likely still be required at least to some extent. 
Second, in this research, we used the concept maps purely for assessing cognitive 
learning. In the future, it might be worthwhile to explore to what extent the first type 
of analysis (tracing concept centrality and specificity) might also allow for inferences 
about normative change. Conceivably, greater centrality of certain concepts and 
higher levels of elaboration might also indicate changing normative priorities.  
A second key instrument in our evaluation framework was the pre- and post-surveys 
completed by participants that we used to gather data on both recorded (normative) 
and self-reported learning. Pre-test-post-test measures that seek to detect shifts in 
knowledge and/or viewpoints by asking participants to respond to a set of closed 
statements before and after an intervention are commonly employed in evaluation 
research, but less often in environmental appraisals (for exceptions, see e.g. Deyle & 
Schively Slotterback, 2009; Garmendia & Stagl, 2010; Huitema et al., 2010; Schively, 
2007). While they are attractive from a research design perspective due to their 
quasi-experimental character, their implementation in a context like ours is not 
without challenges. Pre-post measures aimed at tracing increases in participants’ 
knowledge (which would amount to recorded cognitive learning) are, given their 
quiz-like nature, hardly appropriate for expert participants. For this reason, we did 
not include them in our measurements. At the same time, formulating propositions 
ex ante that capture the essence of what might be learned in normative terms during 
a deliberative appraisal is notoriously difficult (Deyle & Schively Slotterback, 2009; 
Garmendia & Stagl, 2010). If evaluators wrongly anticipate the core questions around 
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which normative learning among participants revolves during the appraisal, they risk 
missing important learning effects. This underscores the value of triangulating such 
recorded pre-test-post-test data with other, self-reported sources that allow 
participants to share their own reflections on the process. Yet as Patton (1990, 467) 
points out, ‘triangulation of data sources will seldom lead to a single, totally 
consistent picture’, but may instead shed light on different aspects of the same 
phenomenon.  
On the whole, we have made good experiences combining recorded data (concept 
maps for cognitive learning, pre- and post-survey statements for normative learning, 
as well as observations and the recordings of the exercise proceedings) and self-
reported data (from surveys and post-interviews). Recorded data pointed to patterns 
that participants may not necessarily have been conscious of themselves, and which 
self-reported, qualitative data could sometimes help to explain, providing a level of 
reflection not commonly found in the former. Future research may look into devising 
similarly complementary recorded measures for assessing relational learning – social 
network analysis is one, but certainly not the only tool that comes to mind here. In 
conclusion, we agree with Blackstock et al. (2007) that future evaluation efforts in 
this field need to move from the purely anecdotal and qualitative that dominates this 
literature towards more systematic, ideally multiple-case assessments. And yet there 
remains an important role also for qualitative methods. Learning from appraisals is a 
process that is likely too complex and multifaceted to be satisfactorily captured by 
purely quantitative indicators.  
This brings us to a broader point. As we discussed above, especially for the expert 
groups, the learning effects from the policy exercises that we measured were, while 
not insignificant, on the whole rather modest, certainly compared to some of the 
claims voiced in the early literature on policy exercises. We find the same pattern 
also with regard to other deliberative appraisals. Their alleged benefits are 
extensively covered in more theoretical work, and confirmed to some extent in 
analyses relying primarily on qualitative, anecdotal information. Yet in the few cases 
where attempts are made to assess outcomes more systematically, and where these 
also include longitudinal (pre-post) measurements, the record is often more mixed 
(see Chapter 3). Above we touched upon some of the reasons why more systematic 
measurements may not pick up on learning that occurred during the appraisal. This 
may be related to the difficulty of posing the right questions ex ante, the hesitation of 
knowledgeable participants to admit to having learned or having changed viewpoints 
during the appraisal, or the fact that some effects may only be realised at a later 
stage.  
On the other hand, it is also possible that the link between deliberative appraisals 
and learning is more tenuous than is often assumed. As Garmendia and Stagl (2010, 
1718) conclude based on their attempt to measure learning from three participatory 
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processes in natural resource management in Europe, ‘we find that social learning 
does happen in participatory workshops, but … to a lesser extent than expected.’ 
Their hypotheses for expected learning outcomes had included problem reframing, 
better understanding of others’ perceptions and needs, enhanced capacity to deal 
with the complexities and uncertainties inherent in environmental change, also with 
a view to taking joint action – a fairly typical list for the public participation literature. 
It is still early days for such conclusions to be drawn at a general level, yet it is clear 
that more research, relying on robust evaluation efforts, is needed to examine to 
what extent the outcomes of deliberative appraisals in environmental governance 
justify the time and effort spent on them and what other intervening variables (type 
of participants, workshop design, timeframe; cf. Cuppen, 2009; Garmendia and Stagl, 
2010) co-determine their impacts. In particular, more longitudinal, multiple-case 
assessments would go some way towards addressing these issues, by shedding light 
on potential longer-term effects and identifying key drivers and obstacles to success 
and failure.  
As our experience as well as that of others shows, the challenges to a more 
systematic evaluation of learning effects from deliberative appraisals are not 
insignificant. Longitudinal assessments, for one, face the difficulty of separating the 
actual impact of the appraisal process from the ‘noise’ of other encounters and 
experiences that participants have gone through in the meantime, thereby reducing 
their potential usefulness especially for short interventions. Moreover, many 
appraisals involve only a relatively small number of participants. This limits the 
potential for quantitative data analysis. Appraisal processes often require a lot from 
their participants in terms of time, commitment and active input. It is therefore only 
natural that elaborate evaluation efforts risk being perceived as cumbersome 
additional burdens and possibly being avoided as such. This risk is perhaps even 
greater for pre-post measures that may seem repetitive and all-too academic to 
participants. Carefully building evaluation elements into the appraisal process rather 
than presenting them as an addition to it may provide a possible remedy here. Yet 
despite all difficulties, putting more effort into systematically measuring learning 
outcomes from interactive appraisals is indispensable if the field is to mature beyond 
the theoretical discussions, case studies and typologies that dominate the literature 
to date.  
8.5 Towards a research agenda 
The preceding sections set out various aspects of a research agenda resulting from 
this thesis in greater detail, in the context of our discussion of the respective findings. 
At this point, suffice it to summarise three key issues. First, there is still considerable 
scope in refining methods of measuring learning. While this thesis broke new ground 
in terms of its efforts to measure learning systematically, its success in demonstrating 
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that normative learning in particular took place was limited. Here, new proxies for 
such learning and methods for measuring it are called for, perhaps linked to the 
analysis of concept maps. It is, however, also conceivable that normative learning as 
a concept may have less traction than anticipated, at least when it comes to policy 
appraisals among experts. Were such a finding to harden in the light of further efforts 
to substantiate instances of normative learning in policy appraisals, this would have 
considerable consequences for our assumptions about appraisals and negotiations 
not just in the climate policy domain but beyond, with respect to policy-making and 
international relations (theory) in general.  
Improving the measurement of learning is closely related to the second item on the 
research agenda: a better understanding of how the different facets of learning 
empirically relate to each other. In order to design better targeted interventions, we 
need to understand the conditions under which different learning types reinforce or 
compete with each other. Ideally, this would build on progress in the realm of 
measurement, but in reality pursuing these two objectives will likely be 
interdependent, with progress in one area enabling advances in the other.  
The first two items on the research agenda refer to challenges that are likely 
amenable to incremental progress because both rely on tweaking established 
instruments and procedures. The last item is different insofar as there are no proven 
success stories yet. When it comes to unleashing the supposed creative potential of 
policy exercises for identifying new policy pathways, we need a more fundamental 
game changer. Can policy exercises really live up to their most important function, 
and if so, under what circumstances? In many ways this represents the ‘holy grail’ of 
the profession, the aspect that is simultaneously most important and least advanced. 
Given this status, it is perhaps not surprising that this thesis cannot claim to have 
made a breakthrough on this front. Yet the fact that it represents the most rigorous, 
systematic evaluation of policy exercises to date suggests that the onus now lies with 
proponents of the method to prove said benefits. We hope in any case that our work 
on the theoretical and empirical challenges and opportunities for learning will in 
various ways make a contribution to progress in environmental governance. 
After these reflections on the theoretical and methodological contributions of the 
thesis and the resulting research agenda, we will return to the subject matter that 
our policy exercises addressed in the following final section: international policy 
efforts in the fight against climate change, and how they changed since work on this 
thesis started.  
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8.6 The changing nature of international climate governance 
Our objective with this thesis was to contribute to a better understanding of the 
value of policy exercises for climate policy appraisal. The two policy exercises that we 
used to investigate this question focused on topical issues for the medium-term 
future of European and international climate policy. The first examined the dilemma 
of how to distribute emission reduction commitments among EU member states, an 
exercise known as burden-sharing. The second focused on design options for a global 
fund to compensate developing countries for reducing their emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD). Both are subjects that are inherently 
distributive in character (see Chapter 3); both also emanate from the assumption of 
the continuation of a centralised, top-down policy architecture, be it at the 
international (in the case of REDD) or at the EU level (for burden-sharing).  
Yet looking at recent developments, the landscape of climate policy appears to be 
evolving into a different direction, globally, but possibly also within Europe. Recent 
UN climate conferences have partly healed the wounds the ‘trauma’ of the 
Copenhagen summit (Haug & Berkhout, 2010) had inflicted on the multilateral 
negotiation process. The international community has embarked on a ‘road to Paris’ 
where a new, post-2020 climate agreement is to be negotiated at the end of 2015 
(Grubb, 2013; Rajamani, 2012). Yet agreement on key aspects such as emission 
reduction commitments and finance in a future global climate accord remains elusive 
at this point in time. While it is likely that the UNFCCC will remain a key forum for 
climate change issues, future climate action looks set to be dominated by a pluralist, 
bottom-up patchwork of public, transnational and private efforts, initiatives, and 
actor coalitions at multiple levels (Stavins et al., 2014; van Asselt & Zelli, 2013). This 
would also have implications for the further development of REDD. There have been 
some advances on this issue at the 2013 COP in Warsaw, endorsing a fund-based 
rather than a market-based architecture for REDD (UNFCCC, 2013). Yet the question 
of financing sources for REDD remains unresolved and REDD remains but one ‘piece 
in the puzzle’ in the struggle to reach a comprehensive agreement. It is therefore 
likely that progress on the issue will mostly ‘occur through complex fragmented 
pathways of international assistance, bilateral and multilateral agreements, and civil 
society and market-based processes’ (Agrawal et al., 2011, 374) rather than a top-
down process. In the meantime, while the provision of the sustainable long-term 
financing needed for REDD is certainly less secure without a global framework, REDD 
has started to transform the thinking of many developing country governments about 
forest issues and produced first impacts on the ground (Haug & Gupta, 2013; 
Sunderlin & Atmadja, 2009). Many of the aspects raised during our policy exercise, 
such as the verification of emission reductions from deforestation, remain relevant 
for performance-based REDD payments also in smaller-n or bilateral constellations, 
such as the carbon funds run by international development banks or donors 
governments. 
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European climate policy is equally confronted with new challenges. Over the past two 
decades, climate change has become an increasingly high-profile issue in the EU and 
has given rise to an impressive level of policy activity (Haug et al., 2010; Huitema et 
al., 2011; Jordan et al., 2012). The adoption of the 20-20-20 by 2020 targets and the 
comprehensive Climate and Energy Package in 2008 probably constituted the high 
point in EU climate policy-making to date (Jordan et al., 2012; Oberthür & 
Pallemaerts, 2010). Since then, the economic downturn and particularly the debt 
crisis in the Southern member states have pushed climate change more to the 
background of the EU agenda, severely reducing prospects for ambitious policy 
outputs in the short to medium term. The draft ‘2030 framework for climate and 
energy policies’ for the post-2020 period released by the European Commission in 
January 2014 (European Commission, 2014) is a testament to this diminished 
ambition. However, despite this changed outlook, the Commission’s proposal 
foresees that the fundamental tenets of EU climate policy be retained also over the 
next decade, including the distribution of mitigation commitments across Member 
States in the ‘effort-sharing domain’. This once more underscores how deeply the 
notion of burden-sharing is engrained in the way climate policy is made in the EU. 
Jordan et al. (2012, 263) call the fact that ‘policy harmonisation’ in the EU – the 
adoption of collective policies and targets – has often only become possible through 
differentiated implementation one of the foundational paradoxes in EU climate policy. 
Finally, there is another shift that has been shaping the climate policy landscape in 
recent years. With the failure to reverse global trends in greenhouse gas emissions, it 
is increasingly apparent that some degree of warming as well as other climate 
impacts will be inevitable, requiring adaptive actions at different levels and by 
different actor groups (Adger et al., 2005). While policy development for climate 
change adaptation is still at an early stage in many countries (Massey et al., 2014), it 
is clear that interventions for adaptation will differ fundamentally from those in 
mitigation. The need for deliberative policy appraisal for adaptation is even more 
pronounced, given the unstructured character of adaptation problems, the many 
uncertainties surrounding climate impacts and agents´ capacity to respond, and the 
often localised nature of solutions, where one-size-fits-all approaches will often fail. 
Not without reason, the literatures on adaptive governance and adaptive co-
management emphasise notions such as participation, learning and experimentation 
as key means for governing socio-ecological systems in times of environmental 
change (Armitage et al., 2007; Armitage et al., 2008; Folke et al., 2005).  
In conclusion, climate governance is undergoing a transformation in several respects. 
Consequently, the need for interactive appraisal methods that allow for dealing with 
the complexity of the issues at stake, while fostering an effective exchange of 
information and ideas among experts and stakeholders, is probably greater than ever. 
The results of this research indicate that policy exercises and policy games, while 
perhaps not the panacea they were described as in the early literature, can be helpful 
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in this regard. Yet for this field to realise its promise, the next stage of research on 
participatory policy appraisal needs to go beyond an uncritical application of certain 
methods and take a harder, more systematic and hypothesis-driven look at their 
respective outcomes, costs and benefits, be it in terms of learning or otherwise. Only 
then will this literature be able to retain its credibility also in the longer term.  
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Annex 1 – Policy exercise materials and 
evaluation instruments 
Annex 1.A Sample interview guide for ex-post interviews (here for burden-
sharing policy exercise with experts) 
1. What did you like about the design of the policy exercise? 
2. And what should have been different? 
3. Do you think the time limit made the exercise more realistic? 
4. At a more general level, what do you see as the key advantages of the policy 
exercise method? And the key drawbacks? 
5. Did you find the policy exercise method a useful way of thinking about the more 
distant future? 
6. If so, in which way was your thinking stimulated? How could it have been 
stimulated even more? 
7. Did the ADAM policy exercise generate innovative ideas or options? 
8. In how far did you feel that the policy exercise was different from other 
international workshops that you have attended? 
9. In how far did the policy exercise format influence the way of interacting among 
participants? 
10. In the exercise, you were asked to play a role. Is this the role you normally 
operate from?  
11. If not, to which extent has playing the role furthered your insight in the way the 
actors in that role operate in reality? 
12. If we were to organise another policy exercise, what advice would you give us? 
What should we do in the same way, what should we do differently?  
Annex 1.B Guiding questions for debriefing session (here for REDD policy 
exercise with experts) 
I. The substance of the exercise 
- Outside of the heat of the moment, do the outputs of the policy exercise seem 
convincing? Why or why not? What conditions would make it so or not?  
- Our starting point was a rather benign global climate policy scenario – a 
continuation of the global climate regime post-2012. However, would any of 
this be feasible under a more fragmented approach? 
- What would you most have needed to know to make a decision or choice? 
- What are the research implications/knowledge needs flowing from this exercise?  
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II. Experience of the policy exercise 
- How was it for you? Was it a day (and effort) worthwhile spent? 
- To what extent did you find the atmosphere and the interaction with 
participants different from a ‘normal’ workshop format?  
- What are you taking home from this day?  
 
III. Critique of approach and design of the exercise  
- If we were to organise another policy exercise, what advice would you give us? 
- Scenarios 
- Teams and representation: 
o Implications of few teams; 
o Implications of no internal structure; alternatives? 
- Procedures: 
o Was this most useful/important way to present the tasks? 
o What would be salient alternatives? 
Annex 1.C Participant lists for expert runs of the policy exercises 
Policy exercise on EU burden-sharing 
Ian Bailey  University of Plymouth 
Markus Brede  CSIRO 
Dagnija Blumberga Institute of Energy Systems and Environment  
Javier de Cendra  Maastricht University 
Bert de Vries  Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) 
Dana Dvorakova  CEZ Group 
David Ellison  Institute for World Economics 
Angela Falconer  AEA Technologies 
Roger Hildingsson University of Lund, Sweden 
Andy Kerr  E3 International 
Kai Kühnhenn  Federal Environment Agency 
Sigurd Naess-Schmidt Copenhagen Economics 
Eva Lövbrand  University of Lund, Sweden 
Bert Metz  Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) 
Till Neeff  Ecosecurities 
Joop Oude Lohuis Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) 
Tim Rayner  University of East Anglia 
Jürgen Salay  European Commission, DG Environment 
Jos Sijm   Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands 
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Johannes Stripple University of Lund, Sweden 
Louis van Schaik  Clingendael Institute 
Timme van Melle  Vu University Amsterdam 
 
Policy exercise on REDD 
Juan Pablo Castro Climate Focus 
Ernestine Meijer  Climate Focus 
Maria Nijnik  Macaulay Land Use Research Institute 
Benoit Morel  Carnegie Mellon University 
Alexandra Morel   Columbia University 
Innocent Bakam  Macaulay Land Use Research Instititute 
Herry Purnomo  Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) 
Cordula Epple  UNEP-World Conservation Monitoring Centre 
Jan Fehse  Ecosecurities/Value for Nature Consulting 
Harro van Asselt  University of Oxford 
Onno Kuik  VU University Amsterdam 
George Dyer  Macaulay Institute for Land Use Research 
Stefanie von Scheliha Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 
Herman Savenije  Tropenbos International 
Deepak Rughani  Biofuelwatch 
Angelica Mendoza Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) 
Harko Koster  WWF Netherlands 
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Annex 1.D Scenarios, policy exercise on burden-sharing 
 
Burden-sharing exercise, Scenario 1: “From Kyoto to Kingston” 
 
We are in the year 2018. Scientific evidence for climate change has increased 
significantly; severe climate impacts are already felt, in Europe and beyond. The post-
2012 Kingston Protocol has gathered a large degree of support, but compliance so far 
has been variable. The US, the new green climate policy leader and the BRIC countries 
have embarked on an ambitious mitigation path. The EU, however, is coming to the 
realisation that its 2009 climate package is a failure. Effort-sharing in particular has 
turned largely ineffective and controversial among member states. New impetus is 
urgently needed for EU climate policy if the Union is to leave its imprint on the yet-to-
be-agreed post-2020 climate agreement…  
 
The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report narrowed down uncertainty margins on a number of 
issues. On the impact side, agriculture and tourism in Southern Europe suffered due to 
extensive heat waves and droughts, while recurrent flooding along the Rhine and in the 
Tisza basin testifies to the vulnerability of Central and Eastern Europe to climate change.  
The “Kingston Protocol” was finally agreed in Jamaica in 2010, after the Copenhagen 
summit ended in stalemate, and has meanwhile been ratified by 183 countries. The 
agreement endorsed a second commitment period (2013-2020) to the Kyoto Protocol, 
with absolute reduction targets for all industrialised countries. No binding targets were 
set for non-Annex-I/B countries. Instead, they subscribed to voluntary commitments to 
reduce emissions through Sustainable Development Policies and Measures (SD-PAMs). 
Market mechanisms moved centre stage in Kingston, with sectoral baselines and credits 
from avoided deforestation both included in the agreement.  
As to mitigation progress among the world’s largest emitters, the unexpected rising star 
at the climate policy horizon is the US, where President Obama and his successor have 
sparked a technology revolution, with large-scale uptake of clean coal, nuclear energy 
and carbon capture and storage resulting in a sharp downturn in emissions. Its Kingston 
target is in close reach, whereas the performance of Canada, Australia and the EU is far 
less glorious. The BRIC countries, however, have taken advantage of the opportunities 
provided by the Kingston Protocol, and have succeeded to slow down their emissions 
growth. As China and Brazil are quickly approaching the ‘graduation threshold’ endorsed 
in the Jamaica accord, it seems likely that they will have to commit to binding emission 
limitation targets under a post-2020 agreement.  
The EU has a tumultuous decade behind it. The European economy has started to grow 
again since 2014. The piecemeal integration of the provisions of the failed Lisbon Treaty 
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into European law has laid the ground for governing the EU after the 2015/2017 Balkan 
enlargements. Yet large disparities in wealth and political priorities complicate EU-
internal decision-making. Furthermore, there is a clear feeling that the EU’s 2009 climate 
package as a whole is unlikely to deliver on its promises. If the EU is to reach its 30% 
Kingston target, it will be largely due to external carbon credits. One seemingly 
innocuous provision in the revised EU ETS directive, the admission of domestic offsets, 
has severely compromised the functioning of the trading scheme and has blurred the 
boundaries with the effort-sharing domain (as emission reductions in non-ETS sectors 
were as a consequence double-counted under the ETS). Furthermore, allowances 
auctioned under the ETS have to a large extent been bought up by big multi-national 
companies, hurting smaller and less profitable industries, especially in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  
While major revisions of other EU climate policies are also pending, this time the EU 
Commission first wants to get it right in the effort-sharing domain, which has proven the 
least successful and most controversial part of the package. Very few countries, except 
for the Nordics, the UK, and the Baltic states, are on track to meeting their effort-sharing 
targets. The challenge to design national policies that effectively contribute to structural 
changes in the building and transport sectors is unresolved in many member states. In 
2016, a group of countries, including Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary 
had a major fall-out with the European Commission, after the latter’s decision to initiate 
infringement procedures for failure to comply with the 2015 and 2016 interim targets 
following two particularly harsh winters in Central Europe. Although the European 
Commission ultimately backed down, this incident severely damaged the relation 
between Brussels and the CEE capitals.  
All this hurts the EU, the former global climate policy leader, which looks set to loose this 
image to the new green superpower US. If the EU wants have an impact on the 
upcoming post-2020 negotiations, it needs to act quickly to demonstrate to the world 
that it recognises the implementation failures of the past and is ready to adopt robust 
policies that will deliver the projected emission reductions with a high degree of 
certainty. 
 
Burden-sharing exercise, Scenario 2: “Coat with many colours”  
 
We are in the year 2018. Scientific evidence for climate change has increased 
significantly; severe climate impacts are already felt, in Europe and beyond. After the 
failed ratification of the Copenhagen Protocol, the UNFCCC has transformed into a 
global climate policy clearing house. In parallel, a multitude of climate initiatives and 
partnerships led by the new green superpower, the US, have successfully spurred 
Annex 
 
181 
 
mitigation efforts, also in China, Brazil and India. The EU, however, has come to the 
realisation that its 2008 climate package, despite the relative success of the EU ETS, has 
failed on the whole. Effort-sharing in particular has proved to be largely ineffective and 
controversial among member states. New impetus is urgently needed if the Union is to 
restore its tainted image as a global climate policy leader… 
 
The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report narrowed down uncertainty margins on a number of 
issues. On the impact side, agriculture and tourism in Southern Europe suffered due to 
extensive heat waves and droughts, while recurrent flooding along the Rhine and in the 
Tisza basin testifies to the vulnerability of Central and Eastern Europe to climate change.  
Under heavy pressure from the EU, the Cancun Protocol was concluded in 2010. Yet 
when the adoption of the 2012 Cornyn Act by the US Congress closed the door to US 
ratification, Canada, Japan, Australia, and the BASIC countries, feeling they had 
overcommitted in the first place, were quick to follow. After trying to resuscitate the 
agreement for a while, the EU accepted the transformation of the UNFCCC into a sort of 
clearing-house, where countries convene to take stock of ongoing efforts and to share 
best practices.  
Outside of the UNFCCC, a myriad of climate initiatives and low-carbon technology 
cooperation projects have sprung up. The first were spurred by the EU, which concluded 
a series of bilateral partnerships with developing countries to secure carbon credit 
supply. Even more important are the initiatives led by the US, where President Obama 
and his successor sparked a technology revolution, with large-scale uptake of clean coal 
(including CCS) and nuclear energy resulting in a sharp downturn in emissions. 
Developing countries, especially China, India and Brazil, have benefited from 
international technology cooperation and strengthened their domestic climate policies. 
Their emission growth has slowed down in recent years, leaving the EU in an unexpected 
laggard position. 
The EU has a tumultuous decade behind it. After the financial crisis at the end of the last 
decade, the European economy has started to grow again since 2014. The piecemeal 
integration of the provisions of the failed Lisbon Treaty into European law has laid the 
ground for governing the EU after the 2015/2017 Balkan enlargements. Yet large 
disparities in wealth and political priorities complicate EU-internal decision-making. 
There is a clear feeling that the EU’s 2009 climate package as a whole is unlikely to 
deliver on its promises. If the EU is to reach its unilateral 20%-by-2020 target, it will be 
largely due to external carbon credits. The only bright spot is the EU ETS. The third and 
fourth phase auctioning of allowances has created a sufficiently high carbon price (partly 
mitigated by external credits), which has started to pay off by transforming key industrial 
sectors. Liquidity of the system has improved after linking to trading schemes in Australia, 
Japan and New Zealand and, finally, the US. In relation to other markets, border tax 
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adjustments have been introduced to address carbon leakage concerns and to safeguard 
European industries against competitiveness losses. 
While major revisions of other EU climate policies are also pending, this time the EU 
Commission first wants to get it right in the effort-sharing domain. Very few countries, 
namely the Nordics, the UK, and the Baltic states, are on track to meet their effort-
sharing targets. The challenge to design national policies that effectively contribute to 
structural changes in the building and transport sectors is unresolved in many member 
states. In 2016, a group of member states, including Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Hungary had a major fall-out with the European Commission, after the latter’s 
decision to initiate infringement procedures for failure to comply with the 2015 and 2016 
interim targets following two particularly harsh winters in Central Europe. Although the 
European Commission ultimately backed down, this incident severely harms the relation 
between Brussels and the CEE capitals.  
All this damages the EU, the former global climate policy leader, which looks set to lose 
this image to the new green superpower US. If the EU wants to restore its climate policy 
reputation, one of the few areas where it can still engender the population’s enthusiasm, 
it needs to act quickly to demonstrate to the world that it recognises the mistakes of the 
past and is ready to adopt robust policies that will deliver the projected emission 
reductions with a high degree of certainty. 
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Annex 1.E Role descriptions, policy exercise on burden-sharing 
 
Germany in 2018 
 
Facts & Figures (year 2016) 
 
  Relative position 
in EU-33 
National emission trend (ETS/non-ETS) compared to 
2005 
-8%   
National emissions in million tCO2 924 1
st
  
Emission trend in non-ETS sectors, compared to 2005 
(excluding use of carbon credits) 
Target: -14% 
Actual: -6% 
 
featurePer capita emissions in tCO2/person 11,2  4
th   
 
GDP development over the period 2008-2018 +20%  (EU 
average) 
 
GDP in 1000 million Euros/yr 3.018  1
st
 
GDP per capita in Euros/yr 36.493  10
th
 
 
Over the last 10 years, Germany has seen robust economic growth, has consolidated its 
leading role in Europe both economically and politically, and has continued its 
transformation towards a services economy.   
Throughout the last decade, climate policy has remained a priority in Germany. By and 
large, the country is on track in the effort-sharing domain, however relying, to a large 
extent on the purchase of external carbon credits and on excess reductions transferred 
from other member states. Domestically, while policy measures on insulation, heating 
and cooling have proven moderately effective, attempts to encourage the modal shift in 
transport seem to have been failing so far. In the EU-ETS sectors, participation in the 
scheme has turned out costly for some parts of German industry, with the metalworking 
and aluminium industry suffering most. Large amounts of external credits combined with 
allowances bought from other member states’ auctions have made compliance possible, 
but have angered smaller installations (and governments) in other member states, 
especially Poland.  
At this moment, Germany holds the EU presidency and considers it of high priority to 
push the EU on an ambitious climate policy, without, however, excessively hurting the 
competitiveness of its own export-oriented industries.  
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Sweden in 2018 
 
Facts & Figures (year 2016) 
 
  Relative position 
in EU-33 
National emission trend (ETS/non-ETS) compared to 
2005 
-11%   
National emissions in million tCO2 59 30
th
  
Emission trend in non-ETS sectors, compared to 2005 
(excluding use of carbon credits) 
Target: -17% 
Actual: -12% 
 
Per capita emissions in tCO2/person 6,2 27
th
  
GDP development over the period 2008-2018 +12% (EU 
average: 20%) 
 
GDP in 1000 million Euros/yr 378 9
th
  
GDP per capita in Euros/yr 39.425 7
th
  
 
 
Efforts to fight climate change have received high priority in Sweden over the last decade. 
The results are impressive – emissions have decreased sharply, renewables growth has 
been robust, and greenhouse gas emissions per capita are among the lowest in the EU 
despite a continuously high standard of living.  
Especially in the effort-sharing domain, the Swedish case is one of the rare success 
stories in the EU. Relying on a balanced strategy of purchases of high quality carbon 
credits and implementing ambitious policies, the country looks set to achieve its -17% 
effort-sharing target. Some studies suggest, however, that climate policy efforts (both 
ETS/non-ETS) have taken their toll on the Swedish economy and are among the key 
reasons for slower-than-EU-average economic growth in Sweden. Furthermore, most of 
the cheaper non-ETS abatement options seem to be exhausted for the moment, with 
some limited potential left only in the transport sector.  
The Swedish population is overall still supportive of the climate policy strategy of 
government, yet begins to tire of the efforts made and the costs involved. The 
conservative opposition party points to the lack of progress in other member states and 
insists that they should step up their efforts before Sweden adopts even more stringent 
policies. 
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Spain in 2018 
 
Facts & Figures (year 2016) 
 
  Relative position 
in EU-33 
National emission trend (ETS/non-ETS) compared to 
2005 
+3%  
National emissions in million tCO2 454 10
th
  
Emission trend in non-ETS sectors, compared to 2005 
(excluding use of carbon credits) 
Target: -10% 
Actual: +2% 
 
Per capita emissions in tCO2/person 9,9 12
th
  
GDP development over the period 2008-2018 0% (EU 
average: 20%) 
 
GDP in 1000 million Euros/yr 1.101 5
th
  
GDP per capita in Euros/yr 24.142 16
th
  
 
 
The past decade has been rocky for Spain. The global financial crisis in 2008/2009 led to 
a property bust across the Iberian Peninsula, propelling the country into a deep and 
drawn-out recession, from which Spain has yet to recover.  
On the climate policy front, the previous government at first made a serious effort to 
shed its laggard image after its failure to its Kyoto burden-sharing target. This translated 
into a renewables boom and decreasing emissions in the residential sector. Yet as the 
economic situation worsened and unemployment figures rose, climate policy 
increasingly took a backseat among other, more pressing concerns. A compliance 
strategy largely based on the purchase of external credits was adopted for the effort-
sharing domain – which, at a time of empty state coffers, did not fare particularly well 
with the Spanish public. Since 2014, Spain has clearly deviated from the linear reduction 
path stipulated by the 2009 effort-sharing decision and is now waiting for a “letter of 
formal notice” from the Commission. At the same time, there are still large mitigation 
potentials available, as for example the much-needed substitution of the many outdated 
and emission-intensive vehicles in public and private transport.   
Moreover, the adverse impacts of global warming on the tourism and agricultural sector 
have alerted the Spanish public to the threat of climate change. In next year’s elections, 
the approach of the candidates towards climate change is likely to play a pivotal role.  
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Poland in 2018  
 
Facts & Figures (year 2016) 
 
  Relative position 
in EU-33 
National emission trend (ETS/non-ETS) compared to 
2005 
+7%  
National emissions in million tCO2 425 15
th
  
Emission trend in non-ETS sectors, compared to 2005 
(excluding use of carbon credits) 
Target: +14% 
Actual: +28% 
 
Per capita emissions in tCO2/person 11,4 2
nd
  
GDP development over the period 2008-2018 +50% (EU 
average: 
+20%) 
 
GDP in 1000 million Euros/yr 571 7
th
  
GDP per capita in Euros/yr 15.400 22
nd
  
 
 
Poland has seen sustained high economic growth over the last decade, thanks to far-
reaching liberalisation efforts and the introduction of a 50% tax discount for repatriates, 
which stimulated to large-scale technology and capital transfers. Today, the country is a 
dynamic, largely internationally competitive economy, with GDP per capita quickly 
growing towards the EU average.  
As to climate policy, however, the country remains a ‘problem child’ within the EU. 
Successive governments underestimated the difficulties of complying with the 
requirements of the EU’s 2009 climate package, especially at a time of strong economic 
growth and increasing purchasing power. Half-hearted attempts at policy 
implementation and enforcement have not had much impact on emissions, especially in 
the non-ETS sectors. This does mean however, that affordable abatement options, such 
as improving insulation, are still available.  
In 2013/2014, Poland slipped into non-compliance with the effort-sharing decision for 
the first time. The cold winters in 2015/2016 increased the compliance gap, prompting 
the Commission to initiate infringement proceedings, which are currently pending. At 
this moment, the Polish government is not showing much effort to meet the 2020 effort-
sharing target. Taking into account the high level of economic growth and the 
extraordinary weather, it takes the stand that in hindsight, the targets were 
unreasonably strict. 
Overall, however, your government and the Polish public remain supportive of European 
integration. Especially given the strained relations with Russia, Poland needs EU backing 
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and thus does not want to be perceived as a complete spoiler in an area where high 
profile EU action is important.  
 
European Commission in 2018  
 
You are senior officials of the Directorate General for Climate Change (DG CC) in the 
European Commission. DG CC was established in 2012 in an attempt to improve the 
cross-sectoral coordination and mainstreaming of climate policies.   
As Commission officials, you see your role as that of honest brokers, who strive to 
maintain the reputation of the EU as a frontrunner in global climate policy (one of the 
few fields where it still manages to inspire), while keeping in mind the EU’s fundamental 
objective of enhancing social and economic cohesion across Europe.  
The adoption of the 2009 climate package was an important success for the Commission, 
yet one that came at a price; CEE countries, but also others, complained about the lack of 
transparency of the proposal and the lack of time to fully comprehend the issues at stake. 
Trust was further shattered when the Commission rather unexpectedly tightened its 
definition of leakage-prone industries, effectively limiting the extent of free allocation, 
for the EU-ETS fourth trading period. Finally, voices, including within the Commission, 
doubt whether it was a wise decision to initiate infringement procedures against the 
group of CEE “effort-sharing offenders” in 2016, and suggest that a more cooperative 
approach might have been more productive.  
With the failure of the EU to achieve its 2020 goals increasingly obvious, it is of crucial 
importance now to send a strong signal both to the European public and the 
international community on the EU’s commitment to fight climate change. A key 
problem in implementing the 2009 effort-sharing decision was the unreliable and 
irregular reporting by member states, which made assessments of progress towards 
target extremely difficult. This certainly wasn’t helped by the large degree of flexibility 
(both internal and external) that member states were given in meeting their 
commitments. It is up to you now to make a first proposal that stands a chance of being 
accepted by member states yet provides a more robust basis to ensure that ambitious 
targets for the non-ETS sectors are actually being met.  
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Annex 1.F Policy element cards, policy exercise on burden-sharing 
Policy elements Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5 
Base year 1990 2005 2016 Average yearly 
emissions between 
_____ and _____ 
 
Criteria for burden-
sharing 
Converging per capita 
emissions in effort-
sharing sectors by 
2030 
Relative GDP per 
capita of member 
states 
 
Equal percentage 
emission reductions in 
effort-sharing sectors 
in all member states 
Least cost reduction 
for the whole EU in 
non-ETS sectors 
 
Compliance and 
enforcement 
In case of non-
compliance, the 
infringement 
procedure under 
European law applies. 
In case of non-
compliance, a 
member state has to 
pay a penalty 
equivalent to the fine 
under the EU ETS. 
Penalties shall be used 
for _____ 
In case of non-
compliance, an 
amount equivalent to 
the excess reductions 
is deducted from the 
subsequent auction of 
allowances of that 
member state under 
the EU ETS. 
Authority 
administering the non-
compliance 
procedure: _European 
Commission 
_European 
Environment Agency 
_newly established 
European Climate 
Agency 
 
Internal flexibility “Banking” - A member 
state can carry over 
excess emission 
reductions up to 
_____% of its overall 
GHG limit to the 
subsequent year. 
“Borrowing” - A 
member state can 
carry forward 
emission reduction 
obligations up to 
____% of its overall 
GHG limit to the 
subsequent year. 
Member states shall 
comply with their 
targets in a linear 
manner. 
Member states shall 
comply with the 
interim target set for 
the year ____  
(and ____). 
A member state can 
trade excess 
reductions in the 
effort-sharing sector 
with other member 
states.   
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Interaction with EU 
ETS 
There is no exchange 
possible between 
emission 
reductions/allowances 
under the EU-ETS and 
under effort-sharing.   
A member state can 
decide to allocate 
excess emission 
reductions achieved in 
the effort-sharing 
sectors for auctioning 
under the emissions 
trading system 
 
A member state can 
decide to reduce its 
amount of allowances 
for auctioning under 
the EU ETS, and use 
them for compliance 
under the effort-
sharing decision 
instead. 
Coverage of the EU 
ETS will be extended 
to….. 
[   ] Transport 
[   ] Land use 
[   ] __________ 
 
 
Quality of external 
credits 
All credits admissible 
under the UNFCCC can 
be used for 
compliance under the 
effort-sharing 
decision..  
No credits from 
[   ] nuclear power 
[   ] large hydro 
[   ] CCS   
[   ] HFC-23 
[   ] ____________ 
are admissible for 
compliance under the 
effort-sharing 
decision. compliance 
are discounted by 
____% 
Non-project-based 
carbon credits (e.g. 
from avoided 
deforestation or 
sectoral approaches) 
that are used for 
At least ____ % of the 
credits used for 
compliance must be 
‘Gold Standard’. This 
percentage grows 
annually by ____ %. 
Only credits that were 
awarded the Gold 
Standard or an 
equivalent quality 
standard can be used 
for compliance. 
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Limits to external 
credits 
External carbon 
credits are not 
admissible for 
compliance under the 
effort-sharing 
decision. 
Every member state 
has a yearly quota of 
____ % of external 
carbon credits at its 
disposal. It expires if 
not used in that same 
year 
Every member state 
has a yearly quota of 
_____% of external 
carbon credits at its 
disposal. Unused 
quota can be banked 
until the end of the 
compliance period. 
Every member state 
has a yearly quota of 
____ % of external 
carbon credits at its 
disposal. If it does not 
use its quota, the 
remaining quota may 
be passed on to other 
member states. 
 
Optional: new policy 
initiatives 
Transport:  Agriculture Building/residential 
sector:  
Waste management Small- and medium-
sized enterprises 
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Annex 1.G Scenario, policy exercise on REDD  
 
Kyoto, Cape Town and beyond 
 
We are in the year 2015. COP-21 has just opened in Santiago de Chile. After a pause 
for breath after the arduous negotiations at COP-17 in Cape Town in 2011, where a 
deal had finally been reached on a post-2012 climate agreement, the eyes of the 
world are once again on the climate negotiations, and on REDD+ in particular.  
What had actually been decided at Cape Town? In a nutshell, a set of decisions 
addressing all four elements of the Bali Action Plan endorsed what came to be known 
as the ‘Copenhagen approach’ – bottom-up emission reduction and stabilisation 
pledges by developed and developing countries, which were annexed to the 
agreement and detailed in individual country submissions. In total, developed 
country pledges amounted to an aggregate 30% cut by 2020 compared to 2000 levels. 
Quantification of the – in parts rather ambitious – actions pledged by developing 
countries is less straightforward, but on the whole, it is doubtful whether the  
commitments made in Cape Town will be sufficient for keeping the global warming 
below 2 degrees Celsius until the end of this century. Cape Town further saw the 
establishment of a Global Green Climate Fund (GGCF) under the UNFCCC, with 
separate funding windows for adaptation, mitigation, and REDD+. The GGCF is to be 
capitalised from ‘appropriate, new and additional contributions’ by developed 
countries, with the aim of approaching a funding volume of 60 billion USD annually 
by 2020. At this moment in 2015, the latter target is still a long way off. Total pledges 
to the GGCF currently amount to almost 20 billion, and the disbursement details of 
the funding windows are still to be worked out in further COP decisions.  
With regard to REDD+, parties in Cape Town agreed that its scope should encompass 
deforestation, forest degradation and the enhancement of existing carbon stocks and 
that the scale of implementation should mainly be national. The REDD+ decision in 
Cape Town further endorsed a historical approach to baseline-setting, with the 
possibility of adjustments where appropriate. Since agreement on other aspects 
proved elusive at this point, Parties decided on an extended pilot and trial period for 
REDD+, with a view to improving data availability and gaining further experience with 
project implementation. COP-21 was called upon to review progress and consider the 
design of the funding window for REDD+ under the GGCF, negotiations on which had 
broken down previously over the sources and necessary scale of funding as well as 
disbursement rules. Observers anticipate that discussions on the REDD+-window of 
the GGCF will also have a pioneering character for the other funding windows, where 
progress has been even slower.  
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While the discussions under the UNFCCC were inching forward over the past few 
years, REDD+ developments outside of it have kept up at a steady pace. In total, 
about 12 billion USD has been spent on readiness efforts through multilateral and 
bilateral channels. The REDD+ partnership in particular has proven its value as an 
effective platform for information exchange and donor coordination. However, there 
has also been evidence of duplication of efforts and of squandered funds. Scandals in 
Malaysia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where funding was received for the 
same REDD-readiness activities from several initiatives, have increased political 
momentum for a concerted global approach to REDD+. 
At the same time, costs for monitoring technology have come down rapidly over the 
last years and data availability has improved across many tropical countries, making 
the widespread implementation of REDD+ activities less of a distant dream. Progress 
with institution-building, however, has been more uneven. While some Latin 
American countries have their national REDD+ administrations up and running and 
their REDD+ strategies and monitoring plans in place, in others, there is still a lot of 
work ahead.  
Looking at global trends in tropical deforestation, the last five years have brought 
about some progress, but a real reversal in global deforestation trends has not yet 
been achieved. Worldwide economic recovery after the crisis at the end of the last 
decade has increased global demand for timber and spurred deforestation in many 
countries. Success stories, for example in some regions of Brazil, are largely offset by 
accelerating deforestation in the Congo Basin, where increased infrastructure 
investments combined with a lack of political accountability have attracted Asian 
logging companies at a large scale.  
The international community thus needs progress on international REDD+ policy. 
Given that prices in the world’s regulatory carbon markets are currently low, there is 
little appetite for an immediate market linkage of a global REDD+ crediting scheme. 
Even though more and more countries (including the United States) are making 
progress towards implementing domestic emissions trading schemes, it seems 
unlikely that there will be sufficient demand in the short term to accommodate a 
large amount of REDD credits.  
Therefore, the task for the Santiago summit is to establish the basic modalities for a 
global REDD+ fund. The Parties moreover still need to decide whether this is an 
interim or a long-term option for REDD+ financing, and, in case a phased approach is 
chosen, how to engineer the transition to the integration of REDD into the carbon 
market. On this day, Brazil, who is particularly keen on progress on a REDD+ fund, has 
invited some countries for an informal meeting at the margins of negotiations. Its 
goal is to develop a proposal for a REDD+ fund that might be able to command broad-
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based support among Parties and thus guide the further negotiations on REDD+ in 
Santiago de Chile. 
 
Annex 1.H Role descriptions, policy exercise on REDD 
 
United States in 2015 
 
The United States in 2015 have finally begun to come to terms with their new role in 
a multi-polar world. After a phase of deep disorientation and anger at the lost causes 
of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the economic crisis, the general mood in the US has 
reverted back to American ‘can do’ optimism. Overall, the new US paradigm 
emphasises moral and technological leadership over military and economic 
dominance.  
After the first years of the new decade, which will be remembered as the ‘dark ages 
of partisan politics’ in Washington DC, things started to turn for the better after 
President Obama was reelected in 2012. A vitriolic Republican electoral campaign 
had pushed large parts of the independent voters back to the Democrats. The new, 
more bipartisan-minded Congress adopted long-needed legislative reform on 
entitlements that laid the basis for a healthy federal budget over the coming decades. 
The US economy has picked up as well, although growth rates compare poorly to 
those in the emerging economies and unemployment figures never returned to pre-
crisis levels.  
Meanwhile, Barack Obama, nearing the end of his second term and concerned about 
his legacy, has turned his attention back to global issues, chief among them climate 
change. Several severe natural disasters plausibly linked to climate change and the 
emergence of a powerful broad-based pro-climate movement of green industry, 
insurance companies and NGOs have convinced a majority of the public that action is 
needed and in the US national interest. Obama’s domestic climate policy record had 
been exceedingly meager in his first term. Now, in 2015, the passage of a bill on a 
federal emissions trading scheme finally seems within reach (although only covering 
utilities). The bill before Congress is likely to incorporate substantial provisions on 
REDD+ activities and offsets. Hopes are high that this bill, in combination with a 
policy package on cleaner transportation, will prompt the much-needed turnaround 
in US emission trends that has failed to materialise thus far. 
Despite this hopeful outlook, the international community – and particularly 
developing countries – are frustrated by the lack of results of US climate policy 
hitherto. Not only has the US so far failed to engage in substantial efforts to reduce 
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emissions at home, its record on international climate financing is equally meager. 
Whereas the US continues to be involved in various bilateral clean tech and REDD+ 
partnerships, the disbursements of US funds to the Global Green Climate Fund (GGCF) 
has been consistently behind schedule and below promised amounts.  
Obama wants to make the Santiago summit a success and considers REDD a pivotal 
piece of the puzzle. However to prevent domestic backlash at third-world corruption 
and UN inefficiency, the US administration would like to see any fund implemented 
by a trusted international institution, strictly performance-based and with stringent 
MRV rules. Moreover, Congress is unwilling to commit long-term funding from 
taxpayer money. Rather, it wants carbon markets and the private sector to generate 
the necessary funds in the medium term.   
 
 
EU in 2015 
 
After protracted economic stagnation for several years that nearly brought down the 
Euro zone, the EU is finally enjoying some economic growth again. Most member 
states’ financial stability has significantly improved, even though the degree to which 
structural reforms have been implemented varies largely across the Community. 
Politically, the EU has entered a consolidation phase, with no major institutional 
reforms or big political projects in sight. Further increase in membership has equally 
been put on ice for the moment, except for the upcoming Balkan enlargement.  
The EU’s economic and political stagnation, along with the continued rise of big non-
Western powers has undoubtedly dented its standing in the world. Fighting climate 
change however provides a major narrative in Brussels’ attempt to connect to 
Europe’s peoples. Learning from the debacle in Copenhagen, the EU has taken steps 
to reform its international climate diplomacy. In institutional terms, climate change 
Commissioner Lord Stern now leads negotiations for the EU delegation in much the 
same way as his counterpart does in the trade arena. In his attempt to shape 
international negotiations, he has relied on sticks as well as carrots, effectively 
supported by the European External Action Service.  The EU has worked very 
productively with the more progressive developing countries towards brokering the 
Cape Town accords. It is not quite clear to what extent the EU’s increase of its 
emissions reduction target to 30% played a role in securing agreement in Cape Town.  
The EU has also continued to make progress in cutting its emissions at home. The 
extent of the reliance of some countries on external carbon credits for compliance 
has however drawn substantial criticism. On the other hand, it has been European 
demand that has prevented prices for credits to fall even further. A review of the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is currently ongoing. It will among other things 
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address options for the inclusion of REDD credits in the scheme after 2020, though 
nothing has been decided yet. The weakest part in the EU’s international climate 
strategy is financing. The EU Commission continues to lack the necessary funds on its 
own to sway developing countries’ positions. At the same time, an EU-internal 
burden-sharing formula for climate financing that the Commission had advocated 
never came to pass, effectively leaving the brunt of the burden on the most 
progressive EU Member states. Some member states have earmarked specific shares 
of their auctioning revenue for REDD+, but overall financing sources remain volatile 
and insufficient. 
REDD+ continues to be a major negotiation priority for the EU and is considered an 
issue on which progress can be made. EU member states have been active in all 
major REDD+ initiatives and have engaged in a host of bilateral partnerships, but 
increasingly see the need for streamlining international efforts, also with a view to 
the prospect of including REDD credits into the EU ETS. The Community stresses that 
its priority is to design a ‘robust’ and economically efficient mechanism with stringent 
monitoring requirements, and emphasises the importance of environmental and 
social safeguards. While the EU remains somewhat cautious about a market-based 
approach to REDD+, most member states acknowledge that this will be the only way 
for leveraging the funds necessary in the longer term.  
 
 
India in 2015 
 
India has done particularly well out of the global economic recovery. A young and 
growing workforce is boosting innovation across a range of sectors and is driving 
domestic consumption, resulting in good economic prospects also in the medium 
term. A self-confident middle class has grown in numbers and spending power. 
Economic progress however has failed to trickle down to large parts of rural India. 
The challenges of alleviating widespread poverty remain enormous, particularly in 
the face of growing environmental pressures, such as water and land scarcity. At the 
same time, the complex institutional setting in the world’s biggest democracy makes 
political reform difficult to achieve.  
In the international arena, institutional reform in the Bretton Woods system and the 
United Nations has increased India’s voice in the world. The country has moreover 
freed itself from the grip of its strategic alliance with China in the realm of global 
climate policy. With the latter increasingly seen among developing countries as 
defending its own interests rather than those of the South at large, India has 
managed to establish itself as a G77 leader of sorts in the climate negotiations. Even 
though the Indian establishment is frustrated with the limited progress of 
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industrialised countries in cutting emissions as well as in delivering climate finance, it 
sees little alternatives to a multilateral solution to the climate crisis. 
In its national low-carbon growth plan, India has focused on moving away from its 
coal-reliant energy base. Severe climate impacts felt in India – massive agricultural 
losses as a consequence of several erratic monsoon reasons and repeated large scale 
flooding in the South – have moved the Indian government towards a more proactive 
stance on domestic climate policy. The country is internationally recognised as one of 
the most successful examples for decoupling economic growth from carbon intensity. 
Moreover, it has recently made significant strides in increasing re-forestation. Its 
limited forest cover however implies that India nationally stands to gain little from a 
REDD+ approach focusing on reducing deforestation and forest degradation. Since 
India continues to be a strong player in the CDM and is well-positioned to command a 
significant share of the emerging market for sectoral mechanisms, it is keen on 
preventing REDD from crowding out other international offsets. At the same time, 
India recognises the important pilot role that the operationalisation of the REDD 
window may have for other parts of the Global Green Climate Fund (GGCF).  
India’s primary objective in this negotiation is therefore to set a precedent for a 
balanced governance structure for climate financing, un-bureaucratic access and 
legally binding funding sources. India hopes that the Santiago summit will mark an 
end to the conventional aid paradigm that has dominated discussions on climate 
finance for too long, and that it will result in a new financial architecture on climate 
change. This architecture should respect all partners’ sovereign equality, and it 
should be based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. The 
GGCF should thus combine national ownership of funds with non-intrusive 
international verification mechanisms, and its setup should reflect historic 
responsibility for climate change.   
 
 
Brazil in 2015 
 
The last half a decade has been a good one for Brazil. Economically, it seems that 
South America’s largest economy has finally started to live up to its eternal label as 
the ‘country of the future’. Having weathered the global financial and economic crisis 
in 2008/2009 rather well, it has since started to grow again with an annual rate 
averaging almost five per cent over the period 2010-2015. President Rousseff’s 
continuation of the poverty alleviation agenda of her predecessor Lula has ensured 
that the benefits of economic growth reach a larger part of the population than 
previously; this is at the root of her reelection in 2014. Finally, Brazil’s hosting of two 
big sport events, the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, is boosting the 
country’s self-confidence and national pride.  
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Good news for Brazil’s environmentalists as well as for the global climate has been 
Rousseff’s stern stance on fighting deforestation in the Amazon. Her efforts in this 
regard have largely paid off:  although more than half a million hectares of forest still 
disappear every year, the deforestation rate has dropped drastically compared to the 
beginning of the 2000s, the president’s headline objective of halting net 
deforestation by 2020 seems possible. This, especially compared to other tropical 
forest countries, relatively bright picture is due to progress at many levels: strong 
forest monitoring systems have improved further, and even small-scale deforestation 
activities have now become detectable by INPE, the national space agency. Good 
progress has been made in cleaning up the land registry and in clarifying tenure rights, 
leading to more sustainable forest management on privately managed lands. The 
enforcement of the forest code by the rather corrupt judiciary in the Amazon region 
remains the problem child, however, which threatens the success of the policies in 
the longer term.  
Yet overall, given its record in cutting emissions from deforestation, Brazil belongs to 
the small group of high performers in the global climate regime, and appears on track 
towards meeting its 2020 national emission reduction goal. The country continues to 
be a heavyweight in the CDM market (which, however, given the modest caps of 
industrialised countries is less dynamic than in the pre-2012 period). Its industries are 
gearing up to get involved in the sectoral crediting mechanisms, the modalities of 
which are currently still under development. As for REDD+, the country has left the 
REDD-readiness phase behind. Its national REDD+ administration is up and running, 
and its monitoring systems and REDD+ strategy are in place – even though the latter 
met with controversy since various stakeholder groups felt that they had not been 
adequately consulted in the process.  
Overall, Brazil is proud of its pioneering role in REDD+. Although it has benefited from 
the various bilateral REDD+ partnerships it has concluded over the last years, it 
stresses the need for a different scale of stable, predictable, long-term funding for 
REDD+, which, in its view, only a global, strictly performance-based approach can 
deliver. Opposition to the large scale use of REDD+ credits by industrialised countries 
for compliance purposes continues to be a cornerstone of the Brazilian position on 
REDD+, especially in the face of slumping demand on the world’s carbon markets. A 
gradual inclusion of REDD into the carbon market, however, is not out of the question 
for a number of high-ranking Brazilian government officials. Brazil is very keen for 
progress to be made on REDD+ in Santiago de Chile, and has therefore invited some 
Parties to today’s informal meeting, which it hopes will facilitate a constructive 
exchange and lead to a joint vision on a global REDD+ fund that can guide the 
negotiations on REDD+ in Santiago.   
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Cameroon in 2015 
 
Cameroon has seen solid economic growth over the past few years, benefiting from 
more stable prices for oil and commodity exports since the recovery of the world 
economy. Asian emerging economies have made big infrastructure investments in 
the country, resulting in the construction of a deep sea water port and a host of 
power and mining projects, among other things. All these developments, however, 
have primarily benefitted the national elites. President Biya continues to soldier on in 
his 33
rd
 year in office, largely oblivious to the grievances of his people. The country 
suffers from high unemployment and can offer only very limited prospects to its large 
young population.  
Meanwhile, infrastructural expansion and large-scale logging by domestic and foreign 
companies have not been without consequences for Cameroon´s vast and 
biodiversity-rich forests. Deforestation is also beginning to have a significant 
environmental impact. In the north of the country in particular, deforestation has 
been blamed for increasing soil erosion, desertification, and reduced quality of 
pastureland. While some REDD+ demonstration activities implemented by 
international NGOs have met with moderate success, the country as a whole still 
lacks an effective forest conservation program. Cameroon still has some way to go 
with regard to REDD-readiness. On the bright side, bilateral and multilateral donors 
have helped to improve forest monitoring, and have strengthened long-needed 
robust information on the country’s forest reserves, including deforestation rates and 
drivers. However, institution-building for REDD+ has progressed only in fits and starts, 
hampered by bureaucratic infighting and a lack of donor coordination.  
Turning to the international arena, Cameroon is very disappointed with the progress 
of the global climate change regime and of REDD+ in particular. Industrialised 
countries have failed to make credible efforts to reduce their emissions at the scale 
needed for averting the worst impacts of climate change on the South. At the same 
time, REDD+ has not yet delivered benefits on the hoped-for scale. The country’s key 
goal for the Santiago summit is thus to ensure predictable, long-term financing of the 
Global Green Climate Fund (GGCF) coupled with direct access to all funds raised. For 
this purpose, Cameroon wants industrialised countries to replace meagre voluntary 
payments with substantial contributions raised on the basis of legally binding 
agreements. At the same time, it seeks to avoid overly bureaucratic procedures for 
fund disbursement and heavy-handed involvement by the international community in 
matters of national sovereignty. Rather than hiring expensive foreign consultants, 
money should be invested into domestic institutions. Moreover, Cameroon would 
like to see compensation not only for reduced deforestation and forest degradation, 
but also for the enhancement of carbon stocks at the earliest possible moment.  
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Annex 1.I Policy element cards, policy exercise on REDD 
Policy elements Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5 
Capitalisation and 
fund replenishment 
Voluntary 
contributions 
Defined bugetary 
contributions by  
industrialised 
countries, based on _ 
Share of proceeds on 
flexible mechanisms  
(similarly to the 
adaptation levy under 
the CDM) 
Share of  revenue 
from auctioning 
[national]  
[international] 
emission allowances 
Levy on international 
aviation and  
maritime transport 
Accounting for co-
benefits 
All [or _% of] REDD 
units must meet 
specified co-benefits 
minimum standards to 
be eligible for 
payment. 
All [or _% of] REDD 
units must be certified 
for high co-benefits by 
an independent third-
party verifier to be 
eligible for payment. 
Relative co-benefit 
performance  
(measured in 
environmental and 
social 'value points' ) is 
factored into  REDD 
unit price, resulting in 
multiplying the unit 
price for better-than-
average performance. 
<Auctioning 
approach> Separation 
into different 
auctioning tranches, 
moving from higher to 
lower co-benefits  
REDD units [as 
evidenced by 
certification through a 
specific standard] [as 
evidenced by the 
achieved number of 
value points]   
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Eligibility criteria/How 
to prioritise specific 
funding needs in view 
of constrained overall 
funding 
[REDD units from] 
Countries with 
_low income 
_good governance 
_high deforestation 
pressure 
_good past 
performance in 
deforestation 
_proven ability for co-
financing 
are prioritised. 
<Auctioning 
approach> Auctioning 
in dedicated  
thematic/ special 
needs/geographic 
tranches.  
<Windows-based 
approach>  Dedicated 
funding windows for 
_LDCs 
_HFLDs 
_.... 
    
How to deal with the 
potential need for 
upfront financing? 
Full upfront payment  
for first financing 
period, for future 
periods as a function 
of performance during 
previous periods. 
No upfront payments. Upfront payments [up 
to _% of the estimated 
total] are issued as 
loans, and 
subsequently 
transformed  into 
grants if targets are 
met. 
Upfront payments are 
made, discounted by 
_% for delivery risk. 
  
Verification Standing international 
panel 
Expert review teams Unilateral MRV by 
REDD-country 
Accredited private 
entities (similarly 
 to Designated 
Operational  
Entities under the 
CDM) 
 
  
Fund administration Global Environment 
Facility 
World Bank High-Level Body, 
composed of _ 
UN-REDD   
Frequency of Continuous Annual Biannual Five-yearly   
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disbursement rounds 
Determination of 
payment size for 
REDD+ units/ 
implementation of 
REDD+ policies 
<Windows-based 
approach> Based on 
countries'  own  
estimate for 
implementation costs 
[subject to review by 
_] 
<Auctioning 
approach> REDD fund 
purchases MRV-based 
REDD units from the 
lowest bid by  a REDD 
country ,  then the 
second-lowest, etc, 
until the tranche is 
exhausted. 
<Windows-based 
approach> REDD unit 
price is based on 
carbon market price 
[_year average]  
[discounted by_] 
[International panel] 
[High level body] […] 
determines 
size of payment, 
based on the 
implementation  
strategy submitted by 
the REDD+ country. 
  
[Optional] 
Recommendation on 
transitioning from 
fund approach to 
integration of REDD 
into the global carbon 
markets 
No transition 
envisaged. REDD+ 
fund  
is the long term vision. 
REDD+ fund ceases 
operation by _ 
REDD+ fund acts as 
'investment reserve', 
purchasing yet-to-be-
created REDD units 
upfront, then banks 
MRV-based credits 
until the governing 
body decides that 
credits can be sold to 
the carbon market  
[subject to minimum 
price] [up to a 
maximum amount] 
Dual-markets 
approach as next  
step (CCAP, 2007) post 
REDD+ fund. Creation 
of a new, separate 
REDD carbon market, 
where Annex I parties 
specify at the outset 
how many , and from 
which countries REDD 
units they will 
purchase as offsets, 
subject to a maximum 
amount determined 
by the COP. 
TDERM approach 
(Hare et al., 2008) as 
next step post REDD+ 
fund. Industrialised 
ocuntries provide 
financing for REDD 
units  proportional to 
their overall emission 
allowances in the 
commitment period.  
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Annex 2 – Learning measurements: supporting 
materials and results 
Annex 2.A Coding systems for concept map analysis 
 
Coding system, policy exercise on burden-sharing 
Label Explanation Sample responses on 
participants’ maps 
Actors Any type of actor, from governments to 
the private sector 
Member states; industry 
Physical climate Physical aspects of climate change Temperature increase; 
catastrophe; greenhouse 
gases 
Criteria  Criteria for burden-sharing Marginal costs of emission 
reduction; GDP/capita 
Economic aspects Economic factors affecting EU climate 
policy/burden-sharing 
Oil supply; prices 
EU ETS Aspects relating to the EU ETS or the 
interrelation between the EU ETS  
Can sectors be integrated 
into EU ETS; external 
credits; trading 
Policy design & 
implementation 
Options for policy design and 
implementation of EU burden-sharing  
Compliance regime; 
monitoring; penalties 
International 
context 
International context of EU burden-
sharing 
Post-Kyoto regime; links to 
other markets 
Politics & 
negotiations 
Aspects relating to rules and dynamics of 
decision-making as well as negotiation 
skills, strategies, constraints 
Deals between member 
states;  
Policy objectives General objectives in policy-making Transparency; flexibility; 
meet EU goal 
Temporal aspects Aspects relating to the temporal 
dimension of EU burden-sharing  
Path to final year; reducing 
emissions later on 
Meta-reflections Reflections on the design of the policy 
exercise [only  
Scenario realism; number 
of countries  
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Coding system, policy exercise on REDD 
Label Explanation Sample responses on 
participants’ maps 
Actors Any type of actor, from 
governments to the private sector 
Governments; donors; 
indigenous people 
Allocation/disbursement Aspects relating to the distribution 
of funds from REDD  
Adequate access for all 
parties; equity; 
performance-based 
Financing and sources Funding streams and options for 
replenishing the global REDD fund 
Capitalisation modalities; 
mandatory contributions; 
whose money   
Co-benefits of REDD Additional benefits from REDD 
beyond GHG reductions 
Biodiversity; poverty 
alleviation; amounts based 
on carbon only or premium 
for co-benefits?  
Environmental 
performance of REDD 
Rule-making or implementation 
aspects related to safeguarding or 
increasing the environmental 
integrity of a REDD mechanism  
Performance criteria and 
monitoring; stock 
inventories; verification 
needs 
Governance of the 
mechanism 
Aspects relating to the steering and 
management of a REDD 
mechanism  
Representation in decision-
making; voting modalities 
International context International policy context to and 
external drivers shaping the 
development of REDD 
Climate agreement? Future 
forest convention; LULUCF  
REDD implementation Issues relating to the execution and 
management of REDD activities on 
the ground  
Land tenure; lacking 
capacity in local institutions 
Politics & negotiations Aspects relating to rules and 
dynamics of decision-making as 
well as negotiation skills, 
strategies, constraints 
Power games; reveal true 
policy preferences 
Policy objectives Objectives in policy-making 
pertaining to REDD  
Short-term: work on 
capacity in LDCs; define key 
REDD priorities; address 
deforestation 
Temporal aspects Aspects relating to the 
(inter)temporal dimension of REDD 
and future prospects of the 
mechanism 
Transition to carbon 
markets; financing short vs. 
long-term 
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Annex 2.B Results from concept map analysis, based on Morine-Dershimer 
(1993) 
 
Table 23. Centrality and specificity scores on concept maps, experts burden-sharing 
exercise.
 1
 
                          Centrality                           Specificity 
 Mean 
score 
map 1 
(X1) 
Mean 
score 
map 2 
(X2) 
Change 
(X1-X2) 
 Mean 
score 
map 1 
(X1) 
Mean 
score 
map 2 
(X2) 
Change 
(X1-X2) 
Actors 3.20 2.00 1.20 Actors 0.0758 0.0823 0.0065 
Physical climate 4.40 3.80 0.60 Physical climate 0.0278 0.0250 0.0028 
Criteria  1.80 1.60 0.20 Criteria  0.3232 0.2103 0.1129 
Economic 
aspects 
4.40 3.60 0.80 Economic 
aspects 
0.1000 0.0618 0.0382 
EU ETS 4.20 2.40 1.80 EU ETS 0.0273 0.1599 -0.1326 
Policy design & 
implementation 
2.00 1.00 1.00 Policy design & 
implementation 
0.0563 0.1940 -0.1376 
International 
context 
2.00 1.20 0.80 International 
context 
0.1379 0.1166 0.0213 
Politics & 
negotiations 
3.60 4.60 -1.00 Politics & 
negotiations 
0.0361 0.0056 0.0306 
Policy objectives 2.00 1.80 0.20 Policy objectives 0.1475 0.1024 0.0451 
Temporal 
aspects 
3.40 2.80 0.60 Temporal 
aspects 
0.0682 0.0423 0.0259 
1
 Since no items on the expert maps referred to the category ‘meta reflections’, the latter is not 
included into this table.   
 
 
Table 24. Summary of analysis of variances. Differences of centrality and specificity 
scores between pre- and post-test, experts burden-sharing exercise. 
1
 
                                                     Centrality    Specificity 
 df F  df F 
Actors 1,8 1.26  Actors 1,8 0.02  
Physical climate 1.8 0.18  Physical climate 1.8 0.01  
Criteria  1.8 0.04  Criteria  1.8 0.82  
Economic aspects 1.8 0.40  Economic aspects 1.8 0.12  
EU ETS 1.8 2.49  EU ETS 1.8 6.14**  
Policy design & implementation 1.8 3.33  Policy design & implementation 1.8 4.03*  
International context 1.8 1.88  International context 1.8 0.09  
Politics & negotiations 1.8 0.52  Politics & negotiations 1.8 1.46  
Policy objectives 1.8 0.03  Policy objectives 1.8 0.48  
Temporal aspects 1.8 0.28  Temporal aspects 1.8 0.44  
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1
 Since no items on the expert maps referred to the category ‘meta reflections’, the latter is not 
included into this table.   
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
Table 25. Centrality and specificity scores on concept maps, students burden-sharing 
exercise.  
                          Centrality                             Specificity 
 Mean 
score 
map 1 
(X1) 
Mean 
score 
map 2 
(X2) 
Change 
(X1-X2) 
 Mean 
score 
map 1 
(X1) 
Mean 
score 
map 2 
(X2) 
Change 
(X1-X2) 
Actors 2.33 2.80 -0.47 Actors 0.2414 0.0859 -0.1555 
Physical climate 3.67 3.93 -0.27 Physical climate 0.0467 0.0183 -0.0284 
Criteria  2.45 2.05 0.40 Criteria  0.1481 0.1439 -0.0042 
Economic 
aspects 
3.42 3.68 -0.27 Economic 
aspects 
0.0517 0.0285 -0.0232 
EU ETS 3.70 2.32 1.38 EU ETS 0.0320 0.1448 0.1127 
Policy design & 
implementation 
2.60 2.25 0.35 Policy design & 
implementation 
0.1297 0.1726 0.0429 
International 
context 
3.58 3.60 -0.02 International 
context 
0.0389 0.0329 -0.0060 
Politics & 
negotiations 
2.60 2.07 0.53 Politics & 
negotiations 
0.1365 0.2302 0.0936 
Policy objectives 2.15 2.47 -0.32 Policy objectives 0.1404 0.0795 -0.0609 
Temporal 
aspects 
3.55 3.15 0.40 Temporal 
aspects 
0.0336 0.0496 0.0160 
Meta-
reflections 
4.27 4.42 -0.15 Meta-
reflections 
0.0009 0.0138 0.0129 
 
 
Table 26. Summary of analysis of variances. Differences of centrality and specificity 
scores between pre- and post-test, students burden-sharing exercise.  
                                   Centrality                      Specificity 
 df F  df F 
Actors 1,118 2.18 Actors
1
 1, 83.57 21.90*** 
Physical climate 1,118 1.13 Physical climate 1,118 3.04* 
Criteria  1,118 2.05 Criteria  1,118 0.02 
Economic aspects 1,118 0.89 Economic 
aspects 
1,118 1.95 
EU ETS
1
 1, 111.50 29.00*** EU ETS
1
 1,82.51 20.98*** 
Policy design & 
implementation 
1,118 1.50 Policy design & 
implementation 
1,118 2.21 
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International context 1,118 0.00 International 
context 
1,118 0.18 
Politics & negotiations
1
 1,118 3.21* Politics & 
negotiations
1
 
1,104.95 5.89** 
Policy objectives 1,118 1.19 Policy 
objectives
1
 
1,101.38 8.53** 
Temporal aspects 1,118 2.09 Temporal 
aspects 
1,118 1.59 
Meta-reflections 1,118 1.04 Meta-
reflections 
1,118 1.75 
1
 Welch-test (robust against violation of equal variances) reported as the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was violated for ANOVA. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
Table 27. Summary of analysis of variances. Between-group (expert/student) 
differences in centrality and specificity scores at pre-test, burden-sharing exercise. 
                                      Centrality  Specificity 
 df F  df F 
Actors 1,63 1.44 Actors
1
 1,10.31 11.67 
Physical climate 1,63 1.28 Physical climate 1,63 .126 
Criteria  1,63 .77 Criteria  1,63 4.45** 
Economic aspects 1,63 1.85 Economic aspect
1
 1,4.17 .66 
EU ETS 1,63 .70 EU ETS
1
 1,5.19 .88 
Policy design & 
implementation
1
 
1,5.12 .35 Policy design & 
implementation
1
 
1,12.65 6.20** 
International context 1,63 5.67** International context 1,63 6.06** 
Politics & negotiations 1,63 1.53 Politics & negotiations
1
 1,12.30 12.30** 
Policy objectives 1,63 .04 Policy objectives 1,63 .013 
Temporal aspects 1,63 .06 Temporal aspects 1,63 1.31 
1
 Welch-test (robust against violation of equal variances) reported as the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was violated for ANOVA. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
Table 28. Summary of analysis of variances. Between-group (expert/student) 
differences in centrality and specificity scores at post-test, burden-sharing exercise. 
                               Centrality  Specificity 
 df F  df F 
Actors 1,63 .83 Actors 1,63 .01 
Physical climate 1,63 .04 Physical climate 1,63 .10 
Criteria  1,63 .43 Criteria  1,63 .99 
Economic aspects 1,63 .01 Economic aspects 1,63 1.17 
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EU ETS
1
 1,4.61 .92 EU ETS 1,63 .04 
Policy design & 
implementation
2 
1,63 3.04* Policy design & 
implementation
1
 
1,63 .08 
International context
1
 1,13.76 75.52*** International context 1,63 6.20** 
Politics & negotiations 1,4.53 9.14** Politics & negotiations
1
 1,48.63 61.81*** 
Policy objectives 1,63 .80 Policy objectives 1,63 .32 
Temporal aspects 1,63 .20 Temporal aspects 1,63 .05 
1
 Welch-test (robust against violation of equal variances) reported as the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was violated for ANOVA. 
2
Homogeneity of variance violated for ANOVA, but Welch-test could not be conducted as the 
variance in one group was 0.  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
Table 29. Centrality and specificity scores on concept maps, experts REDD exercise.  
                         Centrality                         Specificity 
 Mean 
score 
map 1 
(X1) 
Mean 
score 
map 2 
(X2) 
Chang
e (X1-
X2) 
 Mean 
score 
map 1 
(X1) 
Mean 
score 
map 2 
(X2) 
Change 
(X1-X2) 
Financing and 
sources 
1.78 1.56 0.22 Financing and 
sources 
0.1356 0.1944 -0.0589 
Allocation/ 
disbursement 
1.33 1.44 -0.11 Allocation/dis
bursement 
0.2233 0.2178 0.0056 
Governance of 
mechanism 
2.67 2.11 0.56 Governance 
of mechanism 
0.0622 0.1278 -0.0656 
Env. 
performance of 
REDD 
3.00 3.00 0.00 Env.performa
nce of REDD 
0.0867 0.0844 0.0022 
Policy 
objectives 
3.11 2.67 0.44 Policy 
objectives 
0.0467 0.1200 -0.0733 
Actors 2.89 4.22 -1.33 Actors 0.0933 0.0089 0.0844 
Implementa-
tion of REDD 
2.67 2.78 -0.11 Implementa-
tion of  REDD 
0.1144 0.0811 0.0333 
International 
context 
2.44 2.89 -0.44 International 
context 
0.1689 0.0711 0.0978 
Co-benefits of 
REDD 
4.11 3.78 0.33 Co-benefits of 
REDD 
0.0122 0.0167 -0.0044 
Temporal 
aspects 
3.11 2.78 0.33 Temporal 
aspects 
0.0567 0.0822 -0.0256 
Politics & 
negotiations  
4.33 4.44 -0.11 Politics & 
negotiations  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 30. Summary of analysis of variances. Differences of centrality and specificity 
scores between pre- and post-test, experts REDD exercise. 
                                          Centrality  Specificity 
 df F  df F 
Financing and sources 1,16 .09 Financing and sources 1,16 1.45 
Allocation/disbursement 1,16 .09 Allocation/disbursement 1,16 .007 
Governance of mechanism 1,16 .44 Governance of mechanism 1,16 1.96 
Environmental 
performance of REDD 
1,16 .00 Environmental 
performance of REDD 
1,16 .003 
Policy objectives 1,16 .32 Policy objectives 1,16 1.26 
Actors 1,16 4.84** Actors
1
 1,8.72 4.09* 
Implementation of REDD 1,16 .24 Implementation of REDD 1,16 .29 
International context 1,16 .33 International context 1,16 2.24 
Co-benefits of REDD 1,16 .28 Co-benefits of REDD 1,16 .08 
Temporal aspects
1
 1,14.09 .23 Temporal aspects 1,16 .276 
Politics and negotiations 1,16 .09 Politics and negotiations 1,16 .00 
1
 Welch-test (robust against violation of equal variances) reported as the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was violated for ANOVA. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
Table 31. Centrality and specificity scores on concept maps, students REDD exercise. 
                               Centrality                                 Specificity 
 Mean 
score 
map 1 
(X1) 
Mean 
score 
map 2 
(X2) 
Chang
e (X1-
X2) 
 Mean 
score 
map 1 
(X1) 
Mean 
score 
map 2 
(X2) 
Change 
(X1-X2) 
Financing & 
sources 
1.48 1.19 0.29 Financing and 
sources 
0.1929 0.2047 -0.0118 
Allocation/ 
disbursement 
2.22 1.94 0.28 Allocation/ 
disbursement 
0.1201 0.1278 -0.0077 
Governance 
of 
mechanism 
2.75 1.94 0.81 Governance 
of mechanism 
0.1025 0.1200 -0.0176 
Env. 
performance 
of REDD 
2.00 1.91 0.09 Environmenta
l performance 
of REDD 
0.1597 0.1457 0.0140 
Policy 
objectives 
2.59 3.32 -0.72 Policy 
objectives 
0.0807 0.0538 0.0269 
Actors 2.90 3.42 -0.52 Actors 0.0727 0.0500 0.0227 
Implementati
on of REDD 
2.52 3.03 -0.51 Implementati
on of REDD 
0.1009 0.0707 0.0302 
International 3.94 4.10 -0.16 International 0.0119 0.0126 -0.0007 
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context context 
Co-benefits 
of REDD 
3.78 2.46 1.32 Co-benefits of 
REDD 
0.0574 0.0954 -0.0380 
Temporal 
aspects 
3.45 3.00 0.45 Temporal 
aspects 
0.0351 0.0433 -0.0082 
Politics and 
negotiations 
3.04 3.23 -0.19 Politics and 
negotiations 
0.0660 0.0759 -0.0099 
 
 
Table 32. Summary of analysis of variances. Differences of centrality and specificity 
scores between pre- and post-test, , students REDD exercise. 
                                               Centrality  Specificity 
 df F  df F 
Financing and 
sources
1
 
1,130.99 3.73* Financing and sources 1,136 1.52 
Allocation/ 
disbursement 
1,136 1.43 Allocation/ 
disbursement 
1,136 .43 
Governance of 
mechanism
1
 
1,129.18 9.46*** Governance of 
mechanism 
1,136 3.97** 
Env. performance of 
REDD 
1,136 .11 Env. performance of 
REDD
1
 
1,127.17 1.37 
Policy objectives 1,136 6.39** Policy objectives
1
 1,114.03 5.94** 
Actors 1,136 3.64* Actors
1
 1,114.53 5.05** 
Implementation of 
REDD 
1,136 3.01* Implementation of 
REDD
1
 
1,112.79 8.50*** 
International context 1,136 .51 International context 1,136 .05 
Co-benefits of REDD
1
 1,121.18 26.08*** Co-benefits of REDD
1
 1,96.48 27.41*** 
Temporal aspects
1
 1,132.06 3.35* Temporal aspects 1,136 3.08 
Politics and 
negotiations
1
 
1,131.85 .43 Politics and 
negotiations 
1,136 .87 
1
 Welch-test (robust against violation of equal variances) reported as the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was violated for ANOVA. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
Table 33. Summary of analysis of variances. Between-group (expert/student) 
differences in centrality and specificity scores at pre-test, REDD exercise. 
                                                      Centrality  Specificity 
 df F  df F 
Financing and sources
1
 1,8.81 .32 Financing and sources 1,76 1.19 
Allocation/disbursement
1
 1,27.49 14.43** Allocation/disbursement 1,76 7.30** 
Governance of 
mechanism 
1,76 .02 Governance of 
mechanism 
1,76 .35 
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Environmental 
performance of REDD 
1,76 3.83** Environmental 
performance of REDD 
1,76 2.49 
Policy objectives 1,76 .85 Policy objectives 1,76 1.28 
Actors 1,76 .00 Actors 1,76 .01 
Implementation of REDD 1,76 .06 Implementation of REDD 1,76 .01 
International context
1
 1,8.98 5.81** International context
1
 1,8.11 8.51** 
Co-benefits of REDD 1,76 .59 Co-benefits of REDD 1,76 .16 
Temporal aspects 1,76 .51 Temporal aspects
1
 1,12.39 .26 
Politics and negotiations
1
 1,20.02 18.52*** Politics and 
negotiations
1
 
1,8.45 .42 
1
 Welch-test (robust against violation of equal variances) reported as the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was violated for ANOVA. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
Table 34. Summary of analysis of variances. Between-group (expert/student) differences in 
centrality and specificity scores at post-test, REDD exercise. 
                                                     Centrality  Specificity 
 df F  df F 
Financing and sources
1
 1,8.48 .42 Financing and sources 1,76  
Allocation/ 
disbursement 
1,76 1.12 Allocation/ 
disbursement 
1,76  
Governance of 
mechanism 
1,76 .11 Governance of 
mechanism 
1,76  
Environmental 
performance of REDD 
1,76 3.58 Environmental 
performance of REDD 
1,76  
Policy objectives 1,76 1.07 Policy objectives
1
 1,8.70 1.33 
Actors
1
 1,12.52 3.19* Actors
1
 1,41.30 9.11*** 
Implementation of 
REDD 
1,76 .16 Implementation of 
REDD 
1,76  
International context 1,76 6.05** International context
1
 1,8.22 2.55 
Co-benefits of REDD 1,76 4.53** Co-benefits of REDD
1
 1,35.36 20.09*** 
Temporal aspects 1,76 .16 Temporal aspects
1
 1,9.12 .21 
Politics and 
negotiations
1
 
1,18.95 10.86*** Politics and 
negotiations
2
 
1,76 2.32 
1
 Welch-test (robust against violation of equal variances) reported as the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was violated for ANOVA. 
2
Homogeneity of variance violated for ANOVA, but Welch-test could not be conducted as the 
variance in one group was 0.  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Annex 2.C Additional evidence for cognitive learning from concept map 
analysis 
 
Table 35. Summary of analysis of variance. Difference in number of items and levels 
per participant group between pre- and post-test. 
 df F 
Experts EU 
Burden-
sharing 
Items 1, 8 .29 
  Levels 1, 8 .00 
  REDD Items 1, 16 .30 
  Levels 1, 16 .35 
Students EU 
Burden-
sharing 
Items 1, 118 23.31*** 
Levels 1, 118 3.25* 
REDD Items 1, 136 13.16*** 
Levels 1,136 4.11** 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
Table 36. Summary of analysis of variance. Between-group differences (experts vs. 
students; REDD vs. burden-sharing) at pre- and at post-test. 
   df F 
Experts vs. students No. of items pre-test 1,141 3.68* 
  post-test 1,141   .66 
 No. of levels pre-test 1,141 3.45* 
  post-test 1,141 1.34 
Burden-sharing vs. REDD No. of items pre-test 1,141 6.15** 
  post-test 1,141 1.99 
 No. of levels pre-test 1,141 .63 
  post-test 1,141 .12 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
Table 37. Shift in response types from pre- to post-concept maps, per participant 
group. Results from Wilcox Signed-Rank test. 
  z 
Experts EU Burden-sharing .00 
 REDD -1.73* 
Students EU Burden-sharing -3.67*** 
 REDD -2.74*** 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Annex 2.D Survey results, self-reported cognitive learning 
 
Table 38. Proximity to policy-making and self-reported cognitive learning (experts). 
 N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Cognitive learning 
about current policy 
Close to policy-making (public 
sector/NGO) 
7 2.7143 .95119 
Further removed from policy-
making (research/private 
sector) 
19 3.6842 .82007 
Total 26 3.4231 .94543 
Cognitive learning 
about future policy 
Close to policy-making (public 
sector/NGO) 
7 3.2857 1.25357 
Further removed from policy-
making (research/private 
sector) 
19 3.6316 .95513 
Total 26 3.5385 1.02882 
Cognitive learning 
about policy dynamics 
Close to policy-making (public 
sector/NGO) 
7 3.8571 .37796 
Further removed from policy-
making (research/private 
sector) 
19 3.7368 .93346 
Total 26 3.7692 .81524 
 
 
 
Table 39. Academic background and self-reported cognitive learning (students, 
burden-sharing exercise). 
 N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Cognitive learning 
about current policy 
 
Political 
science/IR/European studies 
11 3.7273 1.10371 
Social sciences and 
environmental subjects 
25 3.8400 .80000 
Natural 
sciences/Humanities/others 
11 3.1818 1.16775 
Total 47 3.6596 .98415 
Cognitive learning about 
future policy 
 
Political 
science/IR/European studies 
11 4.2727 1.00905 
Social sciences and 
environmental subjects 
25 4.2800 .84261 
Natural 
sciences/Humanities/others 
11 4.5455 .68755 
Total 47 4.3404 .84124 
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Cognitive learning about 
policy dynamics 
Political 
science/IR/European studies 
11 3.9091 .94388 
Social sciences and 
environmental subjects 
25 3.8400 1.06771 
Natural 
sciences/Humanities/others 
11 4.0000 .77460 
Total 47 3.8936 .96084 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
    
Table 40. Pearson correlations, motivation of experts to participate in the policy 
exercise and self-reported cognitive learning.  
  Cognitive 
learning about 
current policy 
Cognitive 
learning about 
future policy 
Cognitive 
learning about 
policy dynamics 
To learn more about current 
developments in European climate 
policy/ REDD financing 
.299 -.088 .321 
To better understand the dynamics of 
EU climate policy-making/ 
international climate policy-making 
.456
*
 -.105 .149 
To learn more about future 
developments in European climate 
policy/REDD financing 
.036 -.044 -.068 
To better understand the different 
perspectives of stakeholders in 
European climate policy/ REDD 
.269 .077 .491
*
 
Interest in the work of the ADAM 
project/the REDD-ALERT project 
.409 .062 .472
*
 
Opportunity to network .472
*
 .235 .583
**
 
Policy exercise format .525
*
 -.029 .433 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Annex 2.E Survey results, recorded normative change from pre- to post-test 
 
Table 41. T-test results for pre- and post-survey statements for the expert run of the 
burden-sharing exercise 
 Survey 1 
Std. Error 
Mean 
(SE1) 
Survey 2 
Std. Error 
Mean 
(SE2) 
t Sig. (2-
tailed) 
In your view, how important are the following factors in reaching agreement on effort-sharing in 
the EU? 
Sound and transparent economic models 
with clear criteria underlying member state 
targets 
0.23 0.14 -0.43 0.68 
Arrangements which take account of historic 
emission reductions 
0.16 0.19 1.00 0.34 
Willingness of the economically most 
advanced member states to shoulder a 
comparatively larger mitigation burden 
0.21 0.25 1.17 0.27 
Willingness of the less advanced member 
states to make climate change a political 
priority, even if this comes at a certain 
economic cost 
0.18 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Compensation or ‘side payments’ in other 
policy domains 
0.25 0.26 -1.00 0.34 
Pressure for the EU to lead internationally 0.14 0.18 1.84 0.10* 
Strong role of the Commission as an 
impartial facilitator 
0.33 0.18 -1.00 0.34 
In your view, how important are the following factors for the successful implementation of an 
effort-sharing agreement? 
Fairness of targets 0.20 0.21 -1.00 0.34 
An economic context which allows for 
reaching the targets at reasonable costs to 
the economy 
0.23 0.18 0.00 1.00 
A strict compliance regime, with heavy 
sanctions for non-compliers 
0.19 0.18 -0.43 0.68 
Temporal flexibility, including options for the 
banking and borrowing of emission 
reductions 
0.25 0.27 -0.45 0.66 
Fairness of allowance allocation under the 
EU ETS 
0.23 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Accurate and timely reporting of emission 
trends by member states 
0.18 0.21 0.36 0.72 
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Good management on behalf of the 
Commission as regards monitoring and 
enforcement 
0.16 0.19 -1.00 0.34 
The push-effect of a global climate 
agreement including ambitious targets for all 
major emitters 
0.21 0.19 1.61 0.14 
Evidence of significant emission reductions 
globally 
0.21 0.22 3.00 0.01** 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements in the context of burden-/effort-
sharing in European climate policy?  
The EC protects the interests of the less 
developed countries too much 
0.23 0.24 -2.63 0.03** 
The wealthier member states care too little 
about economic development of the poorer 
countries 
0.28 0.28 0.00 1.00 
The economically less advanced member 
states should attach a higher priority to 
climate policy in their national policies 
0.16 0.21 .803 0.44 
The Commission is pushing too hard to 
achieve an ambitious effort-sharing/target-
setting outcome 
0.35 0.28 -1.00 0.34 
 
 
 
Table 42. Means and standard deviations in pre- and post-survey statements for the 
expert run of the burden-sharing exercise. 
 Surve
y 1 
Mean 
(X1) 
Surve
y 2 
Mean 
(X2) 
Chang
e (X2-
X1) 
Surve
y 1 
Std. 
Deviat
ion 
(SD1) 
Surve
y 2 
Std. 
Deviat
ion 
(SD2) 
Chang
e 
(SD1-
SD2) 
In your view, how important are the following factors in reaching agreement on effort-sharing in 
the EU? 
Sound and transparent economic 
models with clear criteria underlying 
member state targets 
4.18 4.27 0.09 0.75 0.54 0.21 
Arrangements which take account of 
historic emission reductions 
3.91 3.73 -0.18 0.47 0.65 -0.18 
Willingness of the economically most 
advanced member states to shoulder 
a comparatively larger mitigation 
burden 
4.45 4.09 -0.36 0.69 0.83 -0.14 
Willingness of the less advanced 
member states to make climate 
change a political priority, even if this 
comes at a certain economic cost 
4.18 4.18 0.00 0.60 0.60 0.00 
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Compensation or ‘side payments’ in 
other policy domains 
3.55 3.82 0.27 0.82 0.87 -0.05 
Pressure for the EU to lead 
internationally 
4.27 3.82 -0.45 0.47 0.60 -0.14 
Strong role of the Commission as an 
impartial facilitator 
3.80 4.10 0.30 1.03 0.57 0.47 
In your view, how important are the following factors for the successful implementation of an 
effort-sharing agreement? 
Fairness of targets 3.80 4.00 0.20 0.63 0.67 -0.03 
An economic context which allows for 
reaching the targets at reasonable 
costs to the economy 
4.18 4.18 0.00 0.75 0.60 0.15 
A strict compliance regime, with 
heavy sanctions for non-compliers 
3.73 3.82 0.09 0.65 0.60 0.04 
Temporal flexibility, including options 
for the banking and borrowing of 
emission reductions 
3.55 3.73 0.18 0.82 0.90 -0.08 
Fairness of allowance allocation under 
the EU ETS 
4.00 4.00 0.00 0.77 0.63 0.14 
Accurate and timely reporting of 
emission trends by member states 
4.18 4.09 -0.09 0.60 0.70 -0.10 
Good management on behalf of the 
Commission as regards monitoring 
and enforcement 
4.09 4.27 0.18 0.54 0.65 -0.11 
The push-effect of a global climate 
agreement including ambitious 
targets for all major emitters 
4.45 4.00 -0.45 0.69 0.63 0.06 
Evidence of significant emission 
reductions globally 
4.00 3.50 -0.50 0.67 0.71 -0.04 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements in the context of burden-/effort-
sharing in European climate policy?  
The EC protects the interests of the 
less developed countries too much 
2.18 2.73 0.55 0.75 0.79 -0.04 
The wealthier member states care too 
little about economic development of 
the poorer countries 
3.09 3.09 0.00 0.94 0.94 0.00 
The economically less advanced 
member states should attach a higher 
priority to climate policy in their 
national policies 
4.10 3.90 0.20 0.54 0.70 0.16 
The Commission is pushing too hard 
to achieve an ambitious effort-
sharing/target-setting outcome 
2.18 2.45 0.27 1.17 0.93 0.23 
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Table 43. T-test results for pre- and post-survey statements for the student run of the 
burden-sharing exercise 
 Survey 1 
Std. Error 
Mean (SE1) 
Survey 2 Std. 
Error Mean 
(SE2) 
t Sig. (2-
tailed) 
In your view, how important are the following factors in reaching agreement on effort-sharing in 
the EU? 
Sound and transparent economic 
models with clear criteria 
underlying member state targets 
0.09 0.12 1.61 .115 
Arrangements which take 
account of historic emission 
reductions 
0.15 0.13 -4.05 .000** 
Willingness of the economically 
most advanced member states to 
shoulder a comparatively larger 
mitigation burden 
0.13 0.14 -1.04 .303 
Willingness of the less advanced 
member states to make climate 
change a political priority, even if 
this comes at a certain economic 
cost 
0.12 0.09 -2.22 .032* 
Compensation or ‘side payments’ 
in other policy domains 
0.13 0.13 0.15 .878 
Pressure for the EU to lead 
internationally 
0.16 0.18 0.64 .523 
Strong role of the Commission as 
an impartial facilitator 
0.13 0.14 -1.96 .057 
In your view, how important are the following factors for the successful implementation of an 
effort-sharing agreement? 
Fairness of targets 0.12 0.10 0.60 .555 
An economic context which allows 
for reaching the targets at 
reasonable costs to the economy 
0.13 0.11 -1.03 .309 
A strict compliance regime, with 
heavy sanctions for non-compliers 
0.13 0.12 0.17 .868 
Temporal flexibility, including 
options for the banking and 
borrowing of emission reductions 
0.14 0.15 -1.92 .062 
Fairness of allowance allocation 
under the EU ETS 
0.11 0.14 1.50 .141 
Accurate and timely reporting of 
emission trends by member states 
0.15 0.12 -0.62 .538 
Good management on behalf of 
the Commission as regards 
monitoring and enforcement 
0.11 0.10 1.43 .160 
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The push-effect of a global 
climate agreement including 
ambitious targets for all major 
emitters 
0.13 0.13 -0.46 .645 
Evidence of significant emission 
reductions globally 
0.15 0.16 0.85 .403 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements in the context of burden-/effort-
sharing in European climate policy?  
The EC protects the interests of the 
less developed countries too much 
0.12 0.12 -1.48 .146 
The wealthier member states care 
too little about economic 
development of the poorer 
countries 
0.15 0.18 0.67 .507 
The economically less advanced 
member states should attach a 
higher priority to climate policy in 
their national policies 
0.16 0.13 -0.60 .553 
The Commission is pushing too 
hard to achieve an ambitious 
effort-sharing/target-setting 
outcome 
0.13 0.13 -0.67 .507 
 
 
 
Table 44. Means and standard deviations in pre- and post-survey statements for the 
student run of the burden-sharing exercise. 
 Survey 
1 
Mean 
(X1) 
Survey 
2 
Mean 
(X2) 
Chang
e (X2-
X1) 
Survey 
1 Std. 
Deviat
ion 
(SD1) 
Survey 
2 Std. 
Deviati
on 
(SD2) 
Chang
e (SD1-
SD2) 
In your view, how important are the following factors in reaching agreement on effort-sharing in 
the EU? 
Sound and transparent economic 
models with clear criteria 
underlying member state targets 
4.20 3.95 -0.24 0.60 0.77 -0.17 
Arrangements which take account of 
historic emission reductions 
3.12 3.90 0.78 0.98 0.83 0.15 
Willingness of the economically most 
advanced member states to shoulder 
a comparatively larger mitigation 
burden 
4.00 4.12 0.12 0.84 0.87 -0.03 
Willingness of the less advanced 
member states to make climate 
change a political priority, even if 
3.76 4.02 0.27 0.77 0.57 0.20 
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this comes at a certain economic 
cost 
Compensation or ‘side payments’ in 
other policy domains 
3.30 3.28 -0.02 0.82 0.82 0.01 
Pressure for the EU to lead 
internationally 
3.61 3.51 -0.10 1.02 1.16 -0.14 
Strong role of the Commission as an 
impartial facilitator 
3.37 3.68 0.32 0.86 0.91 -0.05 
In your view, how important are the following factors for the successful implementation of an 
effort-sharing agreement? 
Fairness of targets 4.39 4.32 -0.07 0.77 0.61 0.16 
An economic context which allows 
for reaching the targets at 
reasonable costs to the economy 
4.00 4.15 0.15 0.84 0.69 0.15 
A strict compliance regime, with 
heavy sanctions for non-compliers 
4.07 4.05 -0.02 0.82 0.77 0.05 
Temporal flexibility, including 
options for the banking and 
borrowing of emission reductions 
3.33 3.65 0.33 0.89 0.92 -0.03 
Fairness of allowance allocation 
under the EU ETS 
4.26 4.03 -0.23 0.72 0.90 -0.19 
Accurate and timely reporting of 
emission trends by member states 
4.02 4.10 0.07 0.96 0.80 0.16 
Good management on behalf of the 
Commission as regards monitoring 
and enforcement 
4.32 4.17 -0.15 0.69 0.67 0.02 
The push-effect of a global climate 
agreement including ambitious 
targets for all major emitters 
3.80 3.88 0.07 0.84 0.84 0.00 
Evidence of significant emission 
reductions globally 
3.76 3.61 -0.15 0.97 1.05 -0.08 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements in the context of burden-/effort-
sharing in European climate policy?  
The EC protects the interests of the 
less developed countries too much 
2.49 2.68 0.20 0.75 0.79 -0.04 
The wealthier member states care 
too little about economic 
development of the poorer countries 
2.93 2.80 -0.12 0.96 1.14 -0.19 
The economically less advanced 
member states should attach a 
higher priority to climate policy in 
their national policies 
3.39 3.49 0.10 1.02 0.84 0.18 
The Commission is pushing too hard 
to achieve an ambitious effort-
sharing/target-setting outcome 
2.34 2.46 0.12 0.82 0.84 -0.01 
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Table 45. T-test results for pre- and post-survey statements of the expert run of the 
REDD exercise. 
 Survey 1 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
(SE1) 
Survey 2 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
(SE2) 
t Sig. (2-
tailed) 
A global REDD+ fund is a valuable interim step 
before linking REDD+ to the global carbon 
market. 
0.41 0.20 -1.32 .225 
Establishing the structures for a global REDD+ 
fund might lead to ‘institutional lock-in’ and 
delay or altogether prevent the integration of 
REDD+ credits into the global carbon market. 
0.26 0.32 0.32 .760 
A global performance-based REDD+ fund is the 
most adequate instrument for financing REDD+ 
also in the long term. 
0.31 0.42 0.00 1.000 
A global REDD+ fund will never generate a 
meaningful level of funding. 
0.42 0.34 1.47 .179 
A global performance-based REDD+ fund 
should make co-benefits, such as biodiversity, a 
key criterion for disbursing funds. 
0.28 0.56 0.82 .438 
A balanced regional distribution of funding 
should be of highest priority for a global REDD+ 
fund. 
0.36 0.41 -0.45 .665 
A global REDD+ fund should be managed by an 
institution with long-standing experience and 
expertise in the field, like the World Bank or 
the GEF. 
0.26 0.29 0.22 .834 
Establishing a REDD+ mechanism that will 
effectively reduce tropical deforestation rates 
is almost impossible 
0.22 0.28 -1.84 .104 
 
 
 
Table 46. Means and standard deviations in pre- and post-survey statements of the 
expert run of the REDD exercise. 
 Surve
y 1 
Mean 
(X1) 
Surve
y 2 
Mean 
(X2) 
Chan
ge 
(X2-
X1) 
Surve
y 1 
Std. 
Devia
tion 
(SD1) 
Surve
y 2 
Std. 
Devia
tion 
(SD2) 
Chan
ge 
(SD1-
SD2) 
A global REDD+ fund is a valuable interim 
step before linking REDD+ to the global 
carbon market. 
3.67 4.11 0.44 1.22 0.60 0.62 
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Establishing the structures for a global 
REDD+ fund might lead to ‘institutional 
lock-in’ and delay or altogether prevent 
the integration of REDD+ credits into the 
global carbon market. 
2.89 2.78 -0.11 0.78 0.97 -0.19 
A global performance-based REDD+ fund is 
the most adequate instrument for 
financing REDD+ also in the long term. 
3.11 3.11 0.00 0.93 1.27 -0.34 
A global REDD+ fund will never generate a 
meaningful level of funding. 
3.11 2.56 -0.56 1.27 1.01 0.26 
A global performance-based REDD+ fund 
should make co-benefits, such as 
biodiversity, a key criterion for disbursing 
funds. 
3.78 3.44 -0.33 0.83 1.67 -0.83 
A balanced regional distribution of funding 
should be of highest priority for a global 
REDD+ fund. 
3.22 3.44 0.22 1.09 1.24 -0.14 
A global REDD+ fund should be managed 
by an institution with long-standing 
experience and expertise in the field, like 
the World Bank or the GEF. 
3.11 3.00 -0.11 0.78 0.87 -0.08 
Establishing a REDD+ mechanism that will 
effectively reduce tropical deforestation 
rates is almost impossible. 
1.78 2.22 0.44 0.67 0.83 -0.17 
 
 
 
Table 47. T-test results for ranking exercise in pre- and post-surveys of the expert run 
of the REDD exercise. 
 Survey 1 
Std. Error 
Mean (SE1) 
Survey 2 
Std. Error 
Mean (SE2) 
t Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Disbursement criteria 0.19 0.24 0.63 0.551 
Modalities for verification of 
performance 
0.17 0.19 -1.18 0.277 
Monitoring requirements 0.21 0.18 0.64 0.542 
Fund capitalisation and replenishment 0.21 0.21 1.53 0.170 
Accounting for the co-benefits of REDD+ 0.22 0.21 0.73 0.487 
Institutional arrangements 0.22 0.22 -0.19 0.857 
Modalities for stakeholder participation 0.19 0.22 0.00 1.000 
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Table 48. Means and standard deviations for ranking exercise in pre- and post-
surveys of the expert run of the REDD exercise. 
  Survey 1 
Mean 
(X1) 
Survey 2 
Mean 
(X2) 
Change 
(X2-X1) 
Survey 1 
Std. 
Deviatio
n (SD1) 
Survey 2 
Std. 
Deviatio
n (SD2) 
Change 
(SD1-
SD2) 
Disbursement criteria 3.75 3.13 -0.63 1.98 2.30 -0.31 
Modalities for verification 
of performance 
3.63 4.50 0.88 2.62 1.51 1.10 
Monitoring requirements 4.50 4.00 -0.50 1.85 1.51 0.34 
Fund capitalisation and 
replenishment 
3.25 2.25 -1.00 1.67 2.05 -0.38 
Accounting for the co-
benefits of REDD+ 
4.50 4.00 -0.50 1.85 1.77 0.08 
Institutional arrangements 3.63 3.75 0.13 2.07 1.83 0.23 
Modalities for stakeholder 
participation 
4.75 4.75 0.00 2.25 2.19 0.06 
 
 
 
Table 49. T-test results (based on corrected data) for ranking exercise in pre- and 
post-surveys of the student runs of the REDD exercise. 
  Survey 1 
Std. Error 
Mean 
(SE1) 
Survey 2 
Std. Error 
Mean 
(SE2) 
t Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Disbursement criteria 0.19 0.24 -2.61 .011 
Modalities for verification of 
performance 
0.17 0.19 -0.79 .435 
Monitoring requirements 0.21 0.18 0.81 .422 
Fund capitalisation and replenishment 0.21 0.21 0.36 .716 
Accounting for the co-benefits of REDD+ 0.22 0.21 0.90 .369 
Institutional arrangements 0.22 0.22 2.75 .008 
Modalities for stakeholder participation 0.19 0.22 -0.92 .362 
 
 
 
Table 50. Means and standard deviations for ranking exercise in pre- and post-
surveys of the student runs of the REDD exercise (based on corrected data). 
  Survey 1 
Mean 
(X1) 
Survey 2 
Mean 
(X2) 
Change 
(X2-X1) 
Survey 1 
Std. 
Deviatio
n (SD1) 
Survey 2 
Std. 
Deviatio
n (SD2) 
Change 
(SD1-
SD2) 
Disbursement criteria 2.57 3.38 0.80 1.58 2.02 -0.43 
Annex 
 
223 
 
Modalities for verification 
of performance 
3.97 4.16 0.19 1.42 1.60 -0.17 
Monitoring requirements 4.50 4.29 -0.21 1.74 1.44 0.30 
Fund capitalisation and 
replenishment 
2.35 2.27 -0.08 1.76 1.73 0.03 
Accounting for the co-
benefits of REDD+ 
4.33 4.12 -0.20 1.78 1.74 0.04 
Institutional 
arrangements 
4.52 3.71 -0.82 1.83 1.79 0.04 
Modalities for 
stakeholder participation 
5.35 5.60 0.25 1.59 1.83 -0.24 
 
 
Table 51. T-test results for pre- and post-survey statements of the student runs of 
the REDD exercise. 
  Survey 1 
Std. Error 
Mean (SE1) 
Survey 2 
Std. Error 
Mean (SE2) 
t Sig. (2-
tailed) 
A global REDD+ fund is a valuable interim step 
before linking REDD+ to the global carbon market. 
0.08 0.12 0.70 .489 
Establishing the structures for a global REDD+ 
fund might lead to ‘institutional lock-in’ and delay 
or altogether prevent the integration of REDD+ 
credits into the global carbon market. 
0.11 0.12 -1.75 .084 
A global performance-based REDD+ fund is the 
most adequate instrument for financing REDD+ 
also in the long term. 
0.14 0.14 -0.09 .928 
A global REDD+ fund will never generate a 
meaningful level of funding. 
0.11 0.12 -0.18 .857 
A global performance-based REDD+ fund should 
make co-benefits, such as biodiversity, a key 
criterion for disbursing funds. 
0.12 0.14 2.29 .025 
A balanced regional distribution of funding should 
be of highest priority for a global REDD+ fund. 
0.13 0.13 1.28 .205 
A global REDD+ fund should be managed by an 
institution with long-standing experience and 
expertise in the field, like the World Bank or the 
GEF. 
0.12 0.15 0.61 .544 
Establishing a REDD+ mechanism that will 
effectively reduce tropical deforestation rates is 
almost impossible 
0.11 0.13 -0.90 .374 
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Table 52. Means and standard deviations in pre- and post-survey statements of the 
student runs of the REDD exercise. 
  Surve
y 1 
Mean 
(X1) 
Surve
y 2 
Mean 
(X2) 
Chan
ge 
(X2-
X1) 
Surve
y 1 
Std. 
Devia
tion 
(SD1) 
Surve
y 2 
Std. 
Devia
tion 
(SD2) 
Chan
ge 
(SD1-
SD2) 
A global REDD+ fund is a valuable interim 
step before linking REDD+ to the global 
carbon market. 
4.25 4.17 -0.08 0.70 1.01 -0.31 
Establishing the structures for a global 
REDD+ fund might lead to ‘institutional 
lock-in’ and delay or altogether prevent 
the integration of REDD+ credits into the 
global carbon market. 
2.83 3.08 0.25 0.95 1.06 -0.11 
A global performance-based REDD+ fund is 
the most adequate instrument for 
financing REDD+ also in the long term. 
3.47 3.48 0.01 1.19 1.20 -0.01 
A global REDD+ fund will never generate a 
meaningful level of funding. 
2.69 2.72 0.03 0.97 1.06 -0.09 
A global performance-based REDD+ fund 
should make co-benefits, such as 
biodiversity, a key criterion for disbursing 
funds. 
4.04 3.72 -0.32 1.04 1.23 -0.19 
A balanced regional distribution of funding 
should be of highest priority for a global 
REDD+ fund. 
3.24 3.04 -0.20 1.11 1.17 -0.05 
A global REDD+ fund should be managed 
by an institution with long-standing 
experience and expertise in the field, like 
the World Bank or the GEF. 
3.43 3.33 -0.09 1.05 1.27 -0.21 
Establishing a REDD+ mechanism that will 
effectively reduce tropical deforestation 
rates is almost impossible 
2.27 2.36 0.09 0.98 1.11 -0.12 
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Annex 2.F Method for recoding responses for the ranking exercise in the 
REDD survey 
We applied this method to all response sets where more than one item had received 
the same rank(s), or where one or two items had not received a score at all (responses 
with more than two missing scores were excluded from the analysis). In recoding the 
responses, we sought to retain the relative position of each item in relation to the 
others, while at the same time adjusting its value in such a way that the mean for all 
seven items, after recoding, would equal that of a correctly ranked set of items 
(M(1,2,3,4,5,6,7)=4). For instance, for a set where two items were ranked ‘1’, we 
recoded both with the score of 1.5, to reflect that they jointly occupied the first and 
second out of seven ranks. For illustration, a few examples from the reare included 
below. 
Item  A B C C E F G Mean 
value 
Original 
response set  
2 2 3 3 4 5 6 3.57 
Response set 
after recoding 
1.5 1.5 3.5 3.5 5 6 7 4 
Original 
response set 
1 1 1 4 5 5 6 3.29 
Response set 
after recoding 
2 2 2 4 5.5 5.5 7 4 
Original 
response set 
2 2 3 3 7 7 7 4.43 
Response set 
after recoding 
1.5 1.5 3.5 3.5 6 6 6 4 
Original 
response set 
1 2 3 4 5 6  3.5 
Response set 
after recoding 
1 2.2 3.4 4.6 5.8 7  4 
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Summary  
 
 
The urgency and scale of the climate problem require innovative ways of thinking 
about policy options that effectively address the complexities and scope of the 
challenge. Learning by policy-makers, scientists, and the public alike is needed to 
come to grips with the dilemmas posed by the specific characteristics of the climate 
challenge. The present thesis examines the potential offered by policy exercises, a 
type of simulation game involving policy-makers and experts, for policy-oriented 
learning. In doing so, it seeks to contribute to a better understanding of learning in 
and for environmental governance, at both the conceptual and the measurement 
level. 
The notion of learning in and for environmental governance builds on several bodies 
of literature, of which the policy sciences, organisational theory, and natural 
resources and adaptive management are considered most relevant to the present 
work. Analyses of learning span a range of social units of analysis, from the level of 
the individual to policy-making systems at large. There are different views in the 
literature as to whether learning needs to result in an observable behavioural or 
policy change, and whether only certain types of change qualify as learning. This 
thesis defines policy-oriented learning as a change in understanding, which in the first 
instance occurs at the level of the individual. Contrary to many typologies which 
embrace a hierarchical understanding of learning, it argues that differentiating 
between different types of learning may be a more appropriate way of 
conceptualizing learning in an environmental governance context. 
The conceptualisation of learning developed here distinguishes between cognitive, 
normative and relational learning. Cognitive learning is defined as the acquisition of 
new knowledge and facts, or the better structuring of existing knowledge, enabling 
more holistic or systems thinking. Normative learning refers to shifts in views, values 
or paradigms, which may vary in their degree of abstraction and social 
embeddedness. Relational learning finally involves a better understanding of others’ 
mind sets, the development of trust and/or a better ability to cooperate. Applications 
of the typology have proven that it lends itself well to cross-case comparison, also 
when involving different evaluation teams. Distinguishing phenomena along the 
cognitive-normative-relational axis is intuitive. Moreover, the lack of a hierarchy 
between different levels of learning may reduce evaluator bias as there is no pressure 
to detect ‘higher order’ effects, which may not be forthcoming, especially if the 
appraisal process is rather short. 
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Policy exercises were first proposed in the late 1980s as a way to make sense of 
complex environmental problems and learn about potential ways of addressing them. 
They responded to the need of adjusting model-based simulation games, which had 
originally developed in a military context and over time broadened to other types of 
applications, to the challenges of long-term policy development in socio-ecological 
systems. Typically, participants in a policy exercise assume roles and take decisions in 
a structured setting that represents a simplified model of the system of reference 
that the game is supposed to represent. There are many claims in the literature as to 
the great learning potential that policy games and exercises offer to participants, 
from improved knowledge integration to stimulating creativity for developing novel 
policy options, including normative and relational benefits. Yet to date this potential 
– and the limitations of the method – have been hardly evaluated in a systematic 
fashion. This finding rings true for a broader range of interactive appraisal methods 
and represents the research gap that the present thesis seeks to address. 
Despite their increasing application in environmental governance contexts, 
systematic evaluations of the learning effects of these methods are still lacking. Most 
efforts undertaken thus far fall short on several counts. Many do not sufficiently 
distinguish between different types of learning, but above all studies rarely involve a 
sufficient set of measurement tools and controls to allow for robust findings. The 
present thesis sets a higher conceptual and methodological standard in this respect. 
It devises a comprehensive evaluation framework that captures different types of 
learning and makes use of a variety of measurement instruments (concept maps, 
surveys, interviews, participant observations, collective debriefing) employed at 
multiple points in time. The framework thereby complies with standards stipulated in 
the evaluation literature, which underscore that assessments of learning should 
combine multiple methods and data sources and measure learning longitudinally. 
We designed and ran two policy exercises on subjects in the realm of international 
climate policy, and evaluated the learning effects from these using the evaluation 
framework referred to above. The first exercise was about challenges related 
distributing emission reduction commitments among member states in the European 
Union, a process commonly known as ‘burden-sharing’ or ‘effort sharing’. The second 
exercise examined options to set up a global fund for REDD (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) under the international climate regime. Such a 
fund would offer financial compensation to developing countries that succeed in 
protecting their forests, thereby avoiding emissions from lost forest carbon stocks.  
Both exercises thus treat complex, unresolved puzzles that have a strong multi-actor, 
equity dimension. Both were run twice, once with international experts and once 
with Master’s students. This multiple-case research design allowed for comparing 
learning effects across the different groups, by disaggregating and aggregating the 
resulting evaluation data along two axes: the maturity of the topic of the exercise (EU 
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burden-sharing being a ‘mature’ policy topic, whereas REDD financing was more 
‘novel’) and the level of expertise of the participants. In terms of limitations of the 
assessment, the thesis focused on participants’ learning, rather than a 
comprehensive evaluation of the policy exercise. In terms of data and research design, 
the lack of a fully equivalent control group and the limited response rates for the 
post-exercise surveys and concept maps in the expert groups represent the most 
important constraints.  
The results of the evaluation demonstrate that policy exercises can produce 
substantial learning effects that can be empirically measured and documented. 
Comparing the three types of learning over the different exercise runs, evidence was 
strongest for participants’ cognitive learning, defined as the acquisition of new and 
the improved structuring of existing knowledge. Results from post-surveys and 
interviews indicate that participants gained insights both with regard to current 
policy developments and future policy options. More than anticipated given experts’ 
experience in policy-making, policy consultancy or applied research, they also learned 
about the dynamics of policy-making and negotiations. This underscores the value of 
experiential learning for developing a deep understanding of process dynamics – 
whether in climate policy or in a different field. Analysis of pre- and post-concept 
maps also testified to changes in the emphasis of key concepts associated with the 
topic of the policy exercises and to improved knowledge structuring as evident from 
an increase in the average number of map levels and items.  
The extent of normative and relational learning that we could ascertain was by 
comparison more limited. Survey results provided limited evidence for objectively 
‘recorded’ normative change and hardly any indication of normative convergence 
within the group. Participants self-evaluated the extent of their normative learning 
more positively, although rather in terms of revised viewpoints on specific issues than 
larger-scale normative shifts. Findings also support the hypothesis that role switches 
can support and facilitate normative learning. Relational learning benefits from the 
exercises concerned primarily a better understanding of others’ mind sets, positions 
and preferences. More specifically, participants reported insights into the interests of 
countries represented in the policy exercises and their underlying interests and 
motivations, as well as the wider actor configuration.  
Comparing between-group effects, results confirmed the hypothesis that, on average, 
students learned more in the exercises than the experts. This was likely a function of 
their much less developed background knowledge on the policy context and the 
specific topic of the policy exercises. Yet our research also found significant evidence 
of learning in the expert group. This is remarkable given the short duration of the 
policy exercise and the high baseline from which the experts started out. The 
expectation that the greater ‘novelty’ of the issue of REDD financing compared to EU 
burden-sharing might enable higher cognitive and normative learning effects among 
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experts (for students, both topics were equally unfamiliar) was generally confirmed. 
This leads to the tentative conclusion that policy exercises hold greater potential for 
more unstructured, less mature topic areas. 
The results of the evaluation confirm some, but not all of the benefits typically 
ascribed to policy exercises. Overall, the learning effects identified resonate with the 
emphasis on cognitive learning benefits voiced in the theoretical literature. There 
was evidence for improved knowledge integration and structuring, and participants 
self-reported insights into the advantages and drawbacks of various policy options. A 
broader, more holistic view of the problem equally transpired from some post-
exercise survey responses and interviews. Indications of an enhanced long-term 
orientation and a serious reflection of the risks and contingencies involved in future 
policy-making were more ambiguous, however. Similarly, the policy innovation 
observed – genuinely new and innovative insights and policy options raised in the 
context of the exercises – was fairly limited. Ultimately, it may do more justice to the 
potential of the method to view the outputs from policy games and exercises as one 
step in a longer appraisal process rather than as an end in themselves.  
On the upside, the exercises created a very interactive atmosphere that stimulated 
policy-makers and experts to share their knowledge and experience and engage in a 
lively dialogue over the proposed policy options, their broader impacts and 
associated challenges. The ‘decision pressure’ in the policy exercise played an 
important role in fostering this effective exchange across disciplinary and 
professional boundaries. This indicates that there is significant promise in using policy 
exercises as a tool to stimulate cognitive and relational learning at the interface of 
science and policy-making. Overall, a collaborative game design process involving key 
stakeholders from the start, a longer duration of the exercise as well as the ‘right’ set 
of participant, some of whom should ideally possess executive experience in policy-
making, should further enhance the effectiveness of the method – though all require 
significant convening power on the part of the organisers. 
In sum, the thesis broke new ground in systematically measuring the learning effects 
of policy exercises in the context of climate policy. Yet it concludes that there is still a 
substantial research agenda to be taken up for better understanding this tool and 
harnessing its potential for policy learning. First, there is still considerable scope in 
refining methods of measuring learning. The success of this thesis in demonstrating 
normative learning was limited. Here, new proxies for such learning and methods for 
measuring it are called for, perhaps linked to the analysis of concept maps. It is, 
however, also conceivable that normative learning as a concept may have less 
traction than anticipated, at least when it comes to policy appraisals among experts. 
Improving the measurement of learning is closely related to the second item on the 
research agenda: a better understanding of how the different facets of learning 
empirically relate to each other. In order to design better targeted interventions, we 
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need to understand the conditions under which different learning types reinforce or 
compete with each other. When it comes to unleashing the supposed creative 
potential of policy exercises for identifying new policy pathways, incrementalism will 
not do. We need a more fundamental game changer. Can policy exercises really live 
up to their most important function, and if so, under what circumstances? In many 
ways this represents the ‘holy grail’ of the profession, the aspect that is 
simultaneously most important and least advanced. In any case, and whatever the 
role that policy exercises can play in this, science is unequivocal in telling us that we 
need to make progress in environmental if we are to preserve our planet for future 
generations to enjoy.  
 
